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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS
MICHAEL ASHLEY STEIN†
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides a clear mandate that
disabled workers be provided with “reasonable” accommodations, but
does not meaningfully articulate the standards by which reasonableness
ought to be measured. Until now, neither courts nor commentators have
provided a systematic model for analyzing accommodation claims. This
Article articulates an initial law and economics framework for analyzing
disability-related accommodations. In doing so, it demonstrates how
accommodations span a cost continuum that can be divided into areas of
Wholly Efficient and Semi-Efficient Accommodations to be funded by
private employers, Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations where
the costs should be borne by the public fisc, and Wholly Inefficient
Accommodations that ought not be provided. It also delineates the
boundaries between each category, and explains why the entities designated
should bear the accommodation costs assigned to them. The analysis of
disability accommodations uses, questions, and at times goes beyond the
neoclassical economic model of the labor market, and also engages
arguments from the jurisprudence of social justice. By utilizing both these
fields, this Article stakes out a unique perspective on disability
accommodations, and provides an avenue for continued discussion and
debate over how disability accommodations ought to be measured.
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INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 requires
employers to provide “reasonable” accommodations to “qualified”
workers with disabilities.2 Yet, in spite of this very clear mandate to
provide reasonable accommodations, the statute leaves as a “great
unsettled question” the matter of what can or should be considered a
reasonable accommodation.3 Specifically, Title I delineates the
boundary between reasonable and unreasonable as an otherwise
undefined point at which a requested accommodation engenders an
“undue hardship” to the providing employer.4 In determining whether
a given disability-related accommodation is reasonable, interested
parties5 are advised to take into consideration the totality of an
employer’s circumstances. These include its size, location, economic
condition, and the number of people it employs.6 The ADA does not,
however, provide any further guidance as to how these considerations
ought to be weighted or balanced.
Not surprisingly, courts have failed to expressly utilize a
balancing approach that enunciates what values, if any, they assign to
these factors. Instead, federal judges usually rule as a matter of law on
whether particular ADA-requested accommodations were reasonable
without articulating how they reached those decisions.7 At the district
court level, this is mainly due to the prevalence of summary judgment
and other pretrial motions that are granted overwhelmingly in
defendants’ favor.8 Consequently, cases reaching the courts of appeals
predominantly focus on whether district court judges abused their
discretion in granting pre-jury dismissal motions, and do not engage
in de novo balancing tests of reasonability.9 This is true even for
Judges (nee Professors) Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, who in
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111–12,117 (2000).
2. Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
3. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). This prescient work is examined in greater detail
infra in Part II.B.1.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A) (defining “undue hardship” as “an action requiring
significant difficulty and expense”).
5. These parties can include a worker with a disability seeking an accommodation, an
employer considering the viability of its provision, or a court rendering a determination of
reasonability in the event that a conflict arises between the two.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(B).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.B.
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their academic roles are among the more august doyens of law and
economics scholarship. For although both Judges Posner and
Calabresi have opined that an assessment of an accommodation’s
reasonableness necessitates application of cost-benefit analysis,10
neither has enunciated how, in practical terms, such a standard should
be applied. Their analyses, however, do offer valuable insights into
some factors that a judge or policymaker might consider when
assessing accommodations through a cost-benefit framework.11
Moreover, very few empirical studies and almost no legal
scholarship exist regarding what in fact constitutes a reasonable ADA
accommodation. Professor Peter Blanck conducted the leading
empirical study of accommodation costs, which found the majority of
those studied reasonable,12 and has subsequently argued for this
phenomenon being typical of other employers. As for legal
scholarship, four theoretical estimations have been published that
provide some useful thoughts about determining the reasonableness
of Title I accommodations. First, Professors Pamela Karlan and
George Rutherglen raise the possibility of applying negligence
analysis to disability-related accommodations.13 Second, Professor
J.H. Verkerke argues that the ADA acts efficiently in matching
disabled workers with reasonably accommodated jobs appropriate to
their skill sets.14 Third, Professor Christine Jolls avers that the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation mandates act as a disincentive to
increasing employment among the disabled.15 Most significantly,
Professors Stewart Schwab and Steven Willborn offer a tort-like
proposal based on Judge Learned Hand’s classic BPL balancing test
for how employers might model their hiring preferences and thus
reasonably accommodate workers with disabilities.16 These scholars,
10. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.);
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.).
11. See infra Parts I.C.1–2.
12. Peter David Blanck, Communicating the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Transcending Compliance: 1996 Follow-up Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1996), at
http://www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/sears/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
13. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 31–32.
14. J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
15. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 276–77 (2000).
16. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1269 (2003). Judge Hand enunciated this standard
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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however insightful their work, nonetheless do not offer
comprehensive guidance on how a judge (or, in theory, a
policymaker) ought to go about balancing accommodation costs, and
who should bear those costs when assessing the reasonableness of
ADA accommodations.
By the same token, very little scholarship has looked beyond the
ADA’s boundaries (however they are fixed) to examine what types of
disability-related accommodations society, rather than employers,
ought to support, and why. Two recent articles provide some clues to
this dilemma in the course of arguing from within the ADA’s
precincts that employers ought to bear part of the responsibility of
helping people with disabilities avoid welfare dependence.17 Professor
Samuel Bagenstos maintains that a motivating factor of the Supreme
Court’s ADA decisions is the desire to keep people with disabilities
in the workplace rather than on welfare.18 This normative goal of
dependency avoidance, he argues, was likewise one of the prime
considerations that impelled the statute’s passage.19 Professor Amy
Wax advances this normative goal of independence by averring that
employer-provided workplace accommodations can improve overall
social utility so long as disabled workers are somewhat productive.20
Nevertheless, she believes that minimum wage and equal pay
legislation will ultimately prevent employers from hiring and
retaining those workers with disabilities, even though it is
economically beneficial to society as a whole to do so.21 The
arguments that Bagenstos and Wax make are extremely thought-
provoking on the general notion of avoiding dependency, as well as
useful in understanding some reasons why ADA accommodations are
viewed as desirable. At the same time, they do not adequately
delineate the reasons that society ought to provide disability-related
accommodations that are otherwise inefficient for private employers,
17. Along with the article by Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, these two articles are the
product of a symposium I had the pleasure of convening. See generally Symposium, Disability
and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 907 (2003).
18. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 921, 976–85 (2003).
19. Id. at 954.
20. See Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”: A Unified Approach,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2003) (analyzing “the cost-effectiveness of the ADA”).
21. Id. at 1424.
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or where the line should be drawn between private inefficiency and
public efficiency.22
Stepping into the breach left open by judges and commentators,
this Article will offer some suggestions on how to economically
conceptualize disability-related accommodation costs. It will then
suggest who should bear the costs for each of the possible
circumstances. I hope that in offering some thoughts on the matter
this Article will provoke further dialogue on this overlooked area of
legal analysis. When making my assessment of disability-related
accommodations both within and without the ADA’s provenance, I
will utilize, question, and at times go beyond the neoclassical
economic model of the labor market, as well as engage arguments
from the jurisprudence of social justice. By using both economic and
social justice arguments, this Article stakes out a unique perspective
on the ADA.
Part I sets forth what the ADA requires in the provision of
accommodations and describes the usual manner in which claims for
ADA accommodations are handled by federal courts. It then analyzes
two cases decided by Judges Posner and Calabresi, respectively, in
which neither engaged a detailed reasonable accommodation analysis,
but where each provided insight into some of the considerations that
could inform a cost-benefit analysis.
Part II reviews empirical work tending to show that
accommodation costs are either minimal, nonexistent, or even cost-
effective. It then sets forth pertinent analyses provided by Pamela
Karlan and George Rutherglen, J.H. Verkerke, and Christine Jolls.
Next, Part II details a proposal by Stewart Schwab and Steven
Willborn which suggests the application of the classic BPL balancing
standard for negligence liability to ADA accommodations, but also
leaves much unresolved. Last, Part II adumbrates articles by Samuel
Bagenstos and Amy Wax that, respectively, lay the groundwork for
reasoning that ADA-type accommodations can enhance social
welfare beyond the statute’s confines.
Part III begins by explaining the methodology employed in my
proposed law and economics framework for assessing disability-
22. Nor do they need to in order to achieve their goals, which they do admirably. I have
made two very preliminary attempts. See Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I,
85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1684 (2000) [hereinafter Stein, Empirical Implications]; Michael Ashley
Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 314, 325–28 (2000) [hereinafter Stein, Labor Markets].
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related accommodations. Operating primarily within the boundaries
of the neoclassical economic model of the labor market, I
nevertheless diverge from previous scholarship by challenging three
of the baseline presumptions adopted by scholars who have written
on the topic: (1) the belief that employers’ hiring and retention
practices relating to disabled workers are efficient; (2) the assumption
that disabled workers are less productive than their nondisabled
counterparts; and (3) the overall perception that the existing labor
market status quo is an equitable one. I thus go beyond the precincts
of typical neoclassical economic schemas. Finally, as a prelude to the
accommodation cost continuum presented in Part IV, Part III
describes the measuring variables that will be used in the framework,
respectively, willingness to pay, disabled profit, average profit, and
social benefit gain.
Part IV conceptualizes disability-related accommodation costs as
existing on a continuum. These expenses range from Wholly Efficient
Accommodations (some of which are provided voluntarily and others
which would be provided voluntarily barring a market failure), to
Socially Efficient Accommodations (including Semi-Efficient
Accommodations coerced through ADA litigation because they
extract a differential cost from employers, and Social Benefit Gain
Efficient Accommodations where individual workers and general
society benefit, but employers do not), to Wholly Inefficient
Accommodations (where the only economically feasible option is
exclusion of these workers from the labor market). In setting forth
the accommodation cost continuum, Part IV organizes thematically
the various disability-related accommodations into the following
categories: Pareto Optimal Accommodations, where the
accommodations are wholly efficient to employers; Kaldor-Hicks
Welfare Enhancement Accommodations, which include both Semi-
Efficient Accommodations and Social Benefit Gain Efficient
Accommodations; and Wholly Inefficient Mandates. At the same
time, Part IV also delineates who should bear the costs for each type
of these accommodations, and why. I conclude by canvassing areas
for future research as a means of facilitating what I hope will become
a rich and ongoing debate. An Appendix sets forth the value
assumptions used in Part IV’s proposed accommodation cost model.
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I.  THE ADA AND THE COURTS
The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable”
accommodations to “qualified” employees with disabilities.23 In so
doing, the statute defines reasonableness as something less than an
undue hardship, a figure calculated in the context of an employer’s
financial circumstances.24 Although application of this standard would
seem to mandate detailed factual analyses, Title I claims are routinely
dismissed on defendants’ motions before they reach a jury or other
factfinders, through the determination that accommodations are
unreasonable as a matter of law.25 Because courts of appeals do not
review these rulings de novo,26 the appellate courts have not provided
much guidance on the subject. Contrary to this trend, however, a pair
of opinions by Judges Posner and Calabresi provide insight on the
type of analyses that might be used when assessing ADA
accommodation claims.
A. ADA Accommodation Requirements
Title I of the ADA governs the conduct of “covered entit[ies],”
defined as private employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and joint labor-management committees.27 These
entities, which for the sake of convenient reference I will call
“employers,” are prohibited from discriminating against qualified
individuals with disabilities in all aspects of the employment
relationship.28
Congress defined a person with a disability29 as one who has “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(a) (2000).
24. Id. § 12,111(10)(B).
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(2).
28. Specifically, the hiring, promoting, firing, and “other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.” Id. § 12,112(a). Employers of fewer than twenty-five workers, federal
government or Native American-owned corporations, and private membership clubs are
excluded from coverage. Id. § 12,111(5)(B)(i)–(ii).
29. Congress adopted the definition of disability whole cloth from the Rehabilitation Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2000)), in
part as the result of a political compromise among cross-disability rights groups and groups who
represented people with specific disabilities. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability,
Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and
Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 85 (2002).
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the major life activities of such individual,”30 who has a history of such
impairment,31 or who is regarded as having one.32 The subject of who
is an individual with a disability, let alone a “qualified” individual
with a disability, has been the focus of much case law33 and legal
scholarship,34 and is likely to continue as a source of contention.35 For
now, it suffices to say that Supreme Court decisions require
disabilities to be significant ones,36 as measured in their mitigated
states,37 with any attendant limitations impairing a wide range of
functional activities.38
To be covered by the ADA, individuals with disabilities must
also be “qualified.” This means that only those individuals capable of
performing the essential job functions of the respective positions
sought, either with or without provision of reasonable
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A). See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited”
Protection From Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions
of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997) (maintaining that the definition of
disability is deleteriously misconstrued).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(B). Breast cancer survivor Patricia Garrett, the named plaintiff in
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), an employment
action precluded on sovereign immunity grounds, id. at 360, is one example. See generally Jane
Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 440–52 (2001)
(arguing for the construction of past and present incidents of cancer as a disability).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(C). See generally Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social
Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes”, 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002) (applying cognitive
psychology literature to describe how and why members of society, including employers and
judges, might consider a nondisabled person disabled).
33. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (“[T]he determination of
whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the
individual’s impairment . . . .”).
34. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 17 (collecting articles and notes analyzing the ADA).
35. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 445–84 (2000) (arguing that disability should be conceived as subordination resulting from
the stigmatization of an individual on the basis of a physical or mental impairment); Mark
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 877–91 (2001) (proposing
that norms are best enforced as group, rather than individual, protections because the larger
societal benefits stemming from the prevention of market discrimination relate to the
incorporation of those groups into the social and economic mainstream).
36. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483–89 (holding that severely myopic twins who were
precluded from positions as global airline pilots were not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA because their visual impairment was commonplace).
37. Id. In fact, one commentator gleans from Sutton a duty to reasonably mitigate one’s
own disability. Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act 18–42
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
38. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (“[T]o be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”).
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accommodations, are covered by the Act.39 Thus, a completely blind
applicant would not be qualified for a position as a truck driver,
where the essential job function is the ability to drive.40 She would,
however, be qualified for a position as a molecular biochemist, where
the essential job function of miscerating substances is either
achievable through the applicant’s own abilities, or through provision
of accommodation in the form of Braille or other coded indicators.41
Reasonable accommodations can encompass a wide range of
individualized adjustments to existing workplace conditions, but are
mainly conceptualized as falling into one or both of two categories.
The first category requires the alteration or provision of a physical
plant,42 such as ramping a stair to accommodate the needs of an
employee who uses a wheelchair. These type of accommodations
involve “hard” costs, meaning that they invoke readily quantifiable
out-of-pocket expenses.43 Purchasing and installing a ramp, for
example, is usually a one-time expenditure with a fixed and knowable
cost.
The second type of accommodation involves the alteration of the
way in which a job is performed.44 This might mean not requiring a
wheelchair-using store clerk to stack high shelves. These sort of
accommodations bring into play “soft” costs, which are more difficult
to quantify.45 This hypothetical employee might require a fellow
39. 42 U.S.C. §12,111(8) (2000).
40. Nonetheless, in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), the Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of a driver with monocular vision, whose driving competence was
not in question, on the ground that his functional method of seeing violated Department of
Transportation regulations. Id. at 567–78 (1999).
41. The nexus between these standards was described in the Senate report on the ADA as
follows:
If a person with a disability applies for a job and meets all selection criteria except
one that he or she cannot meet because of a disability, the criteria must concern an
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored to measure the
person’s actual ability to do an essential function of the job . . . . However, the criteria
may not be used to exclude an applicant with a disability if the criteria can be satisfied
by the applicant with a reasonable accommodation.
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 37–38 (1989).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(A) (requiring an employer to make “existing facilities used
by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”).
43. See Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1677 (noting that most ADA studies
focus on these “hard” costs).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(B) (allowing job restructuring or modification, variation in
existing methods of administration, and the provision of readers or interpreters).
45. See Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1677 (claiming that existing “studies
do not adequately appraise ‘soft’ costs, including nonphysical plant expenses [] such as educating
human resource personnel”).
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worker to stack the high shelves while she staffed the register. Her
circumstance might also necessitate that a human resource manager
meet with other employees to explain the change in their daily duties,
or that a supervisor be required to learn how to take these alterations
into consideration when evaluating overall job performance.
Two overlooked systemic points are worth noting. First,
disability-based accommodations, when required,46 can involve hard
costs, soft costs, or both.47 Second, because ADA Title III requires
that places of public accommodation be made readily accessible,48
some employment-related accommodation costs should be subsumed
by employers in their guise as owners or operators of those venues if
they are otherwise ADA-compliant.49 In this case, assuming that the
store did not fall within any Title III exception,50 the owner would
have been required to install an entry ramp as a reasonable
modification even without the presence of a disabled employee.51
Workplace accommodations become an undue hardship upon
employers when they require “significant difficulty or expense,”52 as
measured against the totality of an employer’s financial
46. Sometimes disability-based accommodations are not required. Just as with nondisabled
persons, people with disabilities vary in their productivity. In Part III.B.2, I discuss the
misperception among economic commentators that all disabled workers are inherently less
productive than their nondisabled counterparts. Nevertheless, as explained below, because this
Article addresses the reasonability of accommodations, I address this possibility parenthetically
and in footnotes.
47. See generally Stein, Empirical Implications,  supra note 22.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181–12,189.
49. However, barring suit, many venues are not readily accessible. For example, the
Empire State Building complied with the ADA’s regulations only after being targeted for
litigation by the Department of Justice. Lindsey Gruson, Getting to Top of Empire State:
Opening the Way for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at B3. The confluence of Titles I and
III is not a point that I have seen referenced in any scholarship assessing ADA
accommodations.
50. Most of the exceptions are predicated on size, although there are also exclusions for
historical buildings (when fundamentally altered), places of worship (unless a space that is
rented to the public is involved), as well as ecumenical defenses that undue burdens or direct
threats were created. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181–12,189.
51. Id. § 12,181. At the same time, the confluence between Title I and Title III access is
incomplete. Absent the presence of a disabled employee, employers are not under a duty to
make areas not open to the public accessible. So although the store owner might have to ramp
the entry, he would not have to make the storeroom accessible. The disparity is intended to
shield public accommodation owner/operators until such time that they become employers. See
generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413
(1991) (discussing some of the political compromises which facilitated the ADA’s passage).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A).
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circumstances.53 Beyond the actual cost of an accommodation,54
considerations include the following: “the overall financial
resources,” “size,” and “number of persons employed” at the
facility;55 “the effect on expenses and resources,” location, structure,
“and functions of the workforce”; as well as the general “impact” of
the accommodation.56 More concretely, these factors could include
the actual cost of the ramp, the amount of store space lost to the
ramp, the profitability of the store, the number of employees, and the
job modification’s impact on the store’s day-to-day operation. If the
store was part of a larger organization, an assessment of
reasonableness could also take into account the store’s other
locations, and whether it made sense to have the wheelchair-using
employee work full time at another location (for example, one with
lower shelves or an abundance of clerks to stack the higher ones), or
alternate between locations (while operating the register or meeting
customers at each).
Thus, the ADA provides a large number of factors to be
considered when assessing the reasonableness of any given
accommodation. At the same time, however, the law fails to offer
substantial guidance as to how an employee, employer, judge, or
policymaker ought to balance those factors beyond the proviso that
an accommodation is reasonable until it engenders an undue
hardship.57
B. The Usual Course of ADA Accommodation Litigation
As a result of the requirement that disabled individuals be
“qualified” to receive protection,58 ADA claimants have the burden
of pleading prima facie cases of discrimination to survive defendants’
summary judgment motions and proceed to trial.59 This procedural
53. Id. § 12,111(10)(B).
54. Id. § 12,111(10)(B)(i).
55. Id. § 12,111(10)(B)(ii)–(iv).
56. Id.
57. Accordingly, there is truth to Justice O’Connor’s extrajudicial statement that the
central difficulty with the scope of ADA coverage is the “uncertainties as to what Congress had
in mind,” Charles Lane, O’Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, Mar.
15, 2002, at A2, although not for the reasons she proffered.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8).
59. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a
prima facie case of discrimination requires that a plaintiff establish that her physical impairment
“substantially limit[ed] one or more . . . major life activit[y]”); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he requirement of only a minimal prima facie showing strips the
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device authorizes federal trial judges to dismiss cases only when there
exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact.”60 However, following
the Supreme Court’s Celotex trilogy,61 some commentators have
argued that it is improper to grant summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases,62 a proposition with which some courts agree.63
Although the Supreme Court held in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green64 that the burden of persuasion required for Title VII65
plaintiffs to survive motions for dismissal is minimal,66 in actual
practice the parallel burden appears higher for Title I plaintiffs.67 This
is so despite language in the ADA indicating that Congress defined
discrimination as, among other causes,68 the denial of reasonable
accommodations69 in order “to provide clear, strong, consistent,
defendant of the ability to remain silent as to its motive while recognizing the plaintiff’s ultimate
obligation to prove that motive’s illegality.”). The same is true for those proceeding under the
Rehabilitation Act. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir.
1981) (“The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he was an otherwise
qualified handicapped person apart from his handicap, and was rejected under circumstances
which gave rise to the inference that his rejection was based solely on his handicap.”).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In deciding whether to grant motions for summary judgment, it is
axiomatic that courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 458–65 (3d ed. 1999).
61. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 477 U.S. 574 (1986).
62. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2234–35 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 203–06
(1993). For a general indictment of the device, see Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 118–19 (1990) (exploring the
deleterious effects of summary judgment on the litigation process, its pro-defendant bias, and
the possibility of its abuse by defendants).
63. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in an ADEA case that, “[a]s a general rule,
summary judgment is not a proper vehicle for resolving claims of employment discrimination.”
Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 644 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Lynn v.
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998) (chastising the district court on the
ground that “summary judgment should seldom be used in discrimination cases”).
64. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–2000(e)17 (2000).
66. Id.
67. The characterization is premised on the statistical evidence presented below, infra
notes 74–78. The qualification reflects the absence of a Supreme Court ruling on point. See
generally Lucinda A. Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in the ADA Employment Case
(Part 1), 24 COLO. LAW. 1301 (1995); Lucinda A. Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in
the ADA Employment Case (Part 2), 24 COLO. LAW. 1785 (1995).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(1)–(7) (2000).
69. Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
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enforceable standards addressing” disability-related discrimination.70
This practice also contravenes circumstances which appear from a
common sense perspective to necessitate just the type of factual
inquiry that should defeat motions for summary judgment, namely a
determination by a jury based upon the set of facts presented by the
opposing parties.71 Additionally, this practice oftentimes prevents the
type of functional inquiry that appears to be envisioned by the
statute.72
At least partly in consequence of district courts’ procedural
practice of granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment and
other pre-jury dismissal devices,73 an American Bar Association
report found that employers prevailed in more than 92 percent of
Title I cases between 1992 and 1997,74 a rate only exceeded by
defendants in prisoners’ rights claims.75 A primary result of this
propensity to use summary judgment and other procedural devices is
that federal district courts avoid applying the factors enumerated by
the ADA when assessing the reasonableness of accommodations:
when issuing rulings the typical memorandum, often unpublished,
70. Id. § 12,101(b)(2).
71. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 60, at 458–65.
72. Id.
73. There is likely to be more going on here than “only” the judiciary’s alleged aversion to
Title I cases. The inquiry is especially pertinent to the quasi-voluntary portion of the
accommodation cost continuum, see infra Part IV.A.2, wherein the ADA is intended to act as a
corrective to cognitive market failure, but empirically does not.
74. Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints,
22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998). A subsequent study of 1998
outcomes indicates that the employers’ win rate increased to 93 percent. Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100
(1999). The empirical study by Colker substantiates these findings, but with greater nuance,
concluding that a large measure of plaintiff losses under the ADA are because “[c]ourts are
abusing the summary judgment device” by “refusing to send normative factual questions” to
juries. Id. at 101. This is especially true, she avers, of the presumably factual question of whether
a given accommodation was reasonable. Id. at 101–02; cf. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R.
Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment
Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV.
LITIG. 505, 508–10 (2000) (arguing, based on empirical studies, that Title I claimants would fare
dramatically better if their claims reached a jury). For a follow-up study on jurors’ positive
sensitivity to ADA claims, see Daniel R. Gallipeau, Juror Perceptions and the ADA, in ALI-
ABA, 2 ADVANCED EMP. LAW. & LITIG. 485, 488 (2000).
75. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (setting forth data establishing the low success
rate of prisoner plaintiffs in civil rights litigation).
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grants the moving party’s motion (usually, the defendant’s)76 and
tersely dismisses the case.77 In turn, the cases brought to the courts of
appeals primarily focus on the propriety of the district court judges’
grants of summary judgment and similar dismissive motions.78
Because the standard of appellate review of these orders is abuse of
discretion, the determination of which is predicated upon the
established trial court record, appellate court judges do not engage de
novo in tests of reasonability.79 Therefore, the initial aversion of
district court judges to articulate, quantitatively, the grounds for their
decisions continues as the litigation ascends the procedural ladder.80
Thus, what differentiates disability claims in degree (rather than in
kind) from, say, negligence claims, is that while each applies a
balancing test to individual circumstances to assess alleged liability,81
the incidence of pre-jury dismissals in the former has helped preclude
the development of predictive standards.82
A good illustration of this phenomenon may be seen in the
procedural history and rulings underlying the Supreme Court’s
decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.83 After injuring his back
handling baggage for U.S. Airways, Robert Barnett transferred to a
then-vacant, less physically strenuous position in the airline’s
mailroom.84 When that position opened up to bidding under the
airline’s seniority-based system, it became apparent that employees
senior to Barnett would seek the position.85 Accordingly, Barnett
76. But see, e.g., EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., No. 1-95-CV-446, 1996 WL 604984, at *2–4
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1996), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to defendant’s liability for disability discrimination
for conditioning his continued employment upon an HIV examination).
77. Colker, supra note 74, at 119–25.
78. Id. at 108. Between 1992 and 1997, for instance, 87 percent of all Title I decisions
appealed were from pro-defendant dismissals or grants of summary judgment.
79. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595–98 (1986).
80. To be fair, this method of adjudication is not unique to disability discrimination claims,
and is in fact the result of a standard convention for clearing cases from the trial calendar on
motions days. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 631–39; Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial
Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 202 (1961).
81. The negligence standard, and its potential analogue for accommodation claims, is
discussed infra in Part II.B.2.
82. A basic tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is the creation of predictable standards
so that future litigants can have a sense of their respective rights and duties. 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 442–43 (1971) (1826).
83. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
84. Id. at 394.
85. Id.
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requested permanent assignment to the mailroom as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.86 U.S. Airways refused to so
reassign Barnett (presumably on the grounds of undue hardship), and
Barnett lost his job.87 He subsequently sued the airline alleging
disability-based discrimination for failure to reasonably accommodate
his disability.88
The district court granted U.S. Airways’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that “the uncontroverted evidence shows
that the U.S. Airways seniority system has been in place for
‘decades,’” hence “any significant alteration of that policy would
result in undue hardship.”89 In making this ruling, the trial judge made
no representation that he had given any weight to the factors
enumerated in the ADA for assessing the reasonableness of
accommodations. A non-exhaustive list of considerations that he
could have weighed, several of which were presented in evidence, are
the following: the airline’s financial resources; the out-of-pocket cost,
if any, of the accommodation; the number of the airline’s employees,
including those affected by the seniority system; the relative
geographical location of the airline’s employees; the situs, number,
and functions of U.S. Airways’s mailrooms; the actual impact,
financial and otherwise, of Barnett’s jumping the seniority queue; and
the likelihood of other employees requesting similar
accommodations. Instead of weighting these considerations, the trial
judge opined that even had he accepted arguendo Barnett’s
contention that the ADA required a “case-by-case approach,” he
would still have issued the same ruling.90 According to the court, this
was because a seniority system was “fundamental,” and so any
alteration to it would inherently prove an undue hardship.91 The
district court also ruled that the requested accommodation would
constitute an undue hardship upon U.S. Airways’s “non-disabled
employees,”92 but did not explain why this was so.93
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 394–95.
89. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, No. C-94-3874, (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1996), reprinted in
App. to Pet. for Cert., at 96a (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. One plausible explanation for the court’s ruling is that it believed that allowing disabled
employees to jump the seniority queue would raise the airline’s labor costs. This would be true,
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the ground that violating U.S. Airways’s “legitimate
seniority policy” was per se unreasonable.94 Like the district court that
preceded it, the appellate panel did not explain why altering the
seniority system in this individual circumstance was unreasonable. At
the same time, the court noted that the case was one of first
impression, and hence one that offered the opportunity to delineate
an area of law.95 Sitting en banc, a panel of the Ninth Circuit96 vacated
the initial appellate panel decision97 and reversed the district court,
holding that the seniority system was only one “factor in the undue
hardship analysis.”98 It held, moreover, that “[a] case-by-case fact
intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular
reassignment would constitute an undue hardship to the employer.”99
Such an assessment could, presumably, require trial courts to balance
the factors required in the ADA, although the Ninth Circuit did not
explicitly call for this appraisal.100
Once before the Supreme Court, the issue of whether the
specifically requested accommodation was reasonable became
for instance, if nondisabled workers would in turn demand higher wages to offset diminution in
seniority rights. For a discussion of “sunken labor costs” in this context, see Seth D. Harris, Re-
Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: US Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the
Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). Such reasoning could also explain why the court considered the
interests of the nonjoined third party employees to be relevant. This last point is not strictly
parenthetical. From a purely economic perspective, the interests of certain third parties could be
construed as valid externalities to be considered in an efficiency calculus. Whether any of the
above motivated the court is only a matter of conjecture in the absence of an articulated reason.
94. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 228 F.3d
1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 988.
96. Employing a panel, rather than the entire court, is a practice unique to the numerically
large and geographically dispersed Ninth Circuit, whereas the other circuits require that all
sitting judges participate. See generally RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990);
Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000).
97. This is the usual procedural course, the theory being that the larger constituted tribunal
then “speaks” for the entire circuit. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 805 (1993). For a novel proposal that a rotating en banc court be empanelled so as to
ensure uniform as well as apolitical decisions, see Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1618–22 (2000).
98. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000).
99. Id.
100. Id.
011204 STEIN.DOC 01/30/04  9:04 AM
96 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:79
tangential,101 with the Court ruling as a matter of law that a requested
accommodation that conflicts with a seniority system is ordinarily
unreasonable.102 At the same time, the Court also held that an
employee could endeavor to show special circumstances where it
might be reasonable to make an exception to an established seniority
system, thus compelling his employer to grant an accommodation (in
Barnett, reassignment).103 Even so, the Court’s ruling begs the very
question of what factors might come into consideration and how they
are to be weighted by a court when taking into account the
reasonableness of an accommodation.104
Two points are worth emphasizing at this juncture. First, owing
at least in part to the incidence of summary judgment and other
pretrial procedural devices, neither federal trial court nor appellate
court judges have engaged in the type of systematic balancing analysis
provided by the ADA and encouraged in this Article.105 Second, in the
two cases discussed in the next Section, the respective appellate
courts adopted opposing views as to whether the Title I claimants
should have survived motions for summary judgment.106 Hence, the
federal courts have not provided predictive guidance on how to
construe the reasonableness of ADA-required accommodations.
C. Judges (nee Professors) Posner and Calabresi
A pair of opinions by Judges Posner and Calabresi, respectively,
held that a proper assessment of what is a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA (or the Rehabilitation Act, whose provisions, as well
as jurisprudence, were adopted by the ADA) requires a cost-benefit
analysis. Although neither applied such a test quantitatively, their
opinions limn some of the issues to be considered when making such
assessments. These insights are especially useful coming from
101. This is surprising because certiorari was granted on this very question. Br. for Pet’r at i,
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250).
102. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002).
103. Id. at 406.
104. The ruling, contrary to the assertions of some disability rights advocates, also
“indicate[s] that the Court would consider some accommodations reasonable, even if the
Justices are currently unwilling to elaborate upon the actual standard in either their rulings or
dicta.” Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 607, 629 (2002).
105. See infra Part IV.
106. See infra Parts I.C.1–2.
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individuals who are not only judges, but also venerable law and
economics scholars.
1. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration.
Lori Vande Zande, a paraplegic wheelchair user, was employed by
the State of Wisconsin as a program assistant in the housing division
of the Department of Administration (DOA).107 Her duties covered a
range of tasks, including compiling fact sheets, administratively
assisting the director of the department, and, ironically, working on
disability-related issues.108 Her responsibilities were apportioned
flexibly, depending on work availability.109
Early in Vande Zande’s tenure, the DOA twice moved to
facilities that were not generally accessible to physically disabled
persons. Both times, the DOA modified some of the plant,110 and
provided accommodations specifically for Vande Zande.111 Although
DOA continued to seek Vande Zande’s input on a number of
accommodations issues,112 an intractable sticking point was the design
of a kitchenette with a thirty-six-inch high counter that was too high
for Vande Zande to use.113 Ultimately, the DOA installed a thirty-
four-inch high counter across the hall near the accessible bathroom,
because rebuilding the kitchenette would have cost as much as
$2,000.114
Another issue of contention was Vande Zande’s requests to
work at home, stemming from her development of pressure ulcers, an
107. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353, 355 (W.D. Wis. 1994), aff’d, 44
F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
108. Id. at 355.
109. Id. However, Vande Zande was not permitted, for reasons unexplained in the opinion,
to devote more than 5 percent of her time to disability-based issues. Id.
110. These accommodations included retrofitting a women’s bathroom, installing a ramp
into the office, relocating and redesigning the women’s locker room, providing a smaller
conference room table, installing a full-length mirror in the bathroom, mounting paddle handles
on one sink, and placing a grab bar on a cot. Id. at 356–57.
111. These accommodations included providing her with a door on her office so that she
could telephone her physician in privacy, purchasing customized furniture, and altering its
policy on photocopier use. Id. at 355–56.
112. One facilities designer spent more than sixty hours discussing and researching building
design with Vande Zande; a second consulted with her fifteen times on her personal office
furniture. Id. at 356.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 357.
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ailment common to paraplegics.115 On three occasions, Vande Zande’s
doctor recommended that she remain at home for four to six weeks to
allow the ulcers to be open to the air.116 After the first request, Vande
Zande was allowed by the DOA to work at home.117 On the second
occasion, Vande Zande’s supervisor stated that he did not believe
there was sufficient work to occupy her full time at home.118 On the
third occasion, her manager again determined that “he could not
foresee” having that type and quantity of work that could be
performed from Vande Zande’s home.119 Vande Zande responded
with a written request for reasonable accommodation in the form of
work-at-home.120 For the next eight weeks, Vande Zande worked at
home full time and was paid full time wages by the DOA for all but
sixteen and one-half hours, during which she used paid sick leave.121
About midway during this interval, Vande Zande informed her
supervisor that she could perform a wider range of activities if, in lieu
of the laptop computer previously provided, the DOA would issue
her a desktop computer and laser printer.122 The DOA refused
because of the expense involved.123 Soon thereafter, Vande Zande
transferred to the Department of Social Services and initiated suit
against the DOA and her immediate supervisors under both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate her
disability.124 Specifically, she contended that the refusal to modify the
115. See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1903 (27th ed. 2000) (describing
symptoms and diagnosis of decubitis ulcers).
116. Vande Zande, 851 F. Supp. at 357.
117. Id.
118. Id. The inference is that Vande Zande continued to work at the office, but the opinion
is vague on this point.
119. Id. at 358.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 359. Parenthetically, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Congress did not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity in enacting Title I of the ADA as it applied to states in their role as
employers. Id. at 360. Hence, Vande Zande could not now bring this suit in federal court unless
the state waived its sovereign immunity. Furthermore, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999),
appears to erect a substantial barrier to redress in state court. See id. at 712 (“[T]he powers
delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the
power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts.”). Some
exceptions to this general prohibition may exist, but those appear to rely on peculiarities of state
law. See Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. and Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945,
952 (7th Cir. 2000) (ruling on the same issue, Judge Easterbrook included state courts in the list
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kitchenette and to permit work at home constituted unfounded
denials of reasonable accommodation requests, and thus comprised
disability-related discrimination.125
In an opinion laudable for its inclusion of detail, but
representative of other decisions in avoiding an empirical weighting
of relevant factors, Chief Judge Crabb granted the DOA’s motion for
summary judgment.126 In pertinent part, she found that the DOA’s
failure to make the entire kitchenette accessible did not violate the
ADA as a matter of law because Vande Zande had complete use of
the facility with the exception of the kitchen sink, and because a sink
was readily available in the accessible restroom.127 Judge Crabb also
held, as a matter of law, that the DOA had reasonably
accommodated Vande Zande even if the “accommodation fell short
of perfection” in not covering two days’ work over an eight-week
period.128 In so ruling, the court elucidated and analyzed the
competing legal arguments made by the parties (namely, whether the
accommodation claims were reasonable), but did not empirically
evaluate the evidence presented in light of the standard mandated by
the ADA.129
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in a unanimous
opinion by Chief Judge Posner.130 Noting that the concept of what
constituted a reasonable accommodation was “at the heart of this
case,”131 Judge Posner set out to define the term. For Posner, the
meaning of “accommodation” was evident: an alteration to the
workplace that enabled an employee with a disability to work. It was
of other possible avenues for plaintiffs seeking such relief because of Illinois’s approach to
sovereign immunity waiver and Illinois state law).
125. Vande Zande, 851 F. Supp. at 360–61. She also contended that the state had engaged in
a pattern or practice of disability-based discrimination by failing to accommodate her, and that
the state had discriminated against her in its hiring and promotion policies. Id. at 354. The
former is not relevant to the discussion of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation; the
latter was voluntarily abandoned. Id.
126. Id. at 363.
127. Id. at 361–62.
128. Id. at 360–61.
129. Id. The Chief Judge’s opinion was nonetheless considerably more detailed and
informative than the vast majority of its analogues.
130. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995). Joining the
Chief Judge were Judge Engel, sitting by designation from the Sixth Circuit, and Judge
Easterbrook, who five years later wrote the opinion in Erickson v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000),
shielding state entities from Title I suits on the ground of sovereign immunity. Id. at 951.
131. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543.
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the term “reasonable” that caused difficulties.132 Vande Zande
maintained that the term “mean[t] apt or efficacious” in reference to
her particular disability, but not in reference to any absolute cost.133
Although accommodations must be efficacious (they would otherwise
not be accommodations), Judge Posner opined that the remainder of
Vande Zande’s definition could not be correct.134 Its application, in his
view, would require Wisconsin to expend unlimited resources (even
to the extent of raising taxes) for what might be “a trivial
improvement.”135
Instead, drawing an analogy to the law of negligence, Judge
Posner held that the term “reasonable requires something less than
the maximum possible care,”136 unless it becomes an undue burden “in
relation to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker
as well as to the employer’s resources.”137 Nor was it necessary to
quantify an undue hardship ceiling on such costs. So long as the cost
was proportionate, it could, in theory, be one which “exceeded the
benefit however slightly.”138 Turning to the two issues on appeal, the
court held that the request to wholly reconstruct a kitchenette was
not reasonable because the impact upon Vande Zande’s work was
trivial.139 As for Vande Zande’s request to work at home, the DOA
had already far exceeded any ADA accommodation requirement.
Placing the DOA under any further obligation would punish the state
“for its generosity” and ultimately “hurt rather than help disabled
workers.”140
Thus, by requiring a workplace alteration to be expedient and
proportionate to the benefits conferred, even if the cost slightly
exceeds the benefits, Judge Posner’s opinion offers insight as to what
132. Id. at 542.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 542–43.
136. Id. at 542. This negligence analogy was taken up by Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note
3, at 31–32, and further developed by Schwab and Willborn, supra note 16, at 1269. See
discussion infra Parts II.B.1–2.
137. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543.
138. Id. at 542.
139. Id. at 545–46.
140. Id. at 545. Although it was not explained in Judge Posner’s opinion how this might
happen, one effect he might have had in mind was creating a deterrent against hiring future
workers with disabilities. This is one of the possibilities that Verkerke explores. See supra note
14, at 921–23. Jolls explores the even wider implication that the very existence of the ADA,
even absent actual accommodations, likewise creates such deterrence. See supra note 15, at 280.
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constitutes a reasonable accommodation. At the same time, he did
not indicate where those lines ought to be drawn.
2. Borkowski v. Valley Central School District. In Borkowski v.
Valley Central School District,141 a public school teacher with a
disability who had been denied tenure sued the school district under
the Rehabilitation Act.142 As a result of a motor vehicle accident prior
to her employment, Kathleen Borkowski suffered serious
neurological damage that limited her memory, concentration,
balance, and mobility.143 She discussed these impairments with school
district officials when interviewing for a library teacher position.144
Borkowski was appointed to a routine three-year probationary
position and assigned to two elementary schools within the district.
Her duties also included teaching library skills.145 During the
provisional period, Borkowski’s performance was regularly evaluated
by three of the district’s personnel, one of whom reported positively.
Conversely, one negative assessment concluded that Borkowski had
trouble controlling her class and that she sat during the lesson.146
Having reached the end of her probationary term without the grant of
tenure, Borkowski resigned.147 She initiated suit to challenge the
district’s decision.148 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, and Borkowski appealed.149
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment on
the ground that material issues of fact remained unresolved, and
remanded the case back to the district court.150 Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Calabresi151 rhetorically asked much the same
question as had Judge Posner: “[W]hat is a reasonable
accommodation, and what is an undue hardship?”152 He agreed with
141. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court opinion was unpublished, hence all
citations are to the Second Circuit’s decision.
142. Id. at 135.
143. Id. at 134.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 135.
149. Id. at 134.
150. Id. No subsequent decision is reported.
151. He was joined in the decision by Judge Walker and by Chief Judge Newman, who also
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 144.
152. Id. at 136.
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Judge Posner that the term “reasonable” was a relational one that
“evaluates the desirability of a particular accommodation according
to the consequences” it will engender, both as to benefits and to
costs.153 It was thus reasonable “only if its costs are not clearly
disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce.”154 Moreover, the
concept of undue hardship was likewise a relational term that “looks
not merely to the costs that the employer is asked to assume, but also
to the benefits to others that will result.”155 Consequently, employers
are required “to perform a cost/benefit analysis.”156 It was not clear
what the essential job functions of Borkowski’s position were,157
whether the provision of a reasonable accommodation (for example,
a teacher’s aide) would have assisted her performance of those
duties,158 and whether she was denied tenure solely due to her
disability.159 In addition to these three unresolved factual issues, the
district had not presented any evidence as to undue hardship.160 As a
result, Judge Calabresi held that the grant of summary judgment was
premature.161
Judge Calabresi’s opinion in Borkowski corroborates the opinion
of Judge Posner in Vande Zande. Both opinions agree as to the
necessity of engaging in a cost-benefit analysis regarding the
reasonableness of a given accommodation, and about some of the
boundaries that could be applied. However, like Judge Posner, Judge
Calabresi did not apply those standards empirically to the case at
issue. The next Part evaluates existing empirical data and academic
analysis of the costs of disability-related accommodations.
II.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND ACADEMIC THEORIES
Empirical studies of accommodation costs suggest that many of
the engendered expenses are either nominal, or even cost-effective,
because of the concomitant external benefits that are captured by
providing employers. The results of these studies are, however,
153. Id. at 138.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 139.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 140.
158. Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 143.
160. Id. at 142.
161. Id. at 143. As an initial matter, the Second Circuit acknowledged that Borkowski might
not be able to prove her assertions, but remanded the case for further factual inquiry. Id. at 134.
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qualified by their flaws. Theoretical analyses of disability
accommodations by legal academics offer some insight on
accommodations, especially as to how an ADA balancing test could
parallel that of negligence actions. At the same time, these treatments
do not fully address how to ascertain the reasonableness of
accommodations.
A. Accommodation Studies
Very few empirical studies have examined what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation. This is especially surprising in view of the
established field of employment antidiscrimination laws that regularly
receive analytical attention, the ability to extend existing research
models to the ADA, and the sizable number of people that Title I
affects. However, the analyses that have been conducted suggest that
the quantifiable costs of accommodation are negligible. These studies
also raise the possibility of external benefits to employers that might
make the provision of accommodations cost-effective, and even
profitable. The studies are not without flaw, and so their findings
should be treated with caution.
1. Quantifiable Costs. The leading empirical study of
accommodation costs, conducted by Professor Peter Blanck,
concluded that many of these expenses were recurrently nonexistent
or minimal.162 Specifically, Blanck’s examination of some 500
accommodations made by Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1997
established that the company provided nearly all of the
accommodations at minimal cost. From 1978 to 1992, the average out-
of-pocket expense for an accommodation was about $120.163 From
1993 to 1996 that average dropped to $45.164 Overall, 72 percent of
accommodations required no cost, 17 percent carried an expenditure
of less than $100, one-tenth cost less than $500, and only 1 percent
162. Blanck and his colleagues from The Law, Health Policy, and Disability Center at the
University of Iowa continue to study the costs of accommodation, especially as these interact
with corporate cultures. Most of their results are available at http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/
lhpdc/civilrights/ada.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
163. Blanck, supra note 12, at 19.
164. Id.
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required inputs of between $500 and $1,000.165 A handful of other
surveys have borne similar results.166
2. External Benefits. Some studies go even further than the
results reported by Blanck, suggesting that employers capture
tangible benefits when they provide accommodations. Essentially,
these studies argue that the provision of accommodations are often
profitable for employers. One federal agency, for example, found
that, on average, for every dollar spent on accommodation,
companies saved $50 in net benefits.167 Thus, although more than
one-half of accommodations cost less than $500, in two-thirds of
those cases companies enjoyed net benefits exceeding $5000.168 This
is based on quantitative evidence finding that disabled workers
receiving accommodations had lower job turnover rates169 and
165. Id.
166. For example, the Job Accommodation Network reported to Congress that the typical
accommodation cost was $200. President’s Committee on the Employment of People with
Disabilities, Report to Congress on the Job Accommodation Network (July 26, 1995) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter President’s Committee]; see also Peter David Blanck,
The Emerging Role of the Staffing Industry in the Employment of Persons with Disabilities: A
Case Report on Manpower Inc. 29 (1998), at http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/publications/
documents/blancketaldocs/Manpower_report.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(reporting that accommodation costs were “minimal”); Rita Thomas Noel, Employing the
Disabled: A How and Why Approach, 44 TRAINING & DEV. J., Aug. 1990, at 26, 31 (reporting
that over 80 percent of accommodations cost less than $500).
167. See President’s Committee, supra note 166.
168. Id.; see also James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health Histories of
Current Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN.
83, 86 (1993) (describing how one company saved $4 million annually and another $310,000
annually by providing necessary accommodations).
169. Blanck reports that 60 percent of workers with disabilities remained in their jobs, as
opposed to 40 percent of able-bodied ones. Moreover, the cost of each job turnover averaged
$2,800. Blanck, supra note 12, at 29.
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equivalent or lower absenteeism rates,170 thus saving their
employers replacement expenses.171
In addition to more readily calculable benefits, Blanck has also
described “ripple effects” emanating from the provision of
accommodations,172 including economic benefits that may be difficult
to quantify initially, but which are eventually internalized by
employers. Among these desirable consequences are purported
higher productivity,173 greater dedication,174 and better identification
of qualified candidates for promotion.175 Employers may also enjoy
fewer insurance claims, reduced post-injury rehabilitation costs,176 an
improved corporate culture,177 and more widespread use by workers
170. See Gretchen Adams-Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Janitorial
Workers with Mental Retardation and Their Non-Disabled Peers on Retention and Absenteeism, J.
REHABILITATION, July–Sept. 1996, at 56, 59 (finding no statistically significant difference in rates of
absenteeism between janitorial workers with mental retardation and their nondisabled peers); Rick A.
Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEV. J., Aug.
1987, at 50, 51 (“[H]andicapped workers have lower absenteeism . . . than nonhandicapped people.”);
J.E. Martin et al., Work Attendance in Competitive Employment: Comparison Between Employees Who
Are Non-Handicapped and Those Who Are Mentally Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142, 145
(1985) (“[A]ttendance records of . . . workers who are mentally retarded are at least as good as [those
of] their nonhandicapped peers.”); Dolores Ondusko, Comparison of Employees with Disabilities and
Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, J. APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING, Summer
1991, at 19, 22–23 (“There was no indication that the number of absences is different between able-
bodied employees and . . . employees with disabilities.”).
171. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 378 (1997)
(arguing that these positive benefits of employing disabled workers are widespread).
172. BLANCK, supra note 12, at 29.
173. Patricia M. Owens, Editorial, Manager’s Journal: Employee Disabilities Needn’t Impair
Profits, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22 (“Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do
attitude for employees with impairments is good for profits and productivity.”).
174. See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, Work & Careers: On the Job with More Help from New
Technology, More Disabled Join the Work Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at C5 (quoting
EarthLink’s vice president: “What you find are employees who probably are more focused and
more dedicated to doing quality work.”).
175. See Thomas W. Hale et al., Persons with Disabilities: Labor Market Activity, 1994,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1998, at 3, 3 (relating that the disabled are less likely to work in
high paying positions relative to the nondisabled).
176. Blanck, supra note 12, at 26–27.
177. See id. at 8 (quoting Sears Chairman and CEO: “When Sears hires, works with, and
accommodates qualified employees with disabilities, Sears enhances its . . . employee morale”).
For fun, compare the account of corporate culture in HARVEY MACKAY, SWIM WITH THE
SHARKS WITHOUT BEING EATEN ALIVE: OUTSELL, OUTMANAGE, OUTMOTIVATE, &
OUTNEGOTIATE YOUR COMPETITION (1988), with SCOTT ADAMS, DILBERT AND THE WAY OF
THE WEASEL (2002).
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without disabilities of efficiency-enhancing technologies previously
utilized exclusively by their peers with disabilities.178
Beyond these ripple effects, accommodations may also result in
“positive externalities,” which may (eventually) in turn benefit
employers, but that are even more difficult to quantify. One such
externality is public cost savings,179 including the reduction of
disability-related public assistance obligations, which is currently
estimated at $120 billion annually.180 Although studies show that
hiring people with disabilities can lower taxpayers’ general burdens181
and benefit the national economy,182 the specific effects upon
individual employers as taxpayers remain unclear.
More attenuated as far as their impact (if any) upon individual
employers, as well as being increasingly difficult to quantify, are the
benefits to society that can issue from employing disabled workers.183
These benefits can include placing people with disabilities in a
position to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship,184
178. For instance, the nonvisually impaired employees of a large insurance company
assimilated voice-recognition technology originally provided as an accommodation. See Heidi
M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II:
Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9,
85–89 (1998) (discussing faults of cost-benefit paradigms in determining whether employers
suffer undue hardship and explaining the “ripple effect”).
179. These, however, are directly to the public, and not to employers. Conceivably, though,
the savings eventually inure to firms in the form of lower taxes, including those accommodations
intended to support workman’s compensation, disability insurance, and support programs.
180. DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING DISABILITY POLICY 1 (Inst. of Indus. Relations,
Working Paper No. 65, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). One report estimated that
for every one million disabled people employed, “there would be as much as a $21.2 billion
annual increase in earned income; a $1.2 billion annual decrease in means-tested cash income
payments; a $286 million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8 billion decrease in
Supplemental Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and 166,000
fewer people using Medicare.” See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can
Do, H.R. MAGAZINE, June 1998, at 140, 144 (citing Rutgers University economist Douglas
Kruse).
181. See, e.g., Taxpayer Return Study California Department of Rehabilitation Mental
Health Cooperative Programs (Oct. 1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding that for
every disabled person employed, California taxpayers saved an average of $629 per month in
costs); The JWOD Program: Providing Cost Savings to the Federal Government by Employing
People with Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (listing survey
results and reporting that the federal government saved $1,963,206 over the course of the study
by employing 270 people with disabilities).
182. See generally Thomas N. Chirikos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the
United States: A Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q., Supp. 2, at 59 (1989).
183. Admittedly, I am unsure if these benefits are possible to quantify.
184. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63–101
(1991) (exploring the connection between work and citizenship in a democracy); Vicki Schultz,
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acknowledging that capable individuals have either a “right” or an
imperative to work,185 permitting the disabled to achieve dignity
through labor and productivity,186 and realizing the values of a diverse
society.187 The value of these gains, as well as what any of them are
worth to individual employers, is not necessarily negligible, even if it
is unclear. The expenses extracted for achieving these benefits
therefore must be evaluated closely when determining whether to
place such costs upon employers, as opposed to spreading the costs
among the public through taxes or other state-governed devices.188
Nevertheless, individual employers arguably benefit from a
collective climate in which citizens value the identities they achieve
from being productive more than they value the relief of being excused
from productivity. How and when to allocate the costs of maintaining a
culture of productivity raises a host of issues, including criticisms of
those law and economics studies utilizing wealth as a value,189 the
continuing commodification debate,190 questions about the perspective
Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886 (2000) (noting the importance of work as
“constitutive of citizenship”).
185. See Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 262, 264
(1992) (arguing for a morally- and economically-based right to work for disabled citizens).
186. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 129 (1998) (“Work
contributes to self-esteem by conferring a sense of mastery over the environment and
reaffirming to the worker that he or she is making a contribution to society.”).
187. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000) (arguing for the workplace as a “vehicle of civic engagement”).
188. The impact of dignitary benefits exceeds the scope of this Article.
189. The critiques were heralded by several professors. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95, 111–22 (1988) (critiquing the adoption of wealth
maximization as a benchmark for efficiency); Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-
Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 135 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
190. See generally Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998) (noting the difficulty of evaluating, in monetary terms, certain
values and goals).
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of policymakers,191 and differences of opinion on the advantages (and
possible obligations) of investing in human capital.192
Regardless of the resolution, if any, that is reached as to what types
of hard-to-quantify benefits are to be accorded significance, an account
that incorporates some of the more difficult-to-quantify benefits listed
above is far more encompassing and informative than the existing,
narrower approach.
3. Limitations. Although propitious for those wishing to
advocate on behalf of the inherent reasonableness of ADA
accommodation, reliance upon the studies set forth in the above
Section requires a good deal of caution. Because corporate cultures
and economies differ, the conclusions drawn from studies of specific
corporations may not be representative of other enterprises. Results
are unlikely to be representative if unexamined enterprises are
dissimilar in size or economic prowess, or engage in unrelated
business activities. Therefore, it may be inaccurate to extrapolate very
small sample group results from particular enterprises onto employers
in general.193
191. See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 117–28 (1996) (discussing the social alienation resulting from the
failure of doctors and medical science to diagnose—or fail to diagnose—an illness or medical
condition which can result in the loss or denial of governmental assistance and other benefits);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS 233, 237–46 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1998) (exploring the effects of political and
philosophical biases on the discipline of law and economics and its applications under two
different approaches: the Chicago School and the Reformist School).
192. Compare, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,
70 J. POL. ECON. 9 (1962) (praising investment in human capital because it will “improve the
physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real income prospects”), with Ruth
Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and
Parenting Responsibilities under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 217–20 (1997)
(“[T]he United States has not facilitated long-term investment in human capital through social
market protection. If our choices were based on a careful study of the experience of other
countries rather than unexamined rhetoric, we might make different and more humane
choices.”). For an international perspective, see RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE
OF HYPERCAPITALISM 62–99 (1998) and CLEMENT FUEST & BERND HUBER, WHY DO
COUNTRIES SUBSIDIZE INVESTMENT AND NOT EMPLOYMENT? 1–21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6685, 1998).
193. See generally DIANA C. PHEYSEY, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES: TYPES AND
TRANSFORMATIONS (1994); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL
GUIDE: SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CULTURE CHANGE (1999). For an interesting, context-
specific study of which cultural conditions lend themselves to success, see G. Mitu Gulati et al.,
When a Workers’ Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1417,
1427–28 (2002).
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In addition, the studies do not report the costs of sought-after
accommodations that were ultimately not provided, presumably due
to expense. As a result, the median cost of accommodations might be
meaningfully higher than those reported.194 Finally, the studies focus
on “hard” costs: expenses engendered by altering physical plant (for
instance, providing stair-free access).195 Such studies do not
adequately appraise “soft” costs, including nonphysical plant
expenses, such as educating human resource personnel.196 Because
soft cost outlays can be significant, or even predominant, the actual
costs of accommodation might be greater than those described by the
above analyses.
Ultimately, the accuracy of the few studies assessing the costs of
providing accommodations to workers with disabilities have to be
verified, refuted, or debated further through subsequent empirical
testing. These studies may show accommodation costs to be more or
less expensive than they are currently perceived, but additional and
rigorous analysis is necessary in order to better understand the impact
of accommodations costs.
B. Accommodation Scholarship
Although existing legal scholarship on the ADA raises some
valuable points for considering accommodations as a whole, it offers
little guidance on how to ascertain the reasonableness of
accommodations. A recent publication by Professors Schwab and
Willborn proposes one approach to this issue,197 while a pair of articles
by Professors Bagenstos198 and Wax,199 respectively, lend insight into
why extra-reasonable accommodations ought to be provided.
1. General Accommodation Scholarship. Although not directly
on point as far as evaluating the reasonableness of ADA
accommodations, three articles are worth noting to the extent that
194. See, e.g., President’s Committee, supra note 166.
195. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
196. Set forth above in text, these accommodation expenses originate in
42 U.S. C. § 12,111(9)(B) (2000). See supra note 44.
197. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1264–65 (advocating the adoption of a tort
law reasonableness standard in determining what constitutes reasonable accommodation under
the ADA).
198. See Bagenstos, supra note 18.
199. See Wax, supra note 20.
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each raises issues that will later become pertinent to my proposed law
and economics framework.200
In an early and prescient article addressing the ADA, Professors
Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen suggest the possible extension
of Title I’s accommodation mandate to members of other, more
traditionally protected groups.201 As a result, employers might be
required to “offer increasingly flexible scheduling options that would
enable more women with childcare responsibilities to undertake
particular jobs,”202 and members of racial and ethnic groups would
receive individualized training and education to mitigate socially
based shortfalls.203 As a “profound” innovation,204 they argue, the
ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement created an
“opportunity to rethink employment discrimination law more
generally.”205 In divining the parameters of accommodations, whether
ADA or more broadly extended, Karlan and Rutherglen elaborate on
Judge Posner’s reasoning in Vande Zande206 and conclude that all
factors involved in assessing reasonableness suggest a comparison to
negligence law.207 In weighing competing interests, negligence
assessment “requires reasonable conduct, and implicitly requires no
undue burden; it, too, is usually applied on the facts of each case; and
it, too, is usually enforced through individual claims.”208
Professor J.H. Verkerke maintains in a recent article that the
ADA acts efficiently in placing disabled workers with jobs
appropriate to their skill sets.209 Applying a theory he previously
articulated in the context of sex- and race-based discrimination,210
200. See infra Part IV.
201. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 38.
202. Id. at 39.
203. Id. at 40.
204. Id. at 41.
205. Id. at 38.
206. Id. at 32 & n.100 (citing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542–53 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
207. Among the parallels noted were “the substantive standard for reasonable
accommodation, the wide range of factors that are relevant to the issue of undue hardship, and
the procedures for enforcement through individual claims in court.” Id. at 32.
208. Id.
209. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 903.
210. J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 133–54 (1998) (sex-based discrimination); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in
Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 361–83 (1995) (race-based
discrimination).
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Verkerke examines the dynamic upon disabled workers of the
phenomenon of “matching, churning, and scarring,” by which he
means the hiring into an inappropriate position, discharging from that
position, and precluding the individual from retaining such position.211
Verkerke argues that the presence of people with disabilities in the
workplace “creates precisely the conditions necessary” for these
inefficient circumstances to occur, especially when a disability is not
readily visibly apparent and is concealed from an employer.212
Nevertheless, he avers that the ADA acts as “a significant legal
intervention” to compel efficiency in the labor market.213 By
according reasonable accommodation protection to qualified
individuals with disabilities, the statute “constrains employers whose
private gains from discharging disabled employees” would in the
ordinary course of business compel them to pass those workers onto
other employers or onto public assistance programs.214 Finally,
Verkerke offers five principles to aid the interactive process in
determining the labor market efficiency of corresponding
accommodations to workers with disabilities. These include
distinguishing between high and low risk jobs, imposing “reasonable
limits” on accommodation costs, encouraging workers to share
common accommodation costs, reducing accommodation expenses
through better matching devices, and creating “presumptions that
generalize by occupation.”215
Finally, and perhaps most globally, Professor Christine Jolls
identifies the circumstances under which an accommodation
mandate,216 including the disability-related one contained in the
ADA, is theoretically likely to reduce a given group’s employment
level or wages, the conditions under which both employment levels
and wages are prone to be reduced, and those under which neither is
likely to occur.217 The degree to which antidiscrimination restrictions
on employment and wage differentials are apt to bind both
accommodated and nonaccommodated groups is pivotal to Jolls’s
211. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 941.
212. Id. at 957. For a cursory discussion of two interesting issues not raised by Verkerke, i.e.,
the timing of notice for individuals with not readily discernable (but highly prejudiced)
disabilities and the attendant question of constructive notice, see infra note 414.
213. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 903.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 941.
216. E.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
217. Jolls, supra note 15, at 254.
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model.218 In the case of workers with disabilities, Jolls posits that
restrictions on employment differentials are unlikely to be binding,
while restrictions on wage differentials are likely to bind.219 Thus,
Jolls’s model predicts that Title I’s reasonable accommodation
mandates will reduce the relative employment rate of workers with
disabilities while either increasing their wage levels or leaving them
unchanged.220 In reaching this conclusion, Jolls confirms the findings
of two empirical studies of the post-ADA employment effects on
workers with disabilities. These two studies find a relative reduction
in the employment rate of workers with disabilities concurrent with
either a neutral or beneficial effect on wages.221 Although the
underlying studies can be challenged for a number of reasons,222 as
218. Jolls finds that where restrictions on wage and employment differentials are binding,
the relative wage and employment level of disadvantaged workers to non-disadvantaged
workers will rise or remain the same. Id. Where restrictions on wage differentials are binding
but restrictions on employment differentials are not binding, the relative wage level of the
disadvantaged worker will rise or remain the same while the relative employment level will fall.
Id. Where restrictions on wage differentials are not binding, regardless of the presence or
absence of binding restrictions on employment differentials, relative wages will fall while the
relative employment levels will rise where the value of the accommodation exceeds its cost,
remain the same where the value of the accommodation equals its cost, and fall where the value
of the accommodation is less than its cost. Id.
219. Id. at 273–81.
220. Id. at 288–90.
221. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 931 (2001) (providing
statistical results of post-ADA employment and wage effects for workers with disabilities);
Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
J. HUM. RESOURCES 691, 700–05 (2000) (concluding that the ADA resulted in a relative
employment decrease for workers with disabilities). The studies employ harmonious
frameworks to explain their results. Professor DeLeire uses data panels of men aged eighteen to
sixty-four from the Study of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1986 to 1993. See
DeLeire, supra, at 705. DeLeire concludes that the ADA’s passage resulted in an average 7.2
percent decrease in the employment levels of men with disabilities relative to that of men
without disabilities. Id. Over the same time, DeLeire reports no relative change in workers with
disabilities’ relative earnings. Id.
Professors Acemoglu and Angrist’s results, culled from the 1988–1997 Current
Population Study (CPS) data for both men and women aged twenty-one to fifty-eight, generally
corroborate DeLeire’s findings, but provide more nuanced detail. See Acemoglu & Angrist,
supra, at 930. Acemoglu and Angrist find that across the twenty-one to thirty-nine age group,
the relative employment levels of workers with disabilities declined by 10 to 15 percent with
respect to hours worked per week. Id. at 932. For the forty to fifty-eight age group, they
conclude that there was no effect upon women with disabilities relative to their peers without
disabilities. Id. However, men’s employment levels decreased significantly. Id. The relative wage
levels of workers with disabilities appeared to remain unchanged. Id.
222. See, e.g., Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
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can Jolls’s conclusions,223 the point to bear in mind is that several very
capable economists believe that ADA accommodations act as a
disincentive to the voluntary hiring of people with disabilities.
2. BPL Balancing: Schwab and Willborn. In an article entitled
Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities,224 Stewart
Schwab and Steven Willborn highlight what they view as distinctions
between the ADA and Title VII.225 The authors see the ADA’s
accommodation mandates as extending beyond the more traditional
type of antidiscrimination requirements contained in Title VII.226 This
is because the ADA requires not only “soft preferences” (meaning
the rendering of equally situated people equally),227 but also “hard
preferences” (by which they mean something beyond equality; for
instance, affirmative action)228 for people with disabilities.
To assess which accommodations are reasonable, Schwab and
Willborn take up the analogy to negligence law first noted by Judge
Posner in Vande Zande229 and later briefly discussed by Karlan and
Rutherglen.230 They propose applying Judge Learned Hand’s seminal
statement of competing duties of care.231 In United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.,232 Judge Hand balanced the burden (B) of care against
the potential of a resulting injury (L), reduced by the probability (P)
of the likelihood that an injury would occur.233 When B < PL a person
LAB. L. 271, 293–312 (2000) (presenting detailed econometric challenges to the two post-ADA
employment studies).
223. For example, John Donohue questions parts of Jolls’s work on the ground that a
central theoretical underpinning of her accommodation model is simple partial equilibrium
theory. John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively
Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 909–12 (2001). This theory has
been brought under fire by another empirical study of minimum-wage analysis which seemed to
disprove the assumption that minimum-wage laws reduce employment levels. Id. at 909–10.
Because these latter results call partial equilibrium theory into question, it also calls Jolls’s
accommodation model into question. Id. at 910.
224. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16.
225. Id. at 1233–37.
226. Id. at 1200.
227. Id. at 1209.
228. Id. at 1211–12.
229. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussed supra
Part I.C.1).
230. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 32; see also supra notes 201–08 and
accompanying text.
231. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1268–71.
232. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
233. Id. at 173.
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who does not take precautions is liable in negligence. In the event
that B > PL, a person who did not take precautions will not be liable
for harm even if an accident arose from that failure.234
As an example of how the BPL criteria could be applied to ADA
accommodations, Schwab and Willborn offer the following
hypothetical:
The reviewing court would compare the burden of the
accommodation to the employer (B) against the gains to the
disabled worker (L), discounted by the likelihood of the
accommodation achieving its goals (P). Thus, if the accommodation
would cost the employer $200 and have an eighty percent chance of
benefiting the person with a disability by $1000, the BPL analogy
would label the accommodation reasonable and require it. On the
other hand, if the accommodation would cost the employer $2000
and have an expected benefit of $800, the accommodation is
unreasonable and need not be undertaken.235
Notwithstanding the elegant simplicity of BPL analysis,236 and
despite very strong contributions of law and economics analysis to
tort law analysis,237 Schwab and Willborn recognize several attendant
234. Id. On the larger question of duty as social contract, which goes beyond the boundaries
of this Article, see generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998), and Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and
Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
235. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1269.
236. Successive, economic-based treatments have been presented, most prominently, by
Richard Posner. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33
(1972) (arguing that the BPL formula presents an economically efficient method of applying
negligence law). But see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand
Formula”, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145, 145 (2003) (criticizing Posner’s advocacy in
support of an increased use of the BPL formula on the ground that Hand himself did not
regularly utilize it).
237. See generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care
Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (discussing the
contributions of economic efficiency to tort law and proposing that “courts reconceptualize
negligence in order to take account of risk to everyone”); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985)
(discussing “whether the principal doctrines of products liability law are consistent with the
hypothesis that the common law is best understood as an endeavor (which need not be
conscious) to promote economic efficiency”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) (introducing the “positive
economic theory” and then showing how its model “can be used to decide whether negligence
or strict liability is the more efficient liability standard in particular circumstances”); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Optimal Liability When the Injurer’s Information About the Victim’s Loss is Imperfect,
7 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 139 (1987) (explaining that a “central result in the economic theory
of liability is that if an injurer’s liability equals the victim’s loss, then either the rule of strict
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issues that would have to be addressed in determining the
reasonability of accommodations.238 For example, the P portion of the
BPL analysis is at risk of underestimation in circumstances where the
accommodation does not achieve its intended result.239 Of greater
significance is settling on a uniform measure by which to compare
costs and benefits. Specifically, one must consider how to quantify
and select the external benefits to be used in the calculus raised
earlier in this Article.240 In addition, Schwab and Willborn assert that
the ADA itself may act as an impediment to the provision of
accommodations, because it places the entire cost on employers and
does not allow disabled workers to pay for all or part of their
accommodations.241 As a result, they conclude that “BPL analysis
seems to be missing something” and suggest that the scope of the
ADA be expanded so as to allow disabled workers to bear some or all
of their own accommodation costs.242
3. Toward Independence: Bagenstos and Wax. Two recent
articles, by Samuel Bagenstos243 and Amy Wax,244 respectively,
examine, as a policy matter, the way in which employer-sponsored
ADA accommodations for people with disabilities can be generally
beneficial for society. Both articles operate from within the
boundaries of the ADA. Thus, both of these scholars, writing
separately, endorse the notion of dependence-avoidance by the
disabled as advantageous both for that group of individuals as well as
for society at large. In addition, each article operates on the
liability or the rule of negligence can induce the injurer to behave properly”); Steven Shavell,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (comparing “strict liability and
negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to ‘appropriately’ reduce accident
losses”); Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON.
589 (1983) (studying “the effect of liability rules on accident avoidance in situations where
potential victims and potential injurers act sequentially”).
238. For instance, is what is relevant in this analysis the gain to the disabled worker, or the
gain to the employer in terms of the worker’s productivity? See Schwab & Wilborn, supra note
16, at 1269–71. Both seem relevant to me, but it is unclear how to incorporate that in the
formula.
239. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1269.
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
241. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1271.
242. Id. This is a frequently made economic argument, and one to which I will return infra
Part III.B.3.
243. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 967.
244. Wax, supra note 20, at 1423.
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assumption that employers, rather than society, ought to bear the
costs of such accommodations.245
Attempting to explain the Supreme Court’s ADA
jurisprudence,246 Samuel Bagenstos suggests that a motivating factor
in the Court’s decisions is the desire to keep people with disabilities in
the workplace rather than on welfare.247 Dependency-avoidance, he
argues, was likewise one of the prime considerations that impelled the
statute’s passage, which was “sold to a significant extent as a means of
welfare reform.”248 Supporting this assertion with a wealth of
evidence,249 Bagenstos concludes that overreliance on this notion of
dependence-avoidance by disability rights advocates ultimately
engenders risk to their cause because it acts to vitiate
counterarguments in favor of governmental interventions on behalf of
unemployed workers with disabilities.250
Continuing her research cycle on welfare rights and reciprocity,251
Amy Wax advances her own theory about the ADA’s normative goal
of independence for people with disabilities.252 Employer-provided
245. See Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 954 (“[M]any of the [ADA’s] strongest supporters . . . .
sold the statute as a means of avoiding the social costs of dependency by moving people off of
benefits rolls and into the work force.”); Wax, supra note 20, at 1425–26 (“[T]he ADA [may] be
seen as a way for taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population
onto employers . . . .”).
246. This is a common theme in his writing. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1492 (2001) (suggesting that the
Court’s decisions can be viewed through the lens of risk regulation, with the Justices deferring
to technocratic, scientific risk regulation); Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 484–532 (proposing that
the Court’s definition of disability could be seen as extending ADA protection only to those
individuals subject to disability-related stigma).
247. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 976–85.
248. Id. at 927.
249. Bagenstos relies on legislative findings, case law, and the history of the Disability
Rights and Independent Living Movements. Id. at 953–1000.
250. See id. at 1016 (“[T]he effort to use welfare reform arguments to reframe
‘independence’ as being essentially coextensive with agency and antipaternalism becomes
increasingly strained as people with disabilities must rely on more and more outside assistance
to achieve that ‘independence.’”).
251. See Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 477, 501–16
(2001) (arguing for conditional reciprocity as an appropriate basis of social welfare policy); Amy
L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 261 (Winter/Spring 2000)
(exploring the possibility and potential impact of constitutional recognition of economic welfare
rights, both in regards to social insurance and need-based transfers).
252. See Wax, supra note 20, at 1423 (arguing that one can defend the ADA without
assuming that the productivity levels of a disabled person and an otherwise qualified able-
bodied person are or can be made the same).
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workplace accommodations, she argues, can improve overall social
utility so long as disabled workers are able to perform the “core
elements”253 of the job at issue.254 For even if “many disabled persons”
are less productive than nondisabled ones,255 Wax argues that the
alternative of labor market exclusion resulting in social welfare
expenditures is ultimately more expensive to society as a whole.256
Nevertheless, Wax asserts that minimum wage and equal pay
legislation prevent employers from hiring and retaining workers with
disabilities, even though it is economically beneficial to society as a
whole to do so.257
These two articles offer very thoughtful treatments on the issue
of why avoiding welfare dependency for people with disabilities is a
laudable, congressionally endorsed, socially efficient goal that should
influence one’s thinking about disability-related work
accommodation. At the same time, because they both operate within
the confines of Title I’s boundaries, they do not delineate under what
circumstances the general tax base ought to provide disability-related
accommodations that are otherwise inefficient for private employers,
or where the line should be drawn between private inefficiency and
public efficiency.
In sum, Karlan and Rutherglen briefly explore the possibility of
applying a negligence analysis to the ADA-type accommodations that
they propose extending to members of protected groups. Verkerke
claims that in allocating accommodations, the ADA serves as an
efficient hiring and termination device for the labor market. And, in
examining the effects of accommodation mandates, Jolls concludes
that the legislation of ADA accommodations acts as a disincentive to
hiring disabled workers. Schwab and Willborn offer the most concrete
analysis by proposing that accommodation costs be measured using a
BPL type standard, while articles by Bagenstos and Wax offer
reasons for why extra-reasonable accommodations should be
provided to disabled workers. Collectively, these scholars have
contributed valuable insights to understanding ADA-type
253. Id. at 1421.
254. See id. at 1426 (noting that given sufficient productivity by the disabled employee, the
result for society as a whole may be “net positive”).
255. Id. at 1423.
256. See id. at 1424 (arguing that if labor markets tailored for marginal productivity force
employees to hire disabled persons at excessive wages, the result may be costly for taxpayers).
257. See id. (demonstrating that labor markets may be distorted when minimum wage and
equal pay statutes set a floor on compensation).
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accommodations and employment discrimination law more generally,
but have not proffered a means by which to define the boundaries of
reasonableness.258 Building on this scholarly framework, Part III sets
forth the methodological assumptions underlying the proposed
accommodation cost framework established in Part IV.
III.  METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Working mainly within the framework of the neoclassical
economic model of the labor market,259 but with some reservations,
the methodology and assumptions I describe in this Part differ from
existing treatments in three ways.260 First, the proposed framework
questions the neoclassical labor market model presumption that
employers act efficiently in regard to employees with disabilities.
Second, the model does not assume that disabled workers are per se
less productive than nondisabled ones, although it certainly
recognizes and provides for this eventuality. Third, the model
challenges the received wisdom of the equitable nature of the labor
market status quo. Moreover, the framework offered in Part IV also
goes beyond the boundaries of the traditional labor market model in
acknowledging that some accommodations can be reasonable from an
ADA point of view while at the same time not necessarily prove cost-
efficient from an employer’s perspective.261 This is the area I denote as
“semi-efficient,” wherein the reasonableness of any given
258. I wish to stress that this comment is descriptive rather than critical. The above articles
succeed on their own merits and did not need to address this issue.
259. A note on nomenclature is warranted at this point. Some economists, as well as a few
law professors, might consider the use of the term “neoclassical economic model of the labor
market” as overly expansive. For example, some commentators might equate “neoclassical
economics” or “price theory” or “neoclassical price theory” with what is referred to as the
“perfect competition model.” Thus, when Robert Bork argued that antitrust enforcement
should rest on “price theory,” he was criticized for claiming that reliance on price theory implied
reliance on all of the assumptions of the perfect competition model. It is certainly true that the
perfect competition model is a neoclassical model, and thus an application of price theory, but
there are also lots of economic models that are forms of neoclassical price theory—models that
depart in one or more ways from the perfect competition model. In sum, “neoclassical” may be
said to encompass a fairly large expanse of economic theory. Nonetheless, I am in good
company in using the concept monolithically. See generally John J. Donohue III, Discrimination
in Employment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 615,
615–23 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
260. By contrast, the variables set forth in the Appendix are consistent with general law and
economics notions.
261. Additionally, within a Kaldor-Hicks welfare enhancement scheme, these
accommodations are also socially inefficient. See infra Appendix, Section D.
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accommodation is measured (as the ADA requires) against the
totality of an employer’s resources. Thus, moving away from an
absolute cost-benefit analysis, there are areas of contingent
reasonableness in which the same accommodation can be reasonable
for some employers, but not for others. This section of the continuum
is incongruent with traditional neoclassical economic analysis, yet
nonetheless is to a large extent exactly what constitutes reasonable
ADA accommodations.
A. The Neoclassical Economic Model
The comprehensive normative goal of neoclassical economics is to
design efficient legal regimes.262 As such, the model begins from the
premise that markets for goods and services operate efficiently. As part
of this postulate it is assumed that markets determine prices, free
bargaining is the norm, and knowledge is completely and symmetrically
disseminated, resulting in prices based on production.263 Under this
theory, market forces also discipline employers with irrational (and thus
inefficient) tastes against particular groups by driving those employers
from the market.264 This economic Darwinism occurs because
employers’ discriminatory hiring practices add to business costs, and
result in comparative losses by diminishing profit margins.265 Exercising
distaste (or socially negative preferences)266 also raises the net-product
margin of nondiscriminatory competitors who engage same-group
employees at reduced wage levels.267 Resting on this foundation, the
neoclassical economic paradigm posits that in the context of an efficient
and properly functioning labor market, employers hire workers with the
greatest net productivity. This utility is calculated by subtracting total
labor cost from total production benefit (a calculation that I adopt
below).268 Because workers with disabilities are viewed as requiring
262. See MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. MCCANN, JR., THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC
UNDERSTANDING: IDEAS AND TRADITIONS 301 (2000) (describing the market as a “model of
allocative efficiency”).
263. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
185, 226–28, 313–14 (7th ed. 1998).
264. See BARRY CLARK, POLITICAL ECONOMY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 196 (1991)
(describing how discriminating employers incur higher wage costs by bypassing otherwise
qualified workers, thus losing market share).
265. Id.
266. The seminal writing on “distaste” is by Nobel Prize-winning economist, and now journalist,
Gary S. Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39–45 (2d ed. 1971).
267. CLARK, supra note 264, at 196.
268. See infra Appendix, Section B.
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costly inputs in the form of accommodations, an employer, if sufficiently
unconstrained by regulations so that she can act of her own preference,
would rationally choose nondisabled employees.269
As a result of these two premises, the neoclassical economic
model concludes that when employers are forced to hire disabled
employees against their own considered judgment, these employers
bear costs that they would not have otherwise borne. Consequently,
Title I accommodations are inherently inefficient because they reduce
the utility an individual employer is able to achieve. Title I’s
requirements are also undesirable because they compel private
employers (as opposed to, say, the general tax base) to bear the costs of
an inefficient social policy. Thus, exclusion of people with disabilities
from the employment sphere is the result of rationally efficient
decisionmaking, not overt discrimination, or a more benign
discrimination resulting from the reliance on statistical discrimination.270
The most thorough evaluation (and concise criticism) of Title I
from a neoclassical economic perspective was published by Professor
Richard Epstein after passage of the ADA, but prior to promulgation of
its regulations.271 Although therefore somewhat precipitate,272 it was also
prescient in that successive literature closely followed his analysis in
269. If this employer was also unconstrained as to wage regulations, then it could be that
disabled employees would sort down to a level beneath their abilities, either by being placed at
less valuable positions or by accepting lower wages at equally valuable places of employment.
As an example, a disabled lawyer from Harvard might end up either at a less prestigious (and
remunerative) firm than a comparable, nondisabled lawyer, or end up at an equally prestigious
firm than that of the comparable nondisabled lawyer by accepting lower wages. Both firms
might well be happy to have Harvard graduates, especially if the less prestigious one ordinarily
is unable to attract those alumni. These scenarios engage inter alia some of the assertions that
Jolls, supra note 15, at 232–33, raises about the binding nature of wage regulations. See also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS  487–88 (1992); Colker, supra note 192, at 217–19 (mentioning similar
concepts in regard to investment in human capital); Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1271
(raising similar assertions in the context of disabled workers self-accommodating through
reduced wages).
270. As one commentator put it, the statute “would not be necessary if these
[accommodations] were beneficial to employers as they automatically act in ways that promote their
self interests.” Thomas H. Barnard, Disabling America: Costing Out the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 58 (1992).
 271. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 480–94. I am grateful to Professor Epstein for his courtesy and
friendship. Although I disagree with almost all his views on employment discrimination law, and
have therefore utilized his work as a counterpoint to my own, he has always been open to
exchanging ideas and I have learned much from him. For an elegant evaluation of the above work,
see John J. Donohue III, Book Review, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1477 (1993).
272. Epstein recently reprised many of his arguments in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY OR MORE OPPORTUNITY? THE GOOD THING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION (2002).
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applying the neoclassical economic labor market model to the ADA.273
This is equally true of the recent scholarship described above274 to the
extent that it also adopts methodological assumptions common to the
neoclassical economic model.
Not all the assumptions impelling Epstein’s analysis are adopted
whole cloth by everyone utilizing law and economics schemas.
Moreover, other variations and interpretations of the neoclassical
model (whether or not applied to the labor market) exist.275
Additionally, two major factors distinguish Epstein’s take on ADA
accommodations from that of other economically inclined authors. The
first differentiating feature is his normative solution to the difficulties
raised by Title I. A longtime advocate of libertarianism,276 Epstein
argues that the ADA (as well as all other regulations governing the
labor market) ought to be abrogated on efficiency and autonomy
grounds.277 This is not a position currently taken by any of the other
authors in the field, although some concur with a corollary of that
proposition, namely, that disabled workers should be allowed to
underbid their services.278
The second major notion that separates Epstein from more
traditional neoclassical economic analysis is his recommendation that
 273.  See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48
VAND. L. REV. 391, 397 (1995) (criticizing the undue hardship standard as it relates to employee
accommodation); Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with
Disabilities Act, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495, 500–02 (1995)
(arguing that the ADA imposes severe liberty restrictions through its employer accommodation
mandates); Ron A. Vassel, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Cost, Uncertainty and
Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397, 406–10 (1994) (promoting a free market solution to disability
based employment discrimination); Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 725–50 (1995) (proposing the
repeal of the ADA on the grounds that it is economically inefficient, decreases societal net
wealth, and is harmful to its intended beneficiaries).
274. See supra Part II.B.
275. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Employment: Alternative Approaches to
Traditional Empirical Research, in EMERGING WORKFORCE ISSUES: W.I.A., TICKET TO WORK,
AND TRANSITION 95–96 (L. Robert McConnell ed., 2001) (describing some alternative metrics).
276. See generally Symposium, The Works of Richard A. Epstein, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
655, 783–803 (2000) (noting Epstein’s marriage of utilitarian and libertarian thought).
277. See EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 484 (arguing that “successful enforcement under the
guise of ‘reasonable accommodation’ necessarily impedes the operation and efficiency of
firms”).
278. That is, disabled workers may accept salaries below equivalent values. This latter
proposal, which also animates Schwab and Willborn’s treatment, see supra Part II.B.2, is
discussed infra Part III.C, in the context of questioning the equitable nature of the labor
market’s status quo.
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deference be paid to the prejudicial tastes of employers and third parties
(in the form of customers and/or other employees) when assessing the
cost of a given accommodation.279 This is an unusual proposal from a
methodological standpoint. Although law and economics assessments
are expected to account for all possible costs and benefits when
assessing the efficiency of any given policy,280 it is atypical when
calculating social good to give weight to preferences arising from
socially undesirable criteria.281 These can include tastes that are illegal,
such as murder, or objectionable, like sadism.282 Imagine, for example,
an economic analysis in which value was accorded to the tastes of Ku
Klux Klan customers who object to interacting with Asian-American
account executives; or, to use a less extreme example, customers who
are not members of an infamous hate group, but who nonetheless feel
that they can better relate to account executives whose native language
(they presume) is English.283
Moreover, another difficulty with accepting irrational preferences
as they relate to disabled workers is that doing so incorporates a
misperception that disability is central to determinations that can also
be universally human. Thus, the “awkward” feelings that Epstein
imagines will be engendered in nondisabled individuals who have to
279. Epstein would require this deference even under his preferred regime, one in which the
ADA was ultimately abrogated. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 486–88.
280. See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 2 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
281. In response to this concern, Professors Adler and Posner create the welfare equivalents
(WE) measure, or the amount of money that would be paid to or by an individual so that on the
right theory of well-being that individual is as well off there as she would be in the status quo.
Id. at 270. Accordingly, because an employee’s preference to work only with a given class of
persons is not based on a valid theory of well-being, it would not be included in the calculus.
This is because inclusion of an invalid preference would result in upholding undesired
prejudices that, even if extant in the status quo, are detrimental to society. Id. at 269 (describing
“distorted” preferences as those which do not “enhance [a] person’s well-being”).
282. Besides Epstein, one article avers that additional externalities, all negative, should be
considered at greater length when weighing the reasonableness of Title I accommodations. See
Jason Zarin, Beyond the Bright Line: Consideration of Externalities, the Meaning of Undue
Hardship, and the Allocation of the Burden of Proof Under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 511, 519 (1998) (arguing that considering the effect of
externalities “improves the accuracy” of a cost-benefit analysis of the burden of an
accommodation). Harlan Hahn addresses this distaste on a sociological level. Harlan Hahn,
Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL’Y STUD. J. 551,
566 (1987).
283. This is not to be confused with workplace rules (illegal under Title VII) that forbid the
speaking of any language other than English at the worksite, as was the case in EEOC v.
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999). See also S. Craig Moore,
English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 15 LAB. LAW. 295, 295–308 (1999).
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interact with a disabled worker.284 Yet, a worker’s attitude, personality,
and demeanor are factors irrespective of disability that ultimately
determine the comfort of interaction. Without a doubt, Oscar the
Grouch would associate poorly with his peers and function poorly in a
customer relations department (or, worse still, as an anger-management
consultant). This would, however, be because of his attitude, rather than
his physical difference of being green and furry.285 Similarly, it can be
expected that the rational responses of others will ultimately be
influenced by whether individuals with disabilities conduct themselves
in the ways that disagreeable people without disabilities do, or whether
they behave agreeably.286
In spite of these two significant departures, to date the analyses
grounded in the neoclassical economic paradigm otherwise dovetails
with Epstein’s view. In sum, Epstein (and through him as a proxy, other
economic commentators) relies on three main assumptions from which
flows the conclusion that the potential benefits to employers associated
with reasonable accommodations are economically inefficient.
Respectively, these are the overall efficient functioning of the labor
market, the inherently lower productivity of disabled workers, and,
accordingly, the equity of the labor market’s status quo.287
B. Challenges to the Neoclassical Economic Model
Although this Article utilizes the general neoclassical economic
model of the labor market, it challenges three basic assumptions of the
framework as it pertains to workers with disabilities: (1) the notion that
the labor market functions efficiently in allocating employment
opportunity to disabled workers; (2) the underlying assumptions that
284. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 486–87.
285. A display at the National Museum of American History’s Behring Center is available at
http://www.si.edu/resource/faq/where/oscar.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal). By
contrast Grover, who is blue and furry, would be very good at either job. That Cookie Monster,
who is also blue and furry, would not, only underscores the individual nature of job matching.
286. Consequently, as far as academic assessments go, deferring to prejudicial irrationalities
about disabled workers, in contrast to acknowledging and then discounting those preferences, is a
controversial method of applying otherwise conventional law and economics criteria and should not
be impugned to other writers from that field. Such inclusion would also result in continuation of the
same biases that the ADA was meant to counteract. Thus, at the very least, justification is required
for such atypical accession to irrational preferences. See Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and
ADA Title I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 193, 200–01 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
2000) (arguing that reacting negatively to the difference of disability is “not inherently
different” from other responses of exclusion now viewed as prejudicial).
287. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 484–85.
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the paradigm uses when assessing those employees’ productivity; and
(3) the proposition that the status quo baseline of the existing labor
market is an equitable one.
1. Labor Market Efficiency. The first flawed assumption in the
neoclassical economic model of the labor market governing workers
with disabilities is the unqualified acceptance of its efficiency. The
paradigm posits that employers acting rationally will hire and
maintain workers with the greatest net product, while those who act
irrationally will be disciplined by market forces and driven from
competition. This premise, which is taken as a standard economic
assumption by many law and economics practitioners and should, in
the normal course of events be accurate, has questionable factual and
normative elements as applied to the reality of disabled workers’
experiences in the labor market.288
A primary objection to categorically applying the neoclassical
law and economics model to the labor market is factual. To begin
with, the standard economic model of analysis is premised on
complete and symmetrical distribution of information to all actors
within a given market.289 Yet not all markets function equally in this
respect. Although an economic account of how information is
disseminated might be true of financial markets whose extensive
reporting requirements are rigorously enforced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),290 no parallel structure exists in the
labor market. A very clear example of information asymmetry in the
context of disabled workers may be seen in a December 2002 study
by the General Accounting Office (GAO),291 which found that only a
288. In explaining this assertion, the scholarship of Professors Cass Sunstein and John Donohue
is instructive in positing that competitive markets not only fail to eliminate discriminatory
practices, but can also extend them. See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1411, 1423 (1986) (rejecting the argument that market forces will “restore the
nondiscriminatory equilibrium by disciplining discriminators”); John J. Donohue III,
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1337, 1348 (1989) (noting that although competitive market forces tend to discipline
discriminators, the same market forces “do not always operate at the optimal speed”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 36 (Ellen
F. Paul ed., 1991) (illustrating how competitive markets may perpetuate discrimination through
“economically rational response[s]” to the desires of third parties, “stereotyping,” or “limited
investments in human capital”).
289. ANINDYA SEN, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 159–60 (1999).
290. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.6 (4th ed. 2002).
291. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUSINESS TAX INCENTIVES: INCENTIVES TO
EMPLOY WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES RECEIVE LIMITED USE AND HAVE AN UNCERTAIN
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“very small proportion”292 of businesses utilized either the two
available federal tax credits for hiring disabled workers,293 or the
barrier removal deduction,294 which would make their premises
accessible to disabled customers (and, with some overlap, workers
with disabilities).295 Respectively, the two hiring incentives provide
for $2,400 and $5,000 (combinable) per annum, per eligible disabled
worker;296 the public accommodation credit allows for as much as
$15,000 per year.297 Thus, a relatively simple vehicle to compensate
employers for accommodation costs––one which, if the Blanck
position outlined above is believed, could make accommodating
disabled workers an even more profitable proposition298––was
reported by the GAO as being severely underused.299 To remedy this
informational failure, the GAO Report recommends “improving
government outreach and education efforts.”300 Consider the
possible ramifications if the GAO had suggested that the
government parallel the SEC’s reporting requirements in reverse,
with every corporate taxpayer receiving a document along with its
annual tax return briefing it on the possible benefits of employing
disabled workers. Furthermore, the liquidity of financial market
commodities does not extend to almost any other market, including
that for employment services,301 where the value of individual
IMPACT (GAO-03-39 Dec. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0339.pdf (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. I thank my colleague Professor John
Lee for bringing this study to my attention.
292. Id. at 2.
293. These tax cuts are, respectively, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 51
(2000), and the Disabled Access Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000).
294. See 26 U.S.C. § 190 (2000) (providing a credit for “architectural and transportation
barrier removal expenses”).
295. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
296. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 2.
297. Id.
298. See supra Parts II.A.1–2.
299. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 11–14. The availability of these measures is not,
however, totally neglected. See, e.g., Linda Nelsestuen & Mark Reid, Coordination of Tax
Incentives Associated with Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 TAXES 37,
38–42 (2003) (reporting on the availability of the ADA tax incentives for eligible employers).
300. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 25. It also recommended two measures not related to
informational asymmetry: increasing the amount of employer incentives and expanding the types
of businesses eligible beyond the ADA’s floor of fifteen employees. Id.
301. The same liquidity does not extend to the absolute fungibility of those workers,
although Verkerke’s article works from this very premise by positing the mobility of disabled
workers (otherwise there would be no future mismatching opportunities). Verkerke, supra note
14, at 910–11. But see Marjorie L. Baldwin & Edward J. Schumacher, A Note on Job Mobility
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workers may be more difficult (although certainly possible)302
to determine.
Information asymmetry may also exist as to the possible tastes of
employers and third parties toward workers with disabilities. Although
empirical surveys of Fortune 500 executives,303 senior executives,304 and
coworkers305 uniformly report favorable attitudes toward employing
disabled individuals, available data fails to evince significant increases in
the relative employment rate among disabled individuals.306 Two
alternative conclusions can be drawn from this apparent paradox: either
cognitive dissonance causes the individuals surveyed to believe they
favor disabled employment when in reality they do not, or those
interviewed truly do espouse pro-disabled sentiments, but because of an
information asymmetry, this preference does not manifest itself when
these individuals act on behalf of corporations.307 Judging from the
shortage of disability awareness and management programs instituted
by corporations as part of their business practices, the latter conclusion
seems plausible.308 This scarcity further denotes a market failure; under
Among Workers with Disabilities, 41 INDUS. REL. 430, 433 (2002) (analyzing empirically the
assumption of mobility among workers with disabilities).
302. See infra Part IV.A.2.
303. Joel M. Levy et al., Attitudes of Executives in Fortune 500 Corporations Towards the
Employability of Persons with Severe Disabilities: Industrial and Service Corporations, 24 J.
APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING 19, 19–31 (1994).
304. A 1995 survey of senior corporate executives found that 89 percent supported plans to
increase the number of workers with disabilities their companies employed. THE
N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 24 (1995).
305. In a 1991 survey, 68 percent of those polled said they would support policies that
increase the number of disabled workers, 65 percent responded that they would not have any
problems with disabled coworkers, and 77 percent said they would not be concerned if their
boss was a seriously disabled person. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., PUB. ATTITUDES TOWARDS
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 23–28 (1991).
306. If anything, the data demonstrates moderate decreases, as reported by the studies of
Acemoglu and Angrist, and DeLeire, set forth supra note 221.
307. Id. Alternatively, one could imagine a corporation in which the leadership polled feel
positively about employing disabled workers, but the human resource managers engaged in the
actual hiring processes feel differently.
308. SHEILA H. AKABAS ET AL., DISABILITY MANAGEMENT 248–49 (1992) (“The attitude
of employers often interferes with bringing workers with disabilities into the workplace.”). But
see THE ADA AT WORK: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A STUDY BY THE SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. 5
(1999) (finding that 82 percent of organizations make existing facilities accessible to disabled
employees, 79 percent are flexible in the application of HR policies, and 67 percent restructure
jobs or modify work hours); Serbrenia J. Sims & Ronald R. Sims, ADA and the Role of Human
Resource Management in Managing the Diverse Workforce of the 1990s, in HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 149, 157 (1995) (“Human rights,
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a neoclassical economic model, companies with access to this
information would act on whatever favorable economic incentives
existed (through generated externalities,309 including tax breaks)310 and
employ greater numbers of disabled workers.
Next, contrary to the neoclassical labor market account, empirical
studies conducted both before and after passage of the ADA clearly
demonstrate the persistence of employment discrimination as an
obstacle to labor market opportunities for workers with disabilities.311 In
analyzing the effects of employer practices, these studies, which assume
information asymmetry in the labor market, distinguish the effects of
economically rational behavior from the effects of prejudicial
behavior.312 In other words, they distinguish between decisions arising
from the use of indicators that substitute reliable generalizations about
group characteristics from those which either wrongly assume or
overestimate the existence of those characteristics.313 Although
assertions of prejudice have long been raised by members of the
social justice, and diversity are increasingly valued in the workplace, as they are in society at
large.”).
309. See supra Part II.A.2.
310. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
311. See generally Marjorie L. Baldwin et al., Gender Differences in Wage Losses from
Impairments: Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 29 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 865, 873–84 (1994); Marjorie L. Baldwin, Estimating Wage Discrimination Against
Workers With Disabilities, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 276, 276–90 (1994); Marjorie L.
Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with Disabilities in
the Year of the ADA, 66 S. ECON. J. 548, 556–62 (2000); Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G.
Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Women with Disabilities, 34 INDUS. REL. 555,
569–76 (1995); Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination
Against Men with Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 6–15 (1994); William G. Johnson &
James Lambrinos, Wage Discrimination Against Handicapped Men and Women, 20 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 264, 270–76 (1985).
312. See, e.g., Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 2 (noting that discrimination may result from “prejudice,
differential information concerning the average productivity of majority and minority workers,
or exploitation of workers”); Johnson & Lambrinos, supra note 311, at 265–66 (distinguishing
prejudice from discrimination that arises when employers believe disabled persons to be “less
productive” and “more costly to hire”).
313. For example, Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Women with
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 555–77, examined the extent of wage discrimination and its
attendant employment effects against disabled women. They found, among other results, that
although the absolute wage differential between women with and without disabilities is small,
more than one-half of the wage differential was directly attributable to discrimination against
the disabled cohort. Id. at 572.
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disability rights community,314 and were documented by Congress in the
legislative findings section that it included in the ADA,315 recognition of
these asseverations, even when backed by the sort of empirical studies
cited above,316 has by and large eluded those commentators analyzing
the ADA’s accommodation mandates.317
In the case of workers with disabilities, estimates of indicators that
are meant to signal appraisals of productivity and accommodation cost
are swayed by existing misconceptions about disabled workers that
substitute for less easily obtainable, accurate information. This is
because, excluding instances of purposeful prejudice, discrimination
may also occur when a decisionmaker who lacks perfect information
about the characteristics of the members of a given group bases her
assessment on inaccurate “indicators” that she believes can evaluate
those individuals’ present or future performance.318  Additionally, even
if economically efficient indicators were substituted for empirically
incorrect ones, a market failure would continue because employers’
discriminatory behavior would be rewarded as efficient. Conversely, a
system requiring economically empowered employers, rather than
economically disempowered employees, to bear cost differentials
incurred by disregarding rational economic discrimination may arguably
be more efficient from a social welfare standpoint. Thus, although the
baseline assumption that employers act in an efficient manner seeking
to maximize their own profits usually appears correct, from at least one
point of view, it is empirically invalid.
Moreover, the neoclassical economic model asserts that once
discriminatory practices are observed, employers who exercise
distaste are disciplined by market forces that reduce their profit
margins while increasing those of their nondiscriminatory
314. For one of the earlier, as well as more elegant, assertions of prejudice, see Jacobus
tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts,
54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966).
315. These findings are detailed in Burgdorf, supra note 51, at 422–27.
316. See supra Part II.
317. This is true to the degree that the empirical studies, which one would think central to
economic analyses––even if ultimately rejected by them after consideration––are cited in only a
handful of law review articles.
318. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic
Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1382 (2002). Specific instances of statistical inaccuracies
exist when excluding people from employment on the basis of genetic identity. See id. (noting
that genetically atypical individuals with asymptomatic conditions may never exhibit symptoms
for a particular illness, yet will remain excluded from some employment opportunities). General
policy misassessments are described in Silvers & Stein, supra note 29, at 102.
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competitors.319 As with the first premise, this theory has not been
empirically demonstrated. Indeed, logical application of the
neoclassical economic paradigm would recount that prior to 1964,320
when federal antidiscrimination laws injected inefficiency into the
dynamics governing private employment relationships,321
discriminatory firms were either penalized or driven from
competition. I am unaware of any empirical evidence that supports
this position.322 To the contrary, United States markets have
historically evinced (and continue to evidence) various forms of
discrimination.323
Finally, the assertion of market failure within the neoclassically
governed employment market is not unique. Claims that imperfect
information undermines the efficiency of hiring decisions have arisen
from econometric,324 economic,325 and civil rights326 sources. Additionally,
319. BECKER, supra note 266, at 39–45.
320. That year heralded the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241, which prohibited employment and other forms of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin.
321. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES (1981) (examining how
economic forces and government intervention impact the success of racial and ethnic
minorities).
322. In fact, if the work of one Nobel Prize-winning economist and his three colleagues is
believed, even Title VII’s promulgation did not eradicate disparities in wage and employment
effects relative to race by itself. Instead, it was protracted governmental enforcement of that
statute. Richard Butler & James J. Heckman, The Government’s Impact on the Labor Market
Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
235, 252 (Leonard J. Hausman et al. eds., 1977); John J. Donohue III & James Heckman,
Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status
of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1637–40 (1991); James J. Heckman & Brook S.
Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of
Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 167–73 (1989).
323. If needed, contemporary empirical proof as to the pervasiveness of minority-based
prejudice is presented in IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? (2001).
324. See, e.g., Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 14 (“The extent to which the remaining employment differential
reflects . . . employers’ lack of knowledge concerning the productivity of persons with
impairments is an open question.”); Johnson & Lambrinos, supra note 311, at 265 (“Employers
may believe that handicapped workers are less productive and more costly to hire and train than
the nonhandicapped.”).
325. See, e.g., DAVID NEUMARK, LABOR MARKET INFORMATION AND WAGE
DIFFERENTIALS BY RACE AND SEX (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6573,
1998) (positing that employer misinformation about minorities and women account for wage
discrimination); Sunstein, supra note 288 (arguing that competitive markets, far from
eliminating discrimination, actually work to extend it).
326. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM 55 (1992) (critiquing civil rights laws and federal policy); Richard Delgado,
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the issue of whether and when to characterize decisions made in the
context of imperfect information based on indicators believed to
accurately evaluate future performance as statistically efficient327 or
empirically unpredictive328 is at the heart of a longstanding debate.329
There are also examples of employers failing to capitalize on other
economically beneficial actions,330 which run contrary to what the
neoclassical economic labor market model would suggest.331
Consequently, although general acceptance of the neoclassical
economic model is a valid departure point from which to begin an
evaluation of the general labor market, unfettered belief in the self-
corrective force of competitive market pressures within the labor field
is, despite its popular currency, unproven.
2. Disabled Worker Productivity. A second systemic shortfall in
the current neoclassical economic account is the tripartite assumption
that (1) disabled employees require accommodations; (2) these
accommodations are inherently costly; and (3) by nature, disabled
workers are less productive than their nondisabled counterparts.
Empirical studies have not established the prevalence of the need for
accommodation among disabled workers across the labor market. It is
Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?,
93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 231–42 (1998) (challenging the law and economics assertion that free
markets will correct discrimination because there are motivators of human behavior, specifically
racist behavior, that are not economic in basis and that cause people to make economically
disadvantageous decisions).
327. See generally Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in
Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1976).
328. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513,
516 (1987); Peter Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
329. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
228, 229 (1986) (examining the effect of statistical discrimination on allocative efficiency and
arguing that it can reduce efficiency).
330. For instance, high-efficiency electrical equipment is available through negawatt
acquisition programs. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets
and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1354
(1993).
331. For additional examples of alleged market failure, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728
(1984); Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 957, 957 (2001); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A
Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1574
(1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975,
985 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 618 (1995).
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reasonable to assume that some percentage of employees with
disabilities will require accommodations. The size of this group,
however, depends upon the individual circumstances of present or
prospective employees, the degree to which an employer’s worksite
and processes already are accessible, and how the term “disabled” is
conceived332 or measured.333 There is, however, no reason to suspect
that every employee with a disability requires an accommodation, as
counterexamples to any such broad generalization are abundant.334
Nor is it accurate to assume that disabled workers are by nature
less productive than their counterparts who are free of disabilities. This
may be true for some individuals with disabilities, just as certain
nondisabled workers are less productive than the majority of disabled
ones. Ultimately, individual productivity is a product of ability, aptitude,
and attitude. Hence, Mr. Rogers might be more productively employed
by a state motor vehicle office than by a time-sensitive, oil-changing
garage. In terms of ADA protection, a disabled worker is not
considered “qualified” under Title I unless she can perform the essential
job functions of her chosen occupation, either with or without
accommodation.335 A disabled employee who satisfies the requirements
of her position (by reaching the average level of required
productivity)336 without accommodation is clearly as productive as her
nondisabled peers. When accommodations are needed to accomplish
integral activities, the existence and degree of relatively lower net
productivity is affected by the ability of that disabled worker to
accomplish nonessential job functions, as well as the value of those
supplementary services to her employer.337
Two points, however, bear noting. First, as an empirical matter,
forty years of pre-ADA empirical studies indicate comparable overall
332. The definition of disability still has not been resolved more than a dozen years after the
ADA’s passage. Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword: Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 907, 908–09 (2003).
333. This is an old and important debate which has yet to be resolved. See generally THE
DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE (Richard V.
Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton eds., 2003); Alberto Martini, Why Estimates of the Number of
Persons with Disabilities Who Want to Work Diverge So Widely (Mathematica Policy Research
Paper No. 7984-001, 1991); Saad Z. Nagi, The Concept and Measurement of Disability, in
DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 1, 14 (Edward D. Berkowitz ed., 1979).
334. Consider, for a moment, the political effect of making parallel assertions in respect to
people based upon their sex or race.
335. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (2000).
336. See infra Part III.C.3.
337. This, of course, begs the question of what functions are or are not essential.
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productivity levels between disabled and nondisabled workers.338 For
example, statistics from the U.S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation
indicate that 91 percent of disabled workers were rated either “average”
or “better than average,” matching the rating given to nondisabled
workers.339 Of course, as with the accommodations studies critiqued
above, the accuracy of these studies’ findings can be called into question
on the grounds of sample size, contextuality, and inappropriateness for
extrapolation.340 This last limitation is especially true in the case of these
productivity studies because they tend to be examinations of how
individuals with particular disabilities fare in certain employment
circumstances, mostly having to do with mentally disabled individuals
performing janitorial services.341 Additionally, the studies predate the
ADA, and mostly analyze efficiency in the context of the federal
government as an employer.342 Thus, extending these findings
ecumenically across the broad spectrum of people with disabilities raises
strong econometric-based reservations.343 At the same time, these
studies have some probative value as the only (currently) available
empirical evidence.344
The second issue to note345 is that these studies fail to address
directly the circumstance of a disabled worker whose
nonaccommodated productivity is lower than average, despite the
subject’s occasional overlap with accommodation analysis. This
confluence is important, especially in the semi-efficient phase of the
accommodation cost continuum, because it raises instances in which
application of the ADA creates a contrary result from applying
338. A good review of the literature is provided by Reed Greenwood & Virginia Anne
Johnson, Employer Perspectives on Workers with Disabilities, J. REHABILITATION, July–Sept.
1987, at 37.
339. Lester & Caudill, supra note 170, at 50–51; George E. Stevens, Exploding the Myths
About Hiring the Handicapped, 63 PERSONNEL 57, 58 (1986).
340. See supra Part II.A.3.
341. See Adams-Shollenberger & Mitchell, supra note 170, at 56; Lester & Caudill, supra
note 170, at 50–51; Martin et al., supra note 170, at 146; Ondusko, supra note 170, at 19–24.
341. Presumably, or at least feasibly, with less concern about efficiency due to the resources
available.
342. The literature is reviewed in Greenwood & Johnson, supra note 338.
343. See supra Part II.A.3.
344. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1672.
345. This Article addresses disability accommodations as opposed to the even larger question of
disability employment. For a discussion of that issue, see generally Bob Dole, Are We Keeping
America’s Promises to People with Disabilities? Commentary on Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 925
(1994); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment
Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998).
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classical economic principles. Although the point will be adumbrated
in further detail below,346 for now it suffices to point out that, from an
economic viewpoint, there is no discernable difference between the
equivalent lower net products generated by (1) a worker with a
disability who does not require an accommodation but who is less
productive than a nondisabled peer; (2) the equally productive
disabled worker provided with a reasonable accommodation; or (3)
the comparatively hyperproductive worker with a disability provided
with a proportionately hyperreasonable accommodation expense.347
From the ADA’s viewpoint, however, the first worker is never
protected (because she is unable to perform the essential job
functions),348 the second worker always is (because she was able to
perform the essential job functions),349 and the third may be
protected, depending upon the total resources of the providing
employer.350
Therefore, although some disabled workers will ultimately be less
productive than their nondisabled peers, others may be more
productive. Some will indeed require accommodations, and others will
not. The assumption that any of these particular circumstances is always
the case is empirically unfounded. Instead, a proper treatment assessing
disability productivity should account for both positive and negative
value fluctuations.351
3. Equity of the Status Quo. Another deviation from the
wholehearted utilization of neoclassical economic principles in my
model is normative. The traditional paradigm operates on the
assumption that the labor market effectively disciplines irrational
prejudicial behavior (in this instance, excluding equally productive
workers), and thus maintains a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.352
Consequently, the baseline assumption is that the labor market is an
equitable one, and that deviations from its normal operation due to
regulatory mandates are economically inefficient.
346. See infra Part IV.B.1.
347. See infra Part IV.B.1.
348. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (2000).
349. Id.
350. Id. § 12,111(10)(B). The standard is discussed supra Part I.A.
351. This is a point to which I will soon turn. See infra Part III.C.2.
352. CLARK, supra note 264, at 196.
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However, the baseline of the neoclassical economic paradigm of
the labor market is a status quo designed by an empowered majority
that has already absorbed existing prejudices and made them
endogenous to future decisionmaking.353 The existence of artificial
barriers (in contrast to natural barriers),354 whether physical or
administrative,355 to workplace participation, and their acceptance as
natural, is a classic example of this inculcated bias.356 To illustrate, recall
the example of the wheelchair-using shop assistant. Suppose now that
the shop, which sells various articles for religious usage, is modeled after
St. Patrick’s Cathedral, with numerous stairs at its entrance. From a
purely economic perspective, installing an elevator next to the stairs is
an inefficient expense solely related to hiring the disabled worker
because an equivalent worker without a disability would not require this
accommodation; it is irrelevant whether the employer (or the previous
building owner) should have installed an elevator upon construction,
despite the public accommodation overlap noted above.357 But it should
be recognized as well that such a conclusion operates on an assumption
that validates the existence of the artificial barrier; in this case, the
mobility-impairing stairs. By contrast, the expenses involved in
eliminating a parallel artificial exclusion, say a racially restrictive
covenant,358 would not be deemed a validly cognizable cost, because the
latter is viewed as an irrational distaste (although the existence of the
covenant would also, at least initially, be recognized as a cost).359
Hence, any analysis that assumes market neutrality (or
equitability) has reflexively erected obstacles to antidiscrimination
principles that are entrenched in the same stereotypes the ADA and
353. Stein, supra note 286, at 200–01.
354. Some workers with disabilities will have impairments that even reasonable
accommodations will be unable to ameliorate. Although some disability rights advocates assert
that all exclusions from the workplace are artificial, I do not.
355. The ADA covers both types of barriers. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112.
356. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 20 (James P. Sterba &
Rosemarie Tong eds., 1998).
357. See Gruson, supra note 49, at B3 (listing modifications totaling $1.8 million accepted by
the manager of the Empire State Building as part of a settlement with the Justice Department).
358. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948) (holding that state enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
359. RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR., ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 272–75
(2001).
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other civil rights statutes seek to alter.360 Whether embracing these
stereotypes is an unconscious,361 semiconscious,362 conscious,363 or
cognitively biased364 decision remains hotly debated, as does the issue of
whether preferences are fixed365 or malleable.366 For now, however, it is
sufficient to say that totally accepting the neoclassical economic model’s
view that the existing prejudicial preferences built into the marketplace
are neutral will only serve to continue those stereotypes.367
Whether an emendation to the labor market’s status quo in the
form of the provision of an accommodation is an equalizing measure or
a measure which goes beyond equality is a contentious issue. Some
disability rights advocates advance the theory that the provision of
accommodations serves to ameliorate artificial exclusions from the
workplace. They analogize, for example, designing workplaces with
stairs to designing workplaces without restrooms for both sexes.368 In
contrast, nearly every academic who takes an economic approach to
analyzing the ADA maintains that Title I abludes from more traditional
360. Another example would be the expenses engendered by extending benefits normally
reserved to heterosexual couples to same-sex couples. If the initial departure point is the
provision of benefits to all individuals with life partners, then the types of relationship (and the
sex identities) are irrelevant.
361. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (offering two different
psychological explanations for unconscious racism).
362. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1331
(1988) (arguing that, in addition to unconscious thought, racism forms a hegemonic force in
American society, one in which blacks have been created as a subordinated “other”).
363. See, e.g., Alan David Freemen, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (1978) (asserting that civil rights statutes are actually used by the white majority to
legitimate the very racial inequality and oppression they were meant to remedy).
364. An especially perceptive approach is found in Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995), where Professor Krieger argues that many
prejudiced, employment-based decisions result from categorization-related decision errors, not
intentionally discriminatory motivations.
365. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977) (arguing that preferences are “stable over time”).
366. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMICS 31–32
(1988) (arguing that preferences change “as the constraints under which [people] ‘implement’
them change”).
 367.  For an application of this theory in another context, see generally William M. Landes,
The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507 (1968).
368. The philosophical underpinnings of this theory are well stated in Silvers, supra note
356.
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forms of antidiscrimination (typically, Title VII).369 Consequently, they
view the provision of accommodations as going beyond what Professor
Kelman describes as “simple” discrimination,370 and passing into
redistribution or even, in extreme circumstances, affirmative action.371
The disagreement over whether the ADA achieves an
antidiscrimination medium, supersedes it, or achieves some
combination of both, is more than merely academic.372 Where a
policymaker believes that the equality line falls, and hence where it is
irrational behavior that is averted, will inform where she draws the lines
between cost bearers. If accommodations effectuate equality, then it
will seem appropriate to lay the costs for those accommodations at the
feet of employers. On the other hand, if reasonable accommodations
are really redistributive devices, however laudable, then it would be
more apposite to have the general tax base bear those costs.373
Additionally, this issue is relevant to the debate over the undervaluation
of disabled workers’ services. Just as was found when examining the
nature of accommodations, the closer to the equality paradigm one gets,
the less fitting it is to allow an equally valuable worker (who also
happens to have a disability) to undervalue her services as the price of
369. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2000) (barring employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); see also John J. Donohue III,
Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2583, 2585–86 (1994) (documenting the evolution of the notion of equality over the twentieth
century); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 307, 314–15 (2001) (noting that the ADA requires similarly situated individuals to be
treated differently rather than more traditional requirements, exemplified by Title VII, that
similarly situated individuals be treated similarly); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 3
(“[U]nder the civil rights statutes . . . plaintiffs . . . cannot insist upon discrimination in their
favor; disabled individuals often can.”); Kelman, supra note 35, at 834–35, 851 (arguing that the
law should prohibit “simple discrimination,” which is the focus of Title VII, without limit, but
that accommodation requirements should also be limited when accommodation resources could
be better spent on other societal priorities).
370. Kelman, supra note 35, at 840.
371. Id. at 852. As a normative matter, Kelman is agnostic about whether or not such
redistribution is good or ill. MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE
BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 81–93 (1999).
372. In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern
Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000), to give one example, Judge Easterbrook
contrasted the ADA with “real anti-discrimination law[s].” Id. at 951. For an assessment of judicial
attitudes toward the ADA and their implications, see Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences,
Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285 (2003), and
Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1279, 1328 (2000).
373. See infra Part IV.C.
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gaining entry to the labor market; such underbidding would simply
compound preexisting societal prejudices.374
C. Measuring Variables
In this Part, I set forth the variables used to measure the
weighted factors in the proposed framework. Respectively, these are
willingness to pay, disabled profit, average profit, and societal
efficiency gains.
1. Willingness to Pay. Measuring and weighing the effect of
variables under a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) involves monetizing
the outcomes of proffered policy changes.375 These calculations are
frequently performed through the balancing of a “willingness to pay”
(WTP) standard as against a “willingness to accept” (WTA)
standard.376 The compensating variables (CV) test, developed by
Professor Hicks,377 measures the efficiency of two welfare positions,
normally, the status quo as against the resulting policy change. To
determine an individual’s CV, her WTP for positive change is
compared to her WTA for negative change. If the sum of all CVs for
a policy change is positive, then the policy is considered efficient.378 To
illustrate: suppose the person living in apartment A would be willing
to pay his next-door neighbor in apartment B as much as $500 not to
play Lawrence Welk music for a year, while neighbor B is unwilling
to accept less then $2,000 for the same omission.379 Polka-averse
neighbor A has a $500 CV; polka-loving neighbor B’s CV is $2,000.
374. For example, Epstein, supra note 269, and others like Schwab and Willborn, supra note 16,
claim that workers with disabilities could either underbid the value of their services or forego health
insurance benefits as a way of capturing accommodation costs. Also, working for lower
remuneration or benefits might indeed be an inducement for nondiscriminatory employers to
engage workers with disabilities. However, it would also reinforce the devaluation of those
individuals beset by unfounded stereotypes, and so continue market failure. Acceding to employers’
tastes by bribing them through reduced compensation also reduces whatever social good and
external benefits can arise from equal pay and occupational dignity. In addition, because the
prospects of recovering the cost of education and training are influenced by prevailing market
conditions, utility will be lost as a result of reduced willingness among the disabled to invest in their
own human capital.
375. ZERBE, supra note 359, at 7.
376. Id.
377. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 189, at 177–80.
378. ZERBE, supra note 359, at 7.
379. See generally COYNE STEVEN SANDERS & GINNY WEISSMAN, CHAMPAGNE MUSIC:
THE LAWRENCE WELK SHOW (1985) (describing the pre-elevator music of this former mainstay
of Saturday night television).
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Although A would like a law passed to restrict B’s musical taste,
because B’s net CV is $1500 greater than that of A, no law would be
passed in respect to A’s preference. However, if ten other mutual
neighbors (or anti-polka activists) felt the same way as A does, the
collective CV would be $5,000. In that circumstance, a noise pollution
ordinance would then be efficient under the CV test since the
collective CVs exceed neighbor B’s CV by $3,000.380
When measuring the reasonableness of accommodations, the
operative CV is that of WTP, rather than WTA, for the practical
reason that the ADA does not allow workers with disabilities to
contribute toward the cost of their accommodations. This is for two
inflexible, statutory reasons. First, the operative notion is that the
accommodation requested is reasonable if it is expedient. Thus,
accepting a lower-costing accommodation would be accepting an
unreasonable accommodation.381 Second, the cost of a reasonable
accommodation cannot be borne by disabled employees through a
reduction in their wages.382 Both options are certainly plausible from
an economic perspective, but fall outside the ADA, which prohibits
wage reduction,383 and thus my analysis.384 Moreover, a vast
quantitative gulf empirically divides WTP from WTA.385 For instance,
in the context of environmental rights, researchers discovered that
380. If all this smells “Coasean,” it should. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (applying this form of analysis in the context of negligence
law). Coase’s concept of transaction costs is discussed in greater detail infra Part IV.A.2.
381. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1995).
382. However, Epstein and Schwab and Willborn suggest exactly this. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 269, at 484; Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1279.
383. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(4) (2000) (including the denial of “equal jobs or benefits” in
the construction of “discriminate”).
384. It does, however, raise the important issue of whether restrictions on wage reduction
(or, to be more accurate, mandates of wage equality), act as a disincentive for employers hiring
disabled workers. This argument was initially articulated by EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 361, but
elaborated upon by Jolls, supra note 15, at 255–61. Combining their assertions (Epstein’s was
strictly theoretical; Jolls’s contained an empirical model), the thrust of the argument is that
employers may have already hired disabled workers—or, more likely, some of their able-bodied
workers may have become disabled—in which case they are required by a well-enforced law to
continue their wage equality. At the same time, these same employers, wishing to avoid taking
on accommodation costs, will avoid hiring new employees with visibly detectable disabilities.
This is especially so when the laws enforcing hiring decisions are as impotent as detailed above,
see supra Part I.A and accompanying text.
385. See, e.g., Daniel Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 493, 506–15 (1994) (noting that in the context of environmental goods, the divergence
might be significant).
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WTA valuations ranged from three to nineteen times higher than
WTP valuations.386 This type of deviation is exacerbated when the
right in question is considered unique by the person valuing WTA, as
might well be the case in employment.387
2. Disabled Profit. To properly capture the range of disabled
workers, both those who will require accommodations and those who
will not, I utilize a variable for disabled profit (DP). This variable
reflects the total employer net profit on any given employee with a
disability, calculated as the total profit gains produced by that
individual disabled worker (DG), plus any quantifiable external
benefits that accrue due to the provision of accommodation (QB),
minus the disabled worker’s salary (WS), her accommodation costs
(AC), and any quantifiable costs (QC). Thus, algebraically: DP = DG
+ QB – (WS + AC + QC).
DP, therefore, reflects the net benefit conferred upon the
employer through the employment transaction and accounts for the
possibility of the disabled employee capturing any amount of
quantifiable external benefits, from negative to positive. In instances
where no external benefit is engendered, QB has no value (so that
QB = 0). This is also true where there are no external costs involved,
(AC = 0). For the purposes of manageable hypotheticals, this Article
assumes both QB and AC have zero values. In the real world,
however, assessable external benefits and costs388 can both range from
zero onwards, so that in reality (QB ≥ 0) and (AC ≥ 0). The DP
variable is neutral, thereby accounting for high, low, and no
accommodation costs, contingent upon what workplace alterations
are requested in each individual circumstance. Thus, as a variable, DP
allows for inclusion in the calculus the entire range of quantifiable
accommodation costs, which will vary from employee to employee.
3. Average Profit. One weakness of the DP variable is that it is
difficult to disaggregate the productivity of any given employee.389
386. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Linda J. Graham, The Role of Rights in Benefit Cost
Methodology: The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74 WASH. L. REV. 763, 769
(1999).
387. Id.
388. See supra Part II.A.
389. Parenthetically, because my model assumes that employees are of equal value as they
enter a given employment, DP does not capture two variables within the full range of
“opportunity cost.” Specifically, assuming profit maximization and a diminishing marginal
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People frequently work in tandem with others, and their productivity
is affected by this synergy,390 as well as by a myriad assortment of
other considerations.391 Unless a real life scenario mirrors a
hypothetical one in which employees manufacture a particular item,
say a widget, and the level of acceptable productivity is absolutely
known, e.g., fifty widgets a day, it is difficult to accurately measure
individual productivity.392
One way to address the issue of absolutely quantifying individual
productivity is to assign a value for an employer’s average yearly
profit from each employee (AP). Doing so takes into account two
realities of the workplace: first, that some employees are consistently
product of labor, a firm will hire workers until marginal cost (MC) is equal to the marginal
benefit (MB). Assume that such a firm hires a disabled worker while MB is still greater than
MC for every worker and that the marginal benefit of hiring a disabled worker (MBd) is less
than that of a nondisabled worker (MBnd). Such a hire would be net profitable. The hiring of
more workers, however, affects previously hired workers. At the point when MC = MBnd
(profit maximization), MC > MBd. This simply illustrates that in reality the net profitability
standard effectively requires employers to endure extra costs. Secondly, it is conceivable that
hiring an individual disabled worker could force a corresponding nondisabled worker onto
public assistance, hence evoking a negative externality.
390. Much like any team (sports or otherwise), the total working group can exceed the sum
of its parts and is affected by numerous, interconnected factors. See generally MURRAY
AINSWORTH, MANAGING PERFORMANCE, MANAGING PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING AND
IMPROVING TEAM PERFORMANCE (2002) (examining factors relevant to workplace
performance); BRIAN DIVE, THE HEALTHY ORGANIZATION: A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
TO PEOPLE & MANAGEMENT (2002) (discussing how to develop a healthy organization);
RONALD R. SIMS, ORGANIZATIONAL SUCCESS THROUGH EFFECTIVE HUMAN RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT (2002) (explaining that management of human resources is the key to success).
391. What, exactly, makes people at work more productive remains both a mystery as well
as a holy grail for human resource scholars. The theories paraded about, some of which seem
more plausible than others, have an amazing range. See, e.g., John Philip Bachner, Eliminate
Those Glaring Errors: Adjust Quality, Not Quantity, of Light to Improve Worker Productivity
and Reap Bottom-Line Benefits, 43 MANAGING OFF. TECH. 16 (1998) (illuminating in more
effective ways); James T. Berger, Flower Power: Beyond Pure Aesthetics, Scientific Studies Show
Interior Landscaping Cleans the Air and Provides a Catalyst for Worker Productivity, 67 J. PROP.
MGMT. 25 (2002) (providing interior plants); Shari Caudron, Humor is Healthy in the
Workplace, 71 PERSONNEL J. 63 (1992) (increasing mirth); Elizabeth Danziger, Minimize Office
Gossip, 67 PERSONNEL J. 31 (1988) (opening formal lines of communication); Terri Gutierrez &
R. John Freese, Dress-Down Days: Benefit or Burden?, 69 CPA J. 32 (1999) (informalizing
work-wear); Daniel McGinn, No Place to Hide Stuff: Can Funky New Furniture Make Us More
Productive?, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1997, at 50 (modernizing interior design).
392. Although this is precisely what law professors and economists, especially law and
economics professors, do. On rare occasions, employers also do so. See Fisher v. Transco Servs.-
Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1241–42 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing how the defendant used a
“Measured Day Work Program” in its grocery warehouse to ensure that employees actively
worked for four hundred seven of the four hundred eighty minutes in each workday).
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more productive than others;393 and second, that even within the
group of more productive employees, those workers are human.394
Using an average yearly net profit amount (in lieu of daily or weekly
ones) as a variable recognizes that employers either have an overall
fixed production objective to extract from its workforce that can then
be divided by the number of its employees, and/or that employers
seek a certain net productivity margin from any given employee that
may vary from day to day, but will in the end average out to a certain
level. Thus, the employer’s AP is equal to the average productivity of
employees less their average salary. This variable may thus be used as
a baseline. An employer expects to get an average employee who will
have average productivity and profitability. In the end, some will be
better widget producers than others, but on average the absolute
number of widgets can be calculated, minus the average salary for
widget makers. The figure also assumes there are no accommodation
costs or benefits associated with hiring or retaining the average
nondisabled worker, which in all likelihood is an illusory
assumption.395
4. Social Benefit Gain. Social Benefit Gain (SBG) is the total
assessable benefit reaped by society in having an economically viable
disabled worker employed instead of receiving social benefits. The
utility inuring to society, called the SBG, is measured as the
equivalent of the disabled worker’s salary (WS), plus all quantifiable
benefits (QB), including the savings of public assistance costs that
would be engendered by having that worker excluded from the labor
market, less the accommodation cost (AC) and any quantifiable
negative externalities (QC). Algebraically, this can be stated as: SBG
= (WS + QB) – (AC + QC). To illustrate, compare two instances, the
first involving an employable worker with a disability, and the second,
an unemployable disabled worker.
393. Within the legal academy, one has only to look at the hundreds of dazzling articles and
many books published by scholars Cass Sunstein and Richard Posner to grasp this point about
human variation (and also feel humbled).
394. Put colloquially, everyone has good and bad days. See generally JON R. KATZENBACH,
PEAK PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF YOUR EMPLOYEES (2000)
(arguing that worker satisfaction is critical to successful businesses).
395. Accommodation costs could include myriad circumstances, including allowing a worker
to watch his daughter’s soccer game. As to benefits, these can mirror those cited above with
respect to hiring and retaining disabled employees. See supra Part II.A.2.
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First, take the case of Sally, a severely hard-of-hearing worker.
To perform the essential job functions of an office manager, a job that
pays a $50,000 salary, Sally requires a part-time American Sign
Language (ASL) interpreter at an annual cost of $10,000. If Sally
does not obtain this job, she will receive public assistance at a yearly
cost of $12,000 (QB);396 if Sally is employed, she will contribute taxes
at a rate that can be represented by the fraction (WS/T).397 Depending
on the size and resources of an employer, accommodating Sally may
or may not be reasonable, and thus the economic efficiency of
employing her as an office manager will be contextually specific to
that employer. From a societal perspective, however, the efficiency
gains of having Sally in the workplace will produce a significant SBG
value. Sally has a SBG of $52,000 + $50,000/T; that is, her salary of
$50,000 (WS) + ($12,000 (QB) + $50,000/T (QB)) – ($10,000 (AC) +
$0 (QC)). Otherwise, in the case of unemployment, Sally has a SBG
of -$12,000 + $0/T; because $0(WS) + ($0(QB) + $0/T(QB)) –
($0(AC) + $12,000(QC)). Under this analysis, it is in society’s
interests that Sally be employed, and that her requested
accommodation be paid for.
Sally’s hypothetical also raises a tangential issue that is likewise
not directly addressed by the ADA, but is pertinent to this inquiry.398
Suppose that Sally can perform all the essential job functions as a
proofreader without an accommodation, and could earn a salary of
$20,000. From a private employer’s perspective, Sally is as
economically efficient as a non-hearing impaired employee. But is the
statute’s purpose “merely” to place a worker with a disability in any
achievable position of employment, or is it designed to maximize that
particular individual’s utility, as in the case of being an office
396. This is not, unfortunately, a far-fetched possibility. See Louis Uchitelle, Laid-Off
Workers Swelling the Cost of Disability Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1 (discussing the
recent surge in Social Security disability rolls). For more empirically-based estimates of transfer
populations, see infra note 538 and accompanying text.
397. The denominator variable, T, can vary depending on the graduated tax rate. In the
scenario presented in the text that follows, it is possible (although not necessarily true) that the
graduated tax rate will differ between two jobs which pay different salaries. The point to be
taken away, however, is that a variable is provided which accounts for contributions back to the
public fisc.
398. Professor Verkerke’s article on “matching” also neglects this point, although it would
seem that a basic tenet of matching would be how productive an employee ought to be. See
Verkerke, supra note 14. To be fair, Verkerke’s analysis still functions (albeit in a bit of a
vacuum from reality) so that an answer to this question is not really necessary (but would have
been helpful as well as stimulating).
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manager? The framework that I propose allows for both
alternatives.399 Where the private employer bears the reasonable
accommodation costs, it is more likely (contingent upon the economy
of the employer) that the disabled worker will have been ADA-
matched as a proofreader. Where the employer is either a private
employer and the calculus falls within Kaldor-Hicks welfare
efficiency, or the employer is a state entity that can in turn
redistribute costs, the disabled worker might have the option of being
an office manager. Note that the circumstances wherein greater
accommodation costs are borne by any provider dovetail with
increasing social utility.400
In cases where the disabled worker is unemployable, the wholly
inefficient SBG will equal zero or less (because any amount greater
than zero is still a positive gain). In this circumstance, the only
economically viable option is to exclude those individuals from
workplace opportunity.401 To achieve this status, a disabled individual
would be unable to hold any position, even with the provision of an
accommodation, and still produce a net social gain of $1. As a result,
this individual would receive payments from the government as a
means of compensating her exclusion from the labor market.
An admitted shortcoming of this variable is that it limits itself to
quantifiable benefits, whereas society also gains benefits that cannot
be easily quantified (what Blanck called “ripple effects”402). When an
unemployed disabled person is able to hold a job due to the provision
of an accommodation, or an employed disabled person is able to find
399. I therefore agree with some of the arguments made by Paulette M. Caldwell. See
Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII
Litigation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 555, 579–83 (1985) (arguing that Title VII enhances workplace
efficiency by increasing the pool of qualified applicants of members of the protected class
through the elimination of employment discrimination).
400. See generally John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337 (1989) (supporting antidiscrimination legislation
from an economic perspective).
401. Although some might argue that, regardless of economic manifestations, workers with
disabilities have a right to work and thus be productive (or at least active) members of society.
E.g., Kavka, supra note 185, at 274. See also Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra note
251 (arguing an interesting variation on this theme, that not only should individuals capable of
any gainful employment be required to work, but that society has a duty to so assist them). I
discuss Wax’s proposal within the context of Socially Efficient, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare
Enhancing, infra Part IV.B.
402. Berven & Blanck, supra note 178, at 89.
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and keep a better job, society gains in several intangible ways,
including increased investment in human capital.403
IV.  THE ACCOMMODATION COST CONTINUUM
The proposed law and economics model for assessing the
reasonableness of disability-related accommodations spans a
continuum of accommodation costs. These run the gamut from
Wholly Efficient Accommodations (some of which are provided
voluntarily and others that would be provided voluntarily absent a
market failure), to Socially Efficient Accommodations (including
Semi-Efficient Accommodations coerced through ADA litigation
because they extract a differential cost from employers, and Social
Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations, where individual workers
and general society benefit, but employers do not), to Wholly
Inefficient Accommodations (wherein excluding workers with
disabilities is the only economically feasible option). The
accommodation cost continuum may be diagrammed as:
The accommodation cost continuum can also be conceived of
schematically as covering a range of economic effects, from Pareto
Efficient Accommodations (wherein both disabled employees and
their employers benefit without loss) to Kaldor-Hicks Efficient
Accommodations (encompassing an area of semi-efficient
accommodations in which both disabled workers and their employers
benefit but employers benefit less than if they discriminate against
disabled workers, and SBG accommodations where disabled workers
and society benefit, but not employers), to Wholly Inefficient
Accommodations (wherein disabled workers benefit, but gains are
403. See infra Part IV.B.
Semi-Efficient
Accommodations
Social Benefit
Gain Efficient
Accommodations
Wholly
Inefficient
Accommodations
Quasi-Voluntary
Accommodations
Voluntarily
Made
Accommodations
More Profit    Less Profit           100 + 100                    0 0 -
  DP ≥ AP   DP ≥ AP  AP > DP > 0     SBG > 0     SBG < 0
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Greater
Profit
Lesser
not achieved by either employers or society at large). The
accommodation cost continuum may be presented in chart form as:
The following subsections discuss each phase of the continuum in
turn, beginning with wholly efficient accommodations and proceeding
through wholly inefficient accommodations.
A. Wholly Efficient (Pareto Optimal) Accommodations
1. Voluntarily Made Accommodations. The section of the
continuum entitled “Voluntarily Made Accommodations” reflects
instances in which employers voluntarily hire, retain, and
accommodate disabled employees at their own expense.404 The
reasons why an employer chooses to accommodate a worker can be
fairly complex, including reasons that are typically considered to be
economically inefficient:405 a strong relationship exists between an
employer and an able-bodied employee406 prior to the
404. The same incentives that operate for the provision of accommodations in this section
also apply to the hiring and retention of equally disabled workers who do not require
accommodations.
405. Epstein characterizes these motivations as arising from “pity,” EPSTEIN, supra note
269, at 486, but they need not.
406. The transmogrification of able-bodied individuals into people with disabilities is,
among minority groups, an almost unique phenomenon (the exceptions being those people of
color who had previously “passed” as white or did not know their identities, see, e.g., Trina
Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000), and those few
individuals who change their sex), and contributes to reducing the sense of “otherness.” It is for
this reason that I have opposed proposals to narrow Title I’s definition of disability to the
“seriously” disabled, even though to date the largest category of people asserting Title I claims
are able-bodied individuals who conceive back-related maladies. Although grounded in
anecdote, I believe that when a known and valued able-bodied employee transmogrifies into a
known and valued employee with a disability, the disabled community as a whole benefits.
Wholly Efficient Accommodations
Voluntarily Made Accommodations
Quasi-Voluntary Accommodations
PARETO OPTIMAL
Semi-Efficient Accommodations
(ADA Accommodations)
KALDOR-HICKS
WELFARE ENHANCING
Socially Efficient Accommodations
(SBG Accommodations)
KALDOR-HICKS
WELFARE ENHANCING
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations WHOLLY INEFFICIENT
MANDATES
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engaged, however, motivations beyond the strictly economically
efficient are not addressed.412 Consequently, as stipulated under the
neoclassical economic model of the labor market, employers act in
their own interests and want to maximize their individual profits. In
the normal course of events, they respond to economic pressures
which stimulate them to either hire, retain, and/or accommodate
disabled employees because Voluntarily Made Accommodations are
wholly efficient (from both a net profit and a Pareto perspective) for
the providing employer.413
The primary reason for an employer to voluntarily hire, retain,
and perhaps provide an accommodation to an employee with an
immediately discernable disability (or one that is either revealed or
manifests after a job offer has been extended)414 is that that employee
Aug. 19, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and afterwards as president of another
organization with similar goals: the Dole Foundation for Employment of People with
Disabilities.
412. These motivations, although laudable, are not predictable and thus not useful for
building an economic model capable of repetition and certainty.
413. Sometimes employers also respond to a combination of incentives, for instance, hiring
mentally retarded people to perform menial, low-paid tasks. The studies cited, see supra Part
II.A.1., present the positive results of these actions, but there are also less happy endings. See
EEOC v. CEC Entm’t, Inc., No. 98-C-698-X, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 14,
2000) (ordering CEC to rehire a mentally disabled former employee); EEOC v. Hertz Corp.,
No. 96-72421, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1998) (upholding the dismissal of
two mentally disabled, job-coached workers on the grounds that making an accommodation
does not concede reasonableness).
414. Pursuant to Title I, employers cannot inquire into the history, existence, or extent of a
person’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(4)(A) (2000); see Chai Feldblum, Medical
Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 531 (1991) (analyzing “the medical examinations and inquiries section of
the employment title of the ADA” using legislative history). Conversely, when a person has a
disability that is not readily ascertainable and does not disclose to her employer the existence of
her disability, she will not be protected under the ADA’s auspices. Id. Much as, under Title VII,
if a person’s religious convictions prevent her from performing her employment, she is not
protected unless she had previously disclosed that limitation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Unif.
Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1985) (denying recourse to an employee who was terminated
for missing work on religious holidays because she had not informed her employer of the
holidays). This raises a very interesting (but secondary) issue relating to individuals without
discernable disabilities that I have not seen addressed in the literature. Professor Verkerke’s
article analyzes the circumstance of a not-readily knowable disability in the context of what
happens when that nondiscernable impairment prevents the employee from fulfilling her
essential job functions (“mismatching”), and discusses the implications for her firing
(“churning”) and possible exclusion from similar future employment (“scarring”). Verkerke,
supra note 14. Not addressed was the flip side of this issue. First, for the purposes of attempting
to enculturate within a firm and avoid prejudice, when should a person with a nonvisible
disability disclose that disability? This is an especially pertinent question if the disability in
question is an episodic one and/or a mental disability that is likely to encounter strong prejudice.
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is considered to be equally as productive as, or more productive than
(and hence net profitable), an alternatively available employee
without a disability. Recall from the discussion above that to be
protected under its auspices, the ADA stipulates that employees with
disabilities must be qualified,415 meaning that they are as productive as
an equivalent, nondisabled employee either with or without the
provision of a reasonable accommodation416 (i.e., DP must always
equal or exceed AP). Workers with disabilities can be at least as
profitable as nondisabled workers and bring about Voluntarily Made
Accommodations through three typical circumstances: (1) the
disabled employee can be one who is hyperproductive and does not
require an accommodation; (2) the worker with a disability can be
hyperproductive to the extent that his higher-than-average
productivity balances out or exceeds the cost of an accommodation;
or (3) the employee with a disability can be of average productivity
and not need a workplace accommodation. Note that only the second
instance raises the prospect of an ADA accommodation.
Returning to the earlier example of widget production as a
means of absolutely measuring and defining acceptable levels of
production,417 assume that Gidget, a person with the condition spina
bifida,418 applies for a job at Worldwide Widget Works (WWW).
Assume further that the average output for any given employee at
WWW is fifty widgets a day (AP = 50). Accordingly, any widget
worker who will, at year’s end, have achieved an AP of 50 or higher
will be considered an acceptable laborer. Finally, for simplicity’s sake,
suppose that employing Gidget does not engender, either positively
See generally SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2002) (examining the implications of the ADA for
persons with mental disabilities). Second, does the notion of constructive notice, which is not
universally accepted as case law in the Title VII context, extend to disability discrimination?
415. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8).
416. Id.
417. See supra Part III.C.3.
418. Medically defined as an “embryologic failure of fusion of one or more vertebral
arches,” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 115, at 1671, spina bifida can manifest
a wide variety of functional limitations, and therefore presents a disabling condition especially
conducive to the changing hypothetical utilized in this section. See generally Birgitte M. Blatter
et al., Heterogeneity of Spina Bifida, 55 TERATOLOGY 224 (1997) (documenting the association
of specific types of spina bifida with general risk factors for the disease); Ineke M. Pit-ten Cate
et al., Disability and Quality of Life in Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 317 (2002) (discussing “the impact of severity and type of
condition and family resources on quality of life in children with spina bifida and
hydrocepahlus”).
011204 STEIN.DOC 01/30/04  9:04 AM
2003] DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS 149
or negatively, any externalities peculiar to her hiring (we assumed
above the equally fictional circumstance of nondisabled workers also
not engendering externalities) such that both (QB = 0) and (QC = 0).
In hypothetical (1), Gidget the widget-maker can produce on
average some number higher than fifty widgets a day (DG > 50) and
also does not require an accommodation (AC = 0). Thus her DP value
is higher than fifty  because (DP > 50) = (DG > 50) – (AC = 0). By
producing a DP net of fifty-plus widgets, Gidget is, all in all, an
exceptional WWW employee. This is because, regardless of her
ultimate gross production value, Gidget’s net profitability is greater
than that of the average widget-maker, i.e., DP > AP. In hypothetical
(2), Gidget is still hyperproductive. Assume that she generates fifty-
five widgets a day (DG = 55), but requires an accommodation from
WWW to do so. If the accommodation cost (AC) is six or more
widgets a day, then Gidget will no longer fit the profile of a
voluntarily accommodated worker at WWW. This is due to Gidget’s
net profit being lower than that of the average widget-maker,
regardless of whether the accommodation costs six or any number
higher than six. Mathematically, this is because (DP < 50) = (DG =
55) – (AC > 6); hence, since AP = 50, AP > DP.419 Finally, in
hypothetical (3), Gidget’s productivity is average, such that DG = AP
= 50, and she does not require WWW to provide her with any
accommodation, so that AC = 0. In this circumstance, where DP =
AP, Gidget is considered to be fungible with her nondisabled peers
and should, all things considered, be voluntarily hired or retained.420
Although both positive and negative externalities have been
assumed away, each of these possible scenarios can incorporate the
type of externalities described above.421 For instance, positive benefits
could include increased productivity and lower job turnover rates.
Negative externalities could include the accommodation, whether
engendering hard or soft costs. Additionally, the negative costs
419. On the other hand, using this baseline, any accommodation that costs five or fewer
widgets a day will place Gidget’s economic production back under the first hypothetical of
hyperproductivity.
420. Idiosyncratic occurrences—e.g., Gidget wore a bright orange shirt to her interview and
the human resource manager has an aversion to the color orange and anyone who would wear a
garment of that color—are discounted both in economic and in rights-based assessments due to
their unlikely capability of repetition. For a discussion of why this is so, see Mark Kelman, Does
Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91, 94 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers
eds., 2000); Kelman, supra note 35, at 863–64.
421. See supra Part II.A.2.
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related to litigation avoidance422—whether realistically in response to
assessed nuisance value settlements423 or, alternatively, from fears of
potential liability,424 including loss of reputation or good will—could
tip the efficiency balance in favor of hiring or retaining a disabled
employee.425 When viewed in light of the empirical data
demonstrating the extent to which employers overwhelmingly win
Title I cases,426 this argument would seem to carry less probative
value. It does, however, bear noting.427
422. See Thornton H. Brooks et al., Second Generation Problems Facing Employers in
Employment Discrimination Cases: Continuing Violations, Pendent State Claims, and Double
Attorneys’ Fees, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 43–51 (Autumn 1986) (discussing the prospect
of increased employment discrimination litigation).
423. See generally D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (considering “a model of the legal dispute
allowing for the occurrence of . . . nuisance suits”).
424. This is usually a standard argument in other civil rights contexts, despite changes in
litigation incentives due to the manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the
provision of attorneys’ fees in Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (interpreting Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to include attorney’s fees among the costs that can be shifted back to
defendants when plaintiffs obtain a judgment that is less than that proffered pretrial where the
statute under which they have litigated would have permitted plaintiff attorney fees). See
generally Roy D. Simon, Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offers of
Judgment and Statutory Attorneys Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 889 (1984) (analyzing the case before
the Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesney and its possible ramifications). This has affected other
types of cases as well. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable
Attorney’s Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 538
(1990) (“[M]any civil rights plaintiffs with colorable claims cannot find attorneys willing to
represent them. The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions,
a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.”).
425. It could also be one reason (among many, including better workplace relations) that
the option of undergoing mediation through the EEOC has been a popular way of addressing
Title I disputes. The last EEOC Report to Congress represented that “[a]n overwhelming
majority of the participants (91 percent of charging parties and 96 percent of respondents)
indicated that they would be willing to participate in the mediation program again if they were a
party to an EEOC charge.” E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Evaluation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Mediation Program (Sept. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/summary.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Some
commentators are (pleasantly) surprised that the EEOC can be at all effective in light of its
dearth of resources. E.g., Kathryn Moss, Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
426. See supra Part I.B.
427. There is another type of market failure that could be raised, one which might be called
“the externality of public assistance.” Even if both employer and potential employee are fully
informed and bargaining costs are zero, it may be that the employer will fail to hire, retain, or
accommodate an individual despite such a decision increasing overall welfare. And, absent the
hire, the individual may go on public assistance, as is described infra Part IV.B. Both of these
steps might be seen as an “externality” in that these nonhiring/retaining firms do not internalize
costs when making employment decisions. There is some precedent for treating such factors as
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Consequently, this section of the accommodation cost continuum
reflects instances when the provision of accommodations (as well as
the hiring and retaining of disabled workers who do not require
accommodations) is wholly efficient and brings about a state of
Pareto optimality. In this dynamic, both the disabled employees and
their employers gain, and no one loses.
2. Quasi-Voluntary Accommodations. This next phase of the
accommodation cost continuum covers workplace decisions wherein
an employer chooses not to employ or retain a disabled worker, even
though that worker (whether or not needing an accommodation) is at
least as profitable as an alternative nondisabled worker. Assuming
once more that all positive and negative externalities have been
accounted for (in this instance, both posited at zero), the disabled
worker’s productivity would encompass the same three possibilities as
those in the previous continuum section on Voluntarily Made
Accommodations. To reiterate, (1) the disabled employee can be one
who is hyperproductive and does not require an accommodation
(Gidget is both super-productive and cost-free); (2) the worker with a
disability can be hyperproductive to the extent that her higher-than-
average productivity balances out or exceeds the cost of an
accommodation (Gidget needs an accommodation but makes up for
its cost); or (3) the employee with a disability can be of average
productivity and not require an accommodation (Gidget is an average
worker).
Accordingly, this section of the accommodation cost continuum
is concerned with market failure. This is because the Quasi-Voluntary
part of the continuum captures cases wherein hiring or retaining
disabled employees would achieve a wholly efficient, net profitable,
Pareto optimal equilibrium wherein everyone gains and no one loses.
externalities to the employer. In fact, one justification for refusal to enforce contracts “in
restraint of trade” at common law was that such contracts deprived individuals bound by them
of the ability to work and support themselves and thus forced such individuals to turn to the
state for their livelihood. The paradigm case was one in which an individual sold a business and
then agreed not to pursue his chosen field in the whole kingdom or jurisdiction. Courts said that
such an agreement would harm society by causing individuals to leave the jurisdiction or turn to
the state to support themselves. Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79
B.U. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1999). One could therefore make similar arguments in the ADA context:
that is, that by failing to hire someone an employer imposes some costs on the State that would
not otherwise be there. I have not included such an expense in this section of the
accommodation cost continuum since I do not believe that it makes sense to speak of a “public
assistance externality” so far as employers are concerned.
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Nonetheless, these workplace opportunities do not manifest. In
consequence, lawsuits and other remedial actions to remedy exclusion
from the type of workplace participation raised in this part of the
continuum seek to correct this market failure. In other words,
abrogating individual employers’ decisions, and thus their autonomy,
in this part of the continuum corrects those employers who were
previously inefficient. The ADA itself only briefly addresses the
notion of market correction. While it characterizes the denial of
reasonable accommodations to qualified workers with disabilities as a
form of discrimination,428 and authorizes subsequent private and
public action,429 it does not go any further. Although I agree with the
statute’s estimation, simply labeling these employers’ activities as
discriminatory does not bring one any closer to understanding and
remedying, at least from an economically based, theoretical
perspective, their source.430
Employers usually respond to the standard motivation posited in
the neoclassical economic model of the labor market. When they do
not, and as a result create a market failure, it is for three main
reasons. In order of increasing likelihood these are (1) an employer’s
distaste for hiring or retaining disabled workers; (2) subjective
ignorance of the true costs and benefits of such actions; and, relatedly,
(3) reliance upon seemingly objective proxies in making these
determinations that turn out to be empirically inaccurate.
An employer may have a “taste” for discrimination.431 Thus,
despite knowing that the potential or current employee with a
disability (depending upon circumstances, either with or without
an accommodation) will be at least as profitable as an
alternative, nondisabled employee, the employer nonetheless
hires or retains nondisabled workers. As with race or sex, the
employer may wish to discriminate.432 This systemic
428. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining discrimination as, among other
actions, “not making reasonable accommodations” absent the showing of an undue hardship).
429. The public action begins with filing a complaint with the EEOC, then in proceeding to
court. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1640–1641 (2002); MICHAEL FAILLACE, DISABILITY LAW DESKBOOK: THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THE WORKPLACE 2–13 (2003).
430. Nonetheless, successfully litigating these occurrences should bring about that
information exchange. As seen above, supra Part I.B., the likelihood of victory is slight.
431. BECKER, supra note 266, at 39–45.
432. Id.; see also William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 507, 508 (1968) (investigating whether “fair employment laws improved the economic
position of racial and religious minorities”); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism
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discrimination433 (which in a doctrinal analysis would fall under
disparate treatment)434 can arise from the employer’s own
aversion to people with disabilities, or can result from similar
feelings among the employer’s clients or existing workers. It is
irrelevant435 whether the source of such negative preferences is
based in animus (“I don’t like people with cerebral palsy”),436
discomfort (“I personally have nothing against people with
cerebral palsy, but they give me the creeps”),437 or rational
and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV., June 1972, at 659 (arguing that statistical analysis can be a
basis for discrimination).
433. Systematic discrimination need not be intentional. This is because the employer’s
action is either “a formal, facially discriminatory policy” or one that identifies individuals within
a particular protected group who are then excluded informally. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 610 (1993). This is true even when the motivation is itself unconscious because of
stereotyping, social norms, or cognitive categories. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I
See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953 (1993) (arguing that racism can be a result of whites not recognizing that some things which
are uniquely white are not universal); Krieger, supra note 364, at 1161 (questioning “the
premise that discrimination necessarily manifests intent or motive”); Lawrence, supra note 361,
at 322 (arguing that “[t]raditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither
intentional . . . nor unintentional”); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993) (“demonstrat[ing] that much employment discrimination is
the result of tortious acts that are most appropriately described as negligent”). For precisely this
reason, one commentator has argued from an economic perspective that such categories ought
to be eliminated. See generally Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129
(1999) (concluding that combating unconscious bias with a scheme modeled on Title VII is
unlikely to be effective). A robust rebuttal to this proposal is provided by Michael Selmi,
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999).
434. This theory is demonstrated through the use of circumstantial evidence, as provided in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989). Which test is used depends upon the circumstances involved. See generally
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 564 (1996) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with
several Supreme Court decisions, has “begun the development of a new, uniform structure for
disparate treatment discrimination which will eliminate much of the complexity and confusion
presently existing”).
435. By this I mean that it is irrelevant from a doctrinal point of view. From an academic
perspective, I have argued elsewhere that disability-based discrimination stems in greater measure
from pity and paternalism than from animus, and so is more analogous to sex than to race. See
Silvers & Stein, supra note 29.
436. Several examples of this perspective were compiled by Congress during the legislative
hearings on the ADA in S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6–7 (1989). The more compelling anecdotal
evidence included testimony by a wheelchair-using future undersecretary of the Department of
Education who was removed from an auction house for being reckoned “disgusting to look at.”
Id.
437. See, e.g., id. (relating how an academically competitive and nondisruptive child was
barred from attending public school because of a teacher’s allegation that his physical
appearance “produced a nauseating effect” upon classmates).
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economic preference (“I actually like people with cerebral palsy,
but my workers and clients do not”). This situation is,
interestingly enough, just the one that Epstein described in
Forbidden Grounds.438 And although most economists would
disagree with Epstein in so far as holding that such preferences
should not, and normally are not, validated in a proper cost-
benefit analysis, Epstein is absolutely correct in recognizing that
such feelings exist.439 In sociological terms, this dynamic is
described as one arising from “existential anxiety.”440
Second, employers are sometimes personally ignorant of the
actual costs and benefits of accommodations.441 An employer may
overestimate the costs of an accommodation, may not be familiar with
the potential benefits and costs that can be associated with providing
accommodations, or may include unsubstantiated costs (or benefits)
when calculating productivity.442
This form of market failure is caused by informational
asymmetry.443 The basic point that should be recollected here is that
438. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 487.
439. Justice Kennedy recently recognized this fact. See Bd. of Treasurers of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[P]ersons with mental or physical
impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as
well as from malicious ill will.”).
440. The term originates with Professor Harlan Hahn, a political scientist at the University
of Southern California and one of the founders of the Disability Studies movement, who
asserted that repugnance to disabled bodily difference combined with fear of also attaining such
variation in the future, results in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from
the mainstream. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The
Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41, 45 (1996); Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics
of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 SOC. SCI. J. 87, 93–96, 100 (1985).
441. See generally John F. Newman & Roxan E. Dinwoodie, Impact of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on Private Sector Employers, 20 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 3 (1996)
(reporting on a study of 20,000 private sector employers in Georgia, which found that employers
lacked information about both the ADA and workers with disabilities).
442. An example from the academic realm is provided by Verkerke, supra note 14, who
believes that the reasonableness of an accommodation will vary depending on whether the job
in question is high- or low-risk. Id. at 941–43. His argument necessarily assumes that people with
disabilities are at greater risk of danger and are also less capable of protecting themselves from
those hazards. This is a proposition without any basis in empirical fact, although one could
plausibly interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S.
73 (2002), to be in harmony with this presupposition. See id. at 76 (holding that a prospective
employee who is a threat to his own safety may be denied an employment opportunity under
the ADA).
443. Since the 1960s, economists have recognized the importance of information when
modifying pre-existing economic models. The seminal article is by George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (analyzing economic organization in
light of the search for information).
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information itself also costs something to acquire. As such, real-world
results might differ from those academic economists would observe
under a perfect competition framework, such as that put forward in
the neoclassical model, precisely because information costs something
to acquire.444 Hence, business practices that may seem inexplicable in
a world with perfect competition assumptions suddenly become
explicable.445 In other words, a model that expressly makes room for
information costs would come out differently from one that assumes
perfect information symmetry. Consequently, when considering how
to cure market failure due to informational asymmetry, it is crucial to
consider as well the costs of the suggested corrective devices.446
The presence of information costs can also lead to a third type of
market failure arising from statistical discrimination.447 When
information costs are present, a firm might rely upon proxies, e.g., a
college degree or past experience, when making employment
decisions, instead of inquiring directly into a disabled person’s skills.
In this circumstance, the disabled employee may be part of a group of
individuals that on average are either less productive, or are
444. Moreover, the perfect competition model (and its assumptions) is better reserved for
addressing a firm’s pricing and output decisions instead of their input-purchasing decisions.
There also are some departures from perfect competition, e.g., product differentiation, that
really have no impact on this analysis.
445. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 13–15 (1988).
446. One such problem is that the information costs to determine the true productivity of an
individual with a disability may make that disabled worker less productive than an equivalent
nondisabled worker, even if the disabled worker was hyperproductive to begin with. Thus,
although originally DP ≥ AP, information cost has now altered the equation so that DP < AP.
When this happens, the disabled worker may drop from the Quasi-Voluntary phase of the
continuum, where mandated solutions are still wholly efficient and Pareto optimal, to either the
Semi-Efficient, or even in extreme cases, the Social Benefit Gain Efficient portions of the
Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing phase where the employment option is only efficient from a
social view. A similar problem occurs in lending policy. There, information asymmetry and/or
statistical discrimination may cause minorities to underinvest in their own human capital and
develop a credit history (in anticipation of being denied credit on account of their race).
Nonetheless, just as banning statistical discrimination may force creditors to expend resources
to try to distinguish between debtors, so too does eliding a parallel transaction cost argument in
this context.
447. “Statistical discrimination occurs when two groups vary on average in terms of some
relevant characteristic, and an employer treats all members of each group as if they all possess
that average characteristic.” Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV.
519, 599 (2001). For example, if employers assume women will have short job tenure, and treat
all women on the basis of that belief, then employers will avoid hiring women for jobs requiring
longevity. This type of discrimination was best evidenced in the internal labor markets of the
twentieth century. Id. at 599.
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perceived to be less productive, than the average worker without a
disability.448 The employer could investigate whether a particular
applicant has productivity above or below that of the rest of the
disabled category. That employer could also look into whether the
worker with a disability requires an accommodation, and if so, of
what type and expense. Yet the employer does not do so to avoid
information costs. Thus, the employer uses the signal of disability,
because he ends up believing, incorrectly, that an individual employee
is also less productive than she really is. This is an event that that
should be banned, because it is inefficient.449
Most commentators consider statistical discrimination to be a
market failure and an inefficient event:450 in the absence of complete
information about the characteristics of a particular group (whether
related to race, sex, disability, or other observable characteristics),451
an employer will utilize certain stereotypes as proxies of
productivity.452 When those signals do not accurately correlate with
448. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Economic Defense of Disability Discrimination Law 20–21
(University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies Working Paper No. 99-14, June 1999),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that employers
who rely on signals or proxies for gauging productivity run the risk of relying on information
which may be wrong or may be a generally accurate statistical inference that is often wrong in
particular cases).
449. Perhaps there are other steps one can take to produce information that makes reliance
on proxies less attractive. Or, maybe because of path dependence, firms will continue to rely on
proxies even if it does not make a lot of sense to do so now. Alternatively, maybe the proxies,
although perfectly rational, still create externalities because firms do not consider the full social
cost of what they are doing.
450. See, e.g., David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level Jobs”, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 63–66 (1998) (arguing that statistical discrimination results in inefficient
job assignments and reduces incentives for its victims to acquire human capital); Mark Kelman,
Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158 (1991);
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production
and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074–78 (1995) (pointing out that the
deadweight loss of race discrimination consists of material sacrifices made by the original
discriminators to lower the status of the victim and the investments made by the original
discriminators). Not all commentators, however, agree with this position. Professor Peter
Norman, for example, argues from the perspective of “a utilitarian social planner” that potential
efficiency gains can extend from statistical discrimination in so far as reducing the “mismatch”
between workers and jobs. By generating more precise information about specific workers, he
argues, discrimination can result in a Pareto improvement when compared to a regulated state
in which statistical discrimination is eliminated. Norman, supra note 328, at 1.
451. Religious observance may or may not be readily observable.
452. Although the word has taken on a pejorative tone, these stereotypes need not all be
negative. Consider, for example, an employer who believes that Samoans make the best
workers. When this happens, as in the case of word-of-mouth reputational hiring, members of
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empirical reality, equally productive workers are shut out of
workplace opportunity.453 As a result, those workers will then
underinvest in their own human capital. Like other self-fulfilling
prophecies, this is because of a Catch-22: certain workers are
disadvantaged in the workplace because they are believed to have
lower net productivity values. In turn, those workers invest less in
their own human capital because they believe that they will be
disadvantaged in the workplace.454
To address a market failure problem of the type represented in
the Quasi-Voluntary phase of the accommodation cost continuum,
one must first begin by defining a “perfect world,” and what results
such a world would produce in the labor market. In this situation, a
perfect world would be the one posited by the neoclassical regime,
one with no transaction costs.455 In this transaction-cost-free world,
private bargains move resources to their highest-valued use and thus
maximize the wealth that can be obtained from society’s existing
resources.456 In such a perfect world, employment practices would
the excluded group may nonetheless have a cause of action. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone
Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff may establish a
pattern or practice claim under Title VII “through a combination of strong statistical evidence
of disparate impact coupled with anecdotal evidence of the employer’s intent to treat the
protected class unequally” (quoting Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036,
1051 (7th Cir. 1991))).
453. Technically, those who are similarly situated. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24 (Orley Ashenfelter &
Albert Rees eds., 1973) (noting that “[s]kin color and sex are cheap sources of information” for
distinguishing between different groups of workers); Stephen Coate & Glen C. Loury, Will
Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220, 1224
(1993) (suggesting that “negative prior beliefs will bias the [work] assignment process”); cf.
Glenn C. Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 249, 263
(1987) (pointing out “the danger that reliance on affirmative action . . . can have a decidedly
negative impact on the esteem of the [beneficiary] groups, because it can lead to the general
presumption that members of the beneficiary groups would not be able to qualify for such
positions without the help of special preference”).
454. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (“[S]tatistical discrimination encourages minorities
to underinvest in human capital, which in turn makes statistical discrimination rational.”).
455. This is true because “in classical economics, the market actors are viewed as having
access to perfect information. All parties understand the benefits and detriments of the bargain
and neither is under compulsion or duress.” Christopher K. Braun, A Semiotics of Economics, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 435, 443 (Robin Paul Malloy &
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).
456. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1968) (“[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs and
no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the
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begin with an individualized determination of each potential
employee’s productivity, costs, and benefits (whether or not that
person had a disability).457
The real (economic) world is not, however, wholly bereft of
transaction costs in this sense—even Professor Ronald Coase458 didn’t
think so.459 Instead, in the real world, there are all sorts of transaction
costs––generally bargaining costs and information costs––that prevent
resources from moving to their highest use and ensure that social
welfare is lower than it would be in a world with no such transaction
costs.460 Put another way, in the real world, some or many markets fail
in the sense that they do not replicate the allocation of resources (e.g.,
who works where, and for how much) that would occur in a
transaction-cost-free world. Yet “market failure” is not an abstract or
a permanent condition. It is, instead, a symptom of transaction costs
which themselves are not necessarily natural, exogenous, or given.461
market by bargains.”). Note, though, that this is the same allocation of resources that would
occur under perfect competition. Id.
457. Id.
458. Author of the pathbreaking article The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960), which introduced the “Coase theorem,” Ronald H. Coase won the Nobel Prize in
Economics, and in the process contributed to the founding of law and economics as a discipline.
See generally STEVEN G. MEDEMA, COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS xi (Steven G. Medema ed., 1997). And, although the Coase
theorem has been questioned (at times with great charm), e.g., A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v.
Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996), it remains the fundamental pillar of that area
of scholarship.
459. As explained by Epstein, “one of Coase’s great achievements was to stress the
importance of thinking about zero transactions costs settings, not because we ever encounter
these in our ordinary lives, but because thinking about them sets up a useful foil for thinking
about the positive transactions cost world that is inescapably ours.” Richard A. Epstein,
Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 553, 555 (1993).
460. The most obvious example is the so-called “monopolistic competition” model, built in
the 1930s, and applied ad nauseam by economists and others ever since. Although this model
employs some of the assumptions of the perfect competition model, e.g., no barriers to entry, it
also departs from perfect competition in other ways, e.g., it assumes that consumers have
varying preferences, with the result that each firm responding to these preferences produces a
slightly different product, thus leading each firm to obtain a modicum of market power, another
departure from the perfect competition model. Another example is the theory of monopoly,
which often assumes that monopolists reduce output below the competitive level. Note,
however, that if the monopolist had perfect information about the preferences of all consumers,
and if arbitrage were not possible, it could engage in price discrimination, and thus increase its
output to the same level that would occur in a world of perfect competition.
461. As Professor Kenneth Arrow has said: “[M]arket failure is not absolute; it is better to
consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular
cases completely block the formation of markets.” Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of
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One implication is that by eliminating or attenuating transaction
costs, one can sometimes cure a market failure, instead of
“regulating” it in a more traditional sense.462 Another implication—
and this one is more important given the ADA—is the extent that a
market failure is both defined and constrained by the sort of
transaction costs at issue. Thus, if one sees a market failure, she needs
to figure out what sort of transaction costs are causing it in order to
determine the right remedy and limits of intervention.463
The ADA provides for three avenues through which to cure the
information asymmetry causing individual employers to suffer from
market failures, and to install a quasi-voluntary, wholly efficient,
Pareto optimal equilibrium. First, as part of assessing the
reasonableness of accommodations, employers are required to engage
in an “interactive process” with disabled workers requesting those
workplace alterations.464 Second, assuming that the interactive process
does not result in a mutually acceptable solution, employees with
disabilities can file disability discrimination charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, afterwards,
engage in EEOC-sponsored mediation with their employers.465 Third,
those same disabled workers, if the mediation process has not proven
Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation, in
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis
eds., 1970).
462. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the
Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States, 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 61, 78 (1999) (establishing that Sherman Act regulation of purported opportunism
is unnecessary if “Sherman Act intervention depends upon the presence of transaction costs,
and if states are capable of reducing such costs by changing the rules that make up the
institutional framework”).
463. Or, to put things more technically, the “Institutional Structure of Production” needs to
be changed to make sure that the resulting “play of the game” (contracting/production by
private parties) produces the allocation of resources that would be produced in a low/zero
transaction-cost world. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1, 27–28 (Ronald H. Coase ed., 1988) (showing that change
in background rules can lower or increase transaction costs and thus affect the content of
bargains people enter); Ronald Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 713, 714 (1992) (describing how change in background rules can affect or alter the
contracts that parties enter as well as the resulting allocation of resources); Alan J. Meese, Price
Theory, Competition, and The Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 78–82, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that antitrust regulation alters
the institutional framework so as to replicate the result that maximizes social welfare); Meese,
supra note 462, at 70–77 (stating that change in background rules can alter transaction costs and
thus eliminate market failures).
464. See infra notes 467–76 and accompanying text.
465. See infra notes 477–82 and accompanying text.
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satisfactory (or even transpired, because it is voluntary), can sue their
employers.466 Each of these measures in turn carries increasingly
heavy transaction costs, but they are designed to correct information
asymmetry through the coerced exchange of information. They can
do so, but with varying success and cost. Each of these avenues is
explored in greater detail below.
When faced with an accommodation request from a worker with
a disability, the employer is required by the ADA to engage in an
“interactive process” with that worker.467 This procedure is one that,
in theory, should generate the information necessary to cure an
informational asymmetry caused by market failure. During this
process, employers and employees meet and exchange not only
formal requests but, equally important, trade information and
perspectives about the accommodation at issue. As a result, disabled
workers inform their employers what accommodations, soft or hard,
they feel they require to perform the essential job functions of their
particular employment. In turn, employers can accede to these
requests or explain to those workers why the accommodations
requested would engender an undue hardship because of either hard
or soft costs.468
One would think that profit-maximizing employers acting in their
own self-interest would have already expended resources to find out
general information on positive and negative externalities. Nonetheless,
although employers might have general information on these effects,
they may not have particular information related to individuals with
disabilities because of lack of experience with, or exposure to, those
workers.469 And, as was shown above, relying on statistical information
as proxy has the potential to create false measures. Further, the disabled
worker has information about himself or herself that may not be readily
available or knowable by the employer, and thus an exchange of
information during the interactive process can add to the employer’s
calculus. At the same time, the employer has greater familiarity and
knowledge about the workplace and its operation and may be able to
466. See infra notes 483–88 and accompanying text.
467. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2002).
468. See generally Alysa M. Barancik, Determining Reasonable Accommodations Under the
ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an “Interactive Process”, 30 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 513, 542–45 (1999); Amy Renee Brown, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: The
Role of Employees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 341, 352–
68 (2002).
469. Blanck et al., supra note 410, at 1593.
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suggest less costly alternatives or other avenues toward achieving a
mutually agreeable position. Note that this interactive process is
intended to be a cooperative, informational exchange rather than a
confrontational process.470
Nor must individual employees and their employers go through
the interactive process blindly or in a vacuum. Well financed,
federally funded centers facilitate the interactive process by providing
concrete accommodation options and suggestions, and informing
employers about existing federal and state tax incentives and
credits.471 These government-supported facilitators include the ten
regionally located offices of the Job Accommodation Network,472 as
well as the President’s Committee on Employment of People with
Disabilities473 and the Social Security Administration’s Employment
Support Program.474 There also exist state-level equivalents.475 As each
of these organizations facilitate the interactive process for free, very
little transaction costs are invoked in their usage.476
In the event, however, that the interactive process fails to bring
about satisfactory results, employees with disabilities (both those who
were denied requested accommodations and those who feel aggrieved
for other reasons)477 can file disability discrimination complaints with
470. See Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process: The Employer and Employee’s Duty
to Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More Than a Game of Five Card
Stud, 77 NEB. L. REV. 281, 288 (1998) (“[B]oth parties can benefit if they are willing to place all
their cards on the table in an effort to determine if a reasonable accommodation can be
identified.”).
471. Nor is it necessary to be physically present to engage this process. The Job
Accommodation Network, see infra note 472, will facilitate the interactive process by telephone,
mail, email, teleconference, or through the Internet.
472. The Job Accommodation Network, at http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu (last visited Sept. 6,
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
473. The Office of Disability Employment Policy, at http://www.dol.gov/odep (last visited
Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
474. The Social Security Administration’s Employment Support Program, at
http://www.ssa.gov/work (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
475. For instance, the Florida Governor’s Alliance for Employment of Citizens with
Disabilities provides an online job bank for disabled job seekers and potential employers,
including a free CD-ROM generated by the privately funded Able Trust that profiles some 1200
college students with disabilities who are seeking internships or jobs upon graduation. The Able
Trust, at http://www.abletrust.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal); The Florida Alliance for Assistive Services and Technology, at http://www.faast.org
(last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
476. The qualification reflects the fact that time, as well as the gathering of information to
be exchanged, are, even if minimal, still transaction costs.
477. For instance, disability harassment is a cause of action recently recognized by the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See, e.g., Flowers v. S. Reg. Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th
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local EEOC offices.478 Subsequently, either the employer or the
employee can request mediation of their differences.479 The ADA
does not require, but strongly advises mediation.480 Nevertheless,
studies, including the EEOC’s own internal report to Congress, have
evidenced that mediation is an excellent vehicle through which to
have employers and employees exchange information and
perspectives.481 Mediation as a process also engenders less psychic cost
and emotional damage to the employment relationship than the third
option, litigation (although the filing of a discrimination complaint is
also unlikely to resound very well with employers). The possible
souring of employer-employee relations is an important point to
emphasize as job reinstatement is one of the primary remedies sought
by Title I plaintiffs.482
Commencing a Title I lawsuit is the third, and certainly least
efficient or effective, means of curing employers’ market failure. In
theory, the litigation of such claims should, in the course of events,
provide the means by which to correct flawed assumptions held by
both employers and employees as to the real costs of
accommodations. As was shown earlier, however, as a practical
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ADA embraces claims of disability-based harassment.”); Fox v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ADA, like Title VII, creates a cause of action
for hostile work environment harassment.”). See generally Lisa Eichorn, Hostile Environment
Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV.
575, 577 (2002) (“[T]he circuit courts began their examinations of whether hostile environment
harassment could be actionable under the ADA by noting that the statute explicitly prohibits
discrimination related to the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges’ of employment.”); Holland M.
Tahvonen, Disability-Based Harassment: Standing and Standards for a “New” Cause of Action,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2003) (“[D]isability harassment as a cause of action is
modeled after the Title VII harassment claim.”).
478. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (1964); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6–1601.8 (2002) (establishing the
guidelines for this process).
479. Id.
480. 42 U.S.C. § 12,212 (2000).
481. See McDermott et al., supra note 425 (finding “a high degree of participant satisfaction
with the EEOC mediation program”); Philip Zimmerman, The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s Mediation Program, 71 CPA J. 66, 66 (2001) (acknowledging that the first year of
the EEOC’s voluntary mediation pilot program was “highly successful”). EEOC mediation has
continued in spite of inadequate funding; although the EEOC’s workload increased by over 40
percent due to the addition of ADA disputes, its budget remained the same. Moss, supra note
425, at 19. Nonetheless, the current EEOC chair has aggressively pursued increased mediation
through a “proactive prevention” program. See EEOC Chair Offers Updated Plan to Combat
Discrimination, 3 EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. UPDATE 6 (2002).
482. Cf. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability Claims
Against State and Local Government Employers in the New “Federalism” Era, 22 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 99, 100 (2001) (explaining the difficulty of bringing civil rights claims).
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matter, this result is precluded by the overwhelming rate of defendant
victories, and especially those victories at the pre-jury stage.483
Parenthetically, it bears noting that in the circumstance of actually
going before a jury, the circuit courts of appeals are divided as to
which party bears the further burden of proving the reasonableness of
a given accommodation. For example, the D.C. Circuit places both
the burden of production and of persuasion on the plaintiff.484 In
contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits place the burdens of proving
both the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation, as well as the
undue hardship that one would cause, on defendants.485 The Second
Circuit, as exemplified in Borkowski, takes a middle ground that
alternates burdens.486 In doing so, its reasoning is persuasive.
Although the disabled plaintiff may have personal knowledge of her
own disability (and is therefore put under the initial burden of
persuasion),487 in turn “the employer has far greater access to
information” regarding “its own organization and, equally
importantly, about the practices and structure of the industry as a
whole.”488 This compromise steers a wise course between the
intercircuit poles in that it duplicates, through coerced circumstances,
the type of informational exchange that should have happened during
the earlier stages of the interactive process.
Title I suits are not a random subset of ADA actions. Litigated
cases may represent particularly strong or particularly weak cases for
disability accommodations. The fact that the courts are so skeptical of
these claims would seem to suggest that the latter may be true, and
this introduces an interesting puzzle: why do plaintiffs bring so many
losing accommodations claims?489 The Priest-Klein model of litigation
483. See supra Part I.B. These results are substantiated in the smaller sample size of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under
the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-
Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 365–66 (2000).
484. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
485. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423–24 (9th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981).
486. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
487. This parallels the duty of a Title VII plaintiff after McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”). This symmetry
was intentional. See Burgdorf, supra note 51 passim (describing which portions of the ADA
were modeled after existing civil rights provisions).
488. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 137.
489. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA 5 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the definition of disability is
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suggests that about half of all litigated claims should be valid ones,490
but that theory then explores reasons why a different percentage may
be valid.491 Although a full explanation is beyond the scope of this
Article, a few possible reasons are worth noting.492 Several
commentators from the disability rights community squarely lay the
results at the feet of judicial resistance to the statute493 or toward
itself at least partially to blame, and proposing an amendment to the scope of coverage so that
the protected class more closely resembles the type of minority classifications utilized in other
civil rights areas); see also Gregory Todd Jones, Testing for Structural Change in Legal Doctrine:
An Empirical Look at the Plaintiff’s Decision to Litigate Employment Disputes a Decade After
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997 (2002) (generally helpful on the subject
of civil rights claims, but not on the ADA because the author does not differentiate his
statistics).
490. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984). Of course, as with any theory, it is not universally embraced. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2000) (noting that,
because people do not always act rationally in their litigation choices, results outside the Priest-
Klein theory can result); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495–501 (1996) (providing an econometric challenge to the Priest-Klein
hypothesis).
491. Priest & Klein, supra note 490, at 52–54. The subsequent literature operates from
within the Priest-Klein paradigm. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Note on Trend-Spotting in the
Case Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 891, 894 (1999) (modifying the Priest-Klein model to “explain[] the
patterns of non-neutral evolution actually observed”); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 234 (1996) (noting that “a ‘multimodal’ approach to the
selection of cases for litigation can reconcile the validity of the selection hypothesis . . . with
observed plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent”); Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel,
Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28
J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103–104 (1999) (comparing independent evidence gathered from the
mode’s three parameters with a structural estimate of the model from data for six types of
federal cases); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule:
Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 212 (1995) (using experimental data to
extend “the [Priest-Klein] selection hypothesis . . . [to] explain[] why we should expect to
observe a variety of plaintiff win rates when examining trial data”).
492. Not raised in the specific circumstance of Title I litigation, but perhaps informative, is
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes
for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 427 (1995), which argues that the effect of the business cycle is as determinative as any
other factor in assessing in advance the likelihood of trial outcomes. Id. at 432–51. When the
economy is weak, they argue, cases brought forward to a jury determination are less likely to
win. Id. at 446–51.
493. To quote one example: “[M]any, perhaps most, courts are not enforcing the law, but
instead are finding incredibly inventive means of interpreting the ADA to achieve the opposite
result that the Act was intended to achieve.” Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving
Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 338 (2001). Tucker’s
assertion is endorsed by many, although not all, of the articles in the following symposia:
Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice
Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000), and Defining the Parameters of Coverage
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people with disabilities.494 Also at work may be unfamiliarity with
disabled people as a group495 and/or schemas that cause judges (as
well as society at large)496 to react in particular ways to them as a
class.497 Additionally, those workers with disabilities denied
accommodations may feel particularly strongly about that denial and
may therefore pursue claims even when they are not winners by the
standards that the courts apply.498 Yet additional reasons could
include the following: that there is a misunderstanding of how the
courts will address Title I claims such that accommodation-related
suits are an example of “negative expected value” litigation that is
brought in the hope that the defendants will settle rather than
litigate;499 that informational asymmetry clouds the litigation decision
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Who is ‘An Individual with a Disability?’, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 327 (1997).
494. This is a line of argument that is well argued, often entertainingly, by Professor Soifer.
See Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, supra note 372, at
1328; Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims,
supra note 372, at 1287.
495. This is a unique civil rights chronology. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY:
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 323–32 (1993)
(recognizing that disabled people as a group were legally empowered prior to the emergence of
a general social consciousness as to why such empowerment was needed).
496. RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY
IN THE WORKPLACE 137–61 (2000). In sum, Professor O’Brien argues that modern disability
employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies that only integrate
disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to the workplace. One consequence of this
normative schema, which O’Brien avers influences judicial attitudes towards people with
disabilities, is Supreme Court resistance to disability rights—especially the ADA’s employment
provisions. Id. See also id. at 205 (claiming that the “justices have rendered a narrow
interpretation of Title I because, like many employers, they perceive disabled people as
threatening”); Stein, supra note 104, at 619–26.
497. The judicial backlash explanations, however, seem to beg the question of why litigants
do not anticipate that hostility in deciding whether to sue. If anything, one would expect those
who have previously suffered discrimination to overestimate the chance of discrimination from
other actors, such as courts. Perhaps this suggests that the Priest-Klein model does not do a very
good job of predicting which disability-related suits are filed.
498. Some commentators assert that the standard, even if correctly applied, may not be the
right one to begin with. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 489, at 5.
499. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 537–76 (1997)
(explaining negative expected value litigation); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2002) (explaining
the limitations of “the Law and Economics model of why cases are litigated”); Russell
Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 61 (2002) (“[A]spirations have an
indirect causal effect on settlement outcomes by directly affecting the ‘settlement levers’
recognized as relevant by the standard model of settlement.”).
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making process;500 that poor lawyering may be at the root of some of
these losses;501 or that mediocre expert testimony contributes to the
stilted win-loss rate.502 Finally, the broad assertions made by media
pundits like Walter Olson, namely, that ADA claimants are whingers,
not even “really” disabled, or both,503 may have some plausibility.504
If one, as an economic policymaker, was to step beyond the
confines of the ADA and engage in a thought experiment, it is also
possible that information revelation mechanisms could be helpful in
the circumstance of this kind of market failure. Disability
accommodation claims are a context in which employers and
employees probably each have good information (or at least much
better information than courts) about the cost of accommodations
and their likely benefits. Further, it is much easier for a court to
estimate ex post whether a disability accommodation was successful
than to guess ex ante. One way to harness that information, while also
limiting courts to ex post analysis, would involve the following
scheme: one allowed an employee to force the employer to make an
accommodation, but then gave the employer the right to sue the
employee afterwards to recover the difference between costs and
benefits if the employer felt that the costs were higher. This would
give the employee some incentive to request only those
500. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 76 (1993) (demonstrating “the unique effects
that the asymmetric information model has on selection bias”); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling
Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON.
451, 451 (1998) (noting that asymmetric information provides a possible explanation for why
“parties fail to settle their cases and instead proceed to costly trials”).
501. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 74, at 517 (“Many ADA cases founder because
counsel for plaintiffs have not prepared the minimum factual record necessary to provide the
jury with a basis to conclude that the ADA protects their clients.”); Wendy Wilkerson,
Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX.
L. REV. 907, 908 (1997) (“[M]any cases have been poorly pleaded.”).
502. The latter was certainly central to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73
(2002), a Title I case in which accommodation was not at issue, and in which summary judgment
was ignominiously granted. Id. at 87.
503. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 114 (1997) (“Employers’ biggest accommodation
challenge may arise less from the gravely disabled, who are relatively few in number and often
far from keen on forcing their services on reluctant hirers, than from the general working
population . . . “).
504. However waugh the presentation. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the
Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 3–34 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Sutton trilogy served to sift out
people not “truly” disabled).
011204 STEIN.DOC 01/30/04  9:04 AM
2003] DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS 167
accommodations she was confident would be successful. There would
be some complications––perhaps a requirement that the employee
bond herself to avoid the judgment-proofing problem––but this
scenario might produce a regime that could produce positive
incentives. At the same time, one might allow negotiation, so that the
employer could buy out the employee instead of making the
accommodation. Instead of the employer having the property right
and the employee having the right to sue, the employee would have
the property right and the employer would have the right to sue.
As a second thought experiment, consider the possibility of
creating a governmentally funded, private firm that was responsible
for all disability accommodations nationally or, alternatively, in a
particular geographic or industry-specific area. As a result, an
employer and employee would apply jointly to that firm, requesting
that it pay for the accommodation. If the firm refused, then litigation
would ensue. Under this system, the employer-employee relationship
would be less adversarial due to their common interest. Of course, the
accommodation firm would have an incentive to maximize its profit,
but this is no different a system than that found in many other areas
of the economy, such as insurance companies, where private firms
have an incentive not to pay but ordinarily will pay where they are
legally required to do so.
B. Socially Efficient (Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing)
Accommodations
The next phase of the continuum, Socially Efficient, Kaldor-
Hicks Welfare Enhancing Accommodations, contains two parts. The
first is Semi-Efficient Accommodations, which extract a differential
cost from employers. Under this part, although both disabled workers
and their employers benefit, those employers benefit less than if they
were able to choose equivalent nondisabled workers. The second
part, Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations, involves
disability-related accommodations that exceed ADA reasonableness.
Because individual workers and general society benefit, but
employers do not, this is an area appropriate for state subsidization.
1. Semi-Efficient (ADA) Accommodations. This part of the
continuum, that of Semi-Efficient (ADA) Accommodations, is one
wherein both disabled workers and their employers benefit, but
employers benefit less than if they were able to choose equivalent
nondisabled workers. The Semi-Efficient part, therefore, is still net
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profitable for employers to the extent that employers will continue to
profit from the presence of accommodated workers with disabilities.505
It is, however, in degrees less efficient and less profitable than the
wholly efficient, completely profitable portion of the continuum that
preceded it. This is because Semi-Efficient modifies the absolute
nature of the Pareto principle (and its limitations) pursuant to the
ADA’s totality of the employer’s financial circumstances formulation.
As a result, an accommodation would fall within the Semi-
Efficient segment of the continuum if both the disabled worker and
the employer benefit, but the employer’s benefits are less than the
optimal ones captured under a Pareto regime. In this regard, the
Semi-Efficient segment is similar to Pareto in that the involved
parties gain more than zero and are placed in net positive positions.
The Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum differs from a Pareto
position, however, in that a Pareto optimal state ensures that
employers receive as much benefit by employing disabled workers as
they would in employing fungible, equivalent, nondisabled workers.
In a Semi-Efficient state the employer still achieves a net positive
profit position, but his profits are less than they would be had he
employed an equivalent, nondisabled employee.506 Hence, within the
Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum, there exists a range of profit-
capturing transactions, from slightly less than full profit to slightly
more than no profit. Moving away from a straight cost-benefit
analysis, within the Semi-Efficient phase, there are areas of
contingent reasonableness in which the same accommodation can be
reasonable for some employers, but not for others. Related to the
issue of where to draw the line on reasonableness are two issues: first,
the extent to which (if at all) accommodations effectuate equality,
rather than redistribution; and second, the cross-dynamic of an
505. I stress accommodations because the ADA does not cover unaccommodated
hypoproductive workers, even though standard economic analysis does not differentiate those
individuals from other equivalently net profitable workers, including accommodated hyper and
average productive workers with disabilities (as well as those without disabilities). See supra
Part I.A.
506. For this reason, the Semi-Efficient state also differs from the state known as Pareto
superior, because in that latter category no one is made worse off. By contrast, in the Semi-
Efficient state, employers are made worse off to the extent that they are not left in a position
equal to the equilibrium that would exist in Pareto optimality. Arguably, they are not worse off
in the sense that their net profits, even when the margin has been reduced to one unit, are still
profitable, but the difference between some profit and no profit, when both are less than full
profit, is one of degree rather than of kind. See generally JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 32–33 (1995) (discussing Pareto superior allocations).
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employer repeatedly providing accommodations, and how this affects
the extent to which profitability ought to be compromised. As will be
seen below, the Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum is uniquely
modulated to the ADA and captures what the statute usually intends
as reasonable accommodations.
Further, there is another way in which the Semi-Efficient
segment of the continuum, by applying the ADA, does not
necessarily dovetail well with classic economic analysis. Among the
range of productivity levels there will be workers with disabilities
whose productivity will be lower than that of their nondisabled
equivalents. This would seem evident because there will also be
nondisabled workers with lower productivity than their disabled
counterparts, a point that will arise in the hypotheticals presented.
Nonetheless, the ADA only considers as qualified those individuals
with disabilities who, either with or without the provision of a
reasonable accommodation, are able to perform essential job
functions. In other words, to be protected under the statute’s aegis,
disabled workers’ gross productivity must equal that of their
nondisabled peers. By contrast, from an economic viewpoint, there is
no difference between the equivalent lower net products generated
by (1) a worker with a disability who does not require an
accommodation but who is less productive than a nondisabled peer;
or (2) the equally productive disabled worker provided with a
reasonable accommodation; or (3) the comparatively
hyperproductive worker with a disability whose extra-reasonable
accommodation expense is such that his net productivity is less than
that of the average worker.
To illustrate: Barry, an individual with muscular dystrophy whose
condition limits the facility of his movements,507 applies for a position
as a hamburger chef at Cholesterol City Burgers (CCB). The essential
job functions of such a position at CCB are to fry 40 burgers an hour
and place them in a heated pan from which CCB burger associates
will later dress them with condiments, wrap them in CCB’s trademark
fuchsia wrappers, and prepare them for distribution by CCB sales
associates. Thus, the average hourly productivity level is 40 units (AP
= 40). Other than having muscular dystrophy, assume that Barry is no
different than other applicants for the position of hamburger chef and
carries neither costs nor benefits related to his disability, i.e., as
before, both QB and QC are zero. Without an accommodation, Barry
507. See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 115, at 558.
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can fry and place 35 burgers an hour, and is therefore not qualified
under the ADA (because where DP = 35, it is less than AP = 40; and
so AP > DP). From an economic point of view, Barry is also not
equally net profitable, and given a choice CCB would not hire him.
However, with the accommodation of a specially designed spatula
more conducive to his physiology and costing the equivalent of 5
burgers per hour (AC = 5), Barry can flip 40 burgers. Thus DP = 35
(because DP = DG + (QB(40+0) - AC(5))). If the provision of the
spatula is considered reasonable in light of the employer’s total
financial circumstances, then Barry is a qualified individual with a
disability and protected by the ADA. At the same time, from an
economic point of view, Barry’s net productivity has not changed in
CCB’s eyes. Because DP = 35 in both cases, Barry is still not an
equally productive burger flipper, and another hamburger chef would
be sought out. If Barry was hyperproductive, flipping an amazing 60
burgers per hour (DG = 60), but required the extra-reasonable
accommodation of a titanium spatula to achieve that level (AC = 25),
he would not be ADA protected (due to the unreasonable nature of
the accommodation), and would also be economically inefficient
(because he achieved a net product lower than AP = 35). Thus,
although the ADA protects Barry in the second example, an
employer would view all three circumstances (with the same net
product) as equally inefficient.508
Additionally, because the Semi-Efficient segment of the
continuum is specially calibrated to capture scenarios arising from
“typical” ADA accommodations, wherein an accommodated worker
with a disability exacts a reasonable cost from her employer, two
ADA-specific issues arise: the relative reasonableness of
accommodations as antidiscrimination measures, and the effect upon
individual firms subject to repeat accommodation mandates.
To begin with, in the Semi-Efficient stage, accommodation costs
are relative rather than absolute. Consequently, if the same person
with a disability requested identical accommodations from two
different employers, the ADA might consider the first request
reasonable (most likely if it was directed at an employer with greater
resources) but not consider the second one to be so (especially if that
employer had fewer resources). This is a calculus unique to the ADA
508. Assume, arguendo, that the 25 unit spatula was reasonable in light of the employer’s
total financial circumstances. In this situation, the ADA protects Barry under the second and
third examples, while an employer would still view all three as equivalently inefficient.
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and is caused by the statute’s requirement that accommodations be
reasonable as measured by the totality of a given employer’s financial
circumstances.509 By contrast, Title VII suits view as irrelevant the
relative costs of bringing about a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.510 In
addition, the notion of relative reasonability, and the inconsistent
results that it can engender, is economically counterintuitive unless
the relative scale makes sense from (a) an administrative point of
view, in that it is less costly for an employer rather than for the state
to administer accommodations,511 and/or (b) a cost-spreading
perspective, because the larger the financial resources of a firm, the
easier it is for it to pass on accommodation costs to the public at
large.512 Finally, because valid accommodation costs can vary
according to the fiscal resources of providing firms, it is possible that
an accommodation can diminish a given employer’s profit margin in a
worker with a disability down to almost no profit.513 In other words,
on a profit scale ranging from one unit to one hundred units of profit,
where an employer expects to capture one hundred units of profit per
employee, an accommodation could conceivably reduce the profit
509. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000); see supra Part I.A.
510. Title VII suits might, however, consider the absolute cost of a remedy by inference
when an employer raises either business necessity as a defense or rebuts a claimant’s assertion
about the existence of an alternative business practice. See generally Thomas A. Cunniff, Note,
The Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 507 (1995) (suggesting that although courts have shifted the burdens in Title VII cases to
make it more difficult for the plaintiff, this may be an efficient outcome as discrimination
decreases over time); John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination
Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987) (employing a cost-benefit
analysis to test the efficiency of Title VII).
511. This argument is a standard one for those commentators who favor regulation over
subsidies. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 20, at 1424–26. The tension between regulation and subsidy
has invoked an ongoing and interesting debate. For recent contributions, see KELMAN, supra
note 371, at 92–93; Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment
Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967 (1999); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor
the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); and Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
512. This is a standard argument in torts scholarship. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Individual
Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210,
237–44 (1996) (arguing that collectivization meets both the deterrence and compensation goals
of tort liability); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1864 (1987) (“[T]ort rules are only capable of forcing manufacturers to
behave somewhat efficiently, some of the time, under some conditions.”).
513. In the event an accommodation drives an employer’s profit margin into a net loss
position, such that the disabled workers gains but the employer loses, that circumstance will fall
within the next section of the continuum, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing Efficiency, if the
social benefit still outweighs the social cost. See infra Appendix, Section D.
011204 STEIN.DOC 01/30/04  9:04 AM
172 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:79
margin of an individual disabled worker to one unit and still be
considered (contextually) reasonable.514 This is because, so long as the
employer reaps some profit from that worker, the provision of
accommodation (given appropriate circumstances) could still fall
within the Semi-Efficient portion of the continuum.
The second issue raised uniquely in the ADA context is a
corollary to the idea that accommodation costs are relative. That is,
will firms who either voluntarily provide accommodations or are
coerced to do so in either the Quasi-Voluntary or the Semi-Efficient
part of the continuum become magnets for attracting additional
disabled workers who fit the Semi-Efficient profile,515 and if so, is that
circumstance one to be favored? According to Professor Epstein, the
prospect of having workers with disabilities employed by the same
firm is a positive event.516 Rather than “handicap ghettoization,” the
concentration of workers with disabilities at particular sites, according
to Epstein, increases the likelihood that physical plant or equipment
accommodations will see repeated usage.517 Hence, it is an efficient
mechanism by which to increase disabled employment.518 Similarly,
Professor Verkerke argues that employees ideally should be matched
with a job in which they would be most efficient.519 This goal can be
achieved, in part, by placing a disabled worker with a company
capable of minimizing accommodation costs.520 A larger sized
employer, in his view, is more likely to have the ability to duplicate
accommodations, for an economy of scale would ultimately bring
down the cost of accommodation even if such an initial
accommodation would appear sizeable in comparison to the
profitability of the individual worker.521 In contrast to these views,
Professor Samuel Issacharoff and Mr. Justin Nelson argue that
514. Congress originally considered and then rejected a proposal during the ADA debate
which would have defined undue hardship as threatening an employer’s continued existence.
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
923, 927 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 90 (1989)).
515. When workers fit within the Wholly Efficient part of the continuum, whether as
recipients of voluntary or semi-voluntary action, this is viewed as a positive effect; it is the less
profitable, semi-efficient workers only who raise the question of desirability.
516. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 492–94.
517. Id. at 493–94.
518. Id. at 494.
519. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 948.
520. Id. at 949–50.
521. Id.
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forcing employers repeatedly to accommodate workers with
disabilities is a deleterious policy.522 Because multiple
accommodations have the potential of driving down gross profits,
they argue that foisting disabled workers onto a particular employer
can harm that entity.523 As a result, having more of those workers
imposed onto their workforce might instead penalize employers who
should be socially lauded for having previously accommodated a
disabled worker.524
Overall, I agree with the view of social efficiency taken by
Epstein and Verkerke.525 Recall that the reasonableness of ADA
accommodations is determined by the totality of an employer’s
financial circumstances.526 Thus, on the positive side, an economy of
scale should lessen the impact upon (and might even increase the
overall) profits of an individual employer over the long haul. And,
although repeatedly imposing disability accommodations on a single
providing employer may well reduce its profit margin per worker on
each occasion, and so will cause that employer to bear an unwanted
financial obligation, whatever total reductions ensue will in the end
be curbed by a standard of reasonableness.527 Accordingly, the costs of
522. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 369, at 344–47.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 350–51.
525. An important point that is tangential to this Article bears noting. When advocating in
favor of the efficiency of repeated accommodations, Epstein and Verkerke each support, by
inference, the notion of directed placements, meaning that they favor specific vocational
placements for workers with disabilities who evidence certain skills. See EPSTEIN, supra note
269, at 493–94; Verkerke, supra note 14, at 937–38. To the extent that this policy either limits the
development of disabled workers or shunts them into certain careers, I very strongly disagree
with it and point to the parallel history among women. See generally Dawn Michelle Baunach,
Trends in Occupational Sex Segregation and Inequality, 1950 to 1990, 31 SOC. SCI. RES. 77
(2002); Jo Anne Preston, Occupational Gender Segregation: Trends and Explanations, 39 Q.
REV. ECON. & FIN. 611 (1999). For disabled people, these type of measures, even when well
intentioned, have historically resulted in sheltered workshops and make-work that demean and
isolate those individuals. See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A
Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (2000) (cataloging and analyzing
welfare law’s past treatment of disabled persons). However, to the extent that such a policy
duplicates some of the gains made in the past through vocational rehabilitation that afforded the
recipients job support and options, I would endorse it. See O’BRIEN, supra note 496, at 87
(chronicling the success of 1950s rehabilitation programs). For a more global view, see David A.
Gerber, Disabled Veterans and Public Welfare Policy: Comparative and Transnational
Perspectives on Western States in the Twentieth Century, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 77 (2001).
526. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000).
527. This situation raises the possibility of intradisability conflicts, i.e., the disabled person
requesting the accommodation that will push an employer’s profit margin near enough to the
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repeat accommodations should not result in “ruinous” economic
losses for any given individual employer.528
To reiterate, in a Semi-Efficient equilibrium, both workers and
employers benefit, but the employers profit less than if they were
unregulated. Modulated specifically to the ADA, the Semi-Efficient
portion of the accommodation cost continuum includes a range of
accommodations that are contextually reasonable and allow
employers to capture variant profit margins. Semi-Efficient
Accommodations also raise the potential situation of individual
employers becoming the focus of repeat accommodation requests.
This phenomenon, should it arise, is prevented from engendering an
undue hardship on those individual employers because of the ADA’s
intervening standard of reasonableness.
2. Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations. The next
section of the accommodation cost continuum, and still within the
scheme of Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancement, is that of Social
Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations.
In this phase, the profit to an employer is zero (or carries a
negative cost), but the social benefit gain in having a less productive
disabled worker employed exceeds the cost of compensating an
employer for doing so. Thus, this area raises a circumstance in which
both the individual worker with a disability and society in general
benefit, but the employers lose. This portion of the continuum
operates outside the boundaries of the ADA because the
accommodations at issue are no longer reasonable.529 Accordingly,
undue hardship category so that no further workers can be accommodated has an interest
adverse both to putative employees, as well as to currently able-bodied colleagues who might
become disabled. For two thoughtful treatments on the implications of intragroup conflict
within the context of gay and lesbian civil rights, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns,
106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997), and Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989).
528. This reasonableness limitation remains despite complaints in the popular media that
the ADA will bring American business to rack and ruin. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 503, at
102–18 (arguing that costs of accommodation are higher than the acknowledged projections of
the ADA’s supporters); Peter J. Riga, Employers’ Litigation Horror Stories, L.A. DAILY J.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 6 (lamenting that, although the ADA was a good idea, it has been prone to
abuse and has become a “lawyers’ employment service”).
529. The arguments made in this Section apply equally to circumstances of hypoproductive,
non-accommodated disabled workers whose net output is the same as those disabled workers
with average or hyperproductivity who engender accommodation costs.
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this is an area where the state has the potential to compensate losing
employers and should do so out of self-interest.530
When an employer cannot profit from retaining a worker with a
disability due to her accommodation cost, there still may be reason to
compel that employer to accommodate the disabled worker on the
ground that society in general may benefit. In the preceding area of
the continuum, that of Semi-Efficient Kaldor-Hicks
Accommodations, it was assumed that a firm still benefited from
employing the individual worker with a disability even if it was forced
to take only one out of the potential one-hundred units of profit from
that transaction.531 When that profit is zero or less, i.e., when
employing a person with a disability engenders no profit or even a
negative cost, societal benefits may still be used as an additional
reason to employ that individual because of Kaldor-Hicks concerns.
Recall that under a Kaldor-Hicks regime, a policy is efficient so long
as the winners can in theory, even if not in reality, compensate the
losers.532 Moreover, as the prime vehicle for assessing the costs and
benefits of public policy choices, Kaldor-Hicks allows for involuntary
transfers in the name of efficiency while not requiring that everyone
affected by an action be agreeable to its consequences.533 The key to
utilizing a Kaldor-Hicks model is that, assuming the benefits of a
proposed program outweigh its costs, the policy will be upheld as
valid if it will increase societal well-being.534
As used in the accommodation cost continuum, a Kaldor-Hicks
welfare enhancing policy—as defined by the limits of Pareto
optimality and semi-efficiency—will employ disabled workers who
530. I acknowledge that, from an economic perspective, a plausible argument could be made
that the state ought to similarly compensate employers providing semi-efficient
accommodations who reap less than full profits from their disabled workers. That may be so,
although I argue elsewhere that there are reasons for resisting the reach of subsidies.  Stein,
Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1668–69. In any case, that assertion goes beyond the
province of both the ADA and this Article.
531. In Vande Zande, Judge Posner opined that forcing an employer to bear a marginal loss
could also be reasonable. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“It would not follow . . . that an accomodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the
cost exceeded the benefit however slightly.”). Posner may well be correct, but I have chosen to
draw the line at no profit for prudential reasons.
532. See infra Appendix, Section D. See also Allan M. Feldman, Kaldor-Hicks
Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra
note 259, at 417.
533. Id.
534. DIANA FUGUITT & SHANTON H. WILCOX, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC
SECTOR DECISION-MAKERS 39 (1999); HARRISON, supra note 506, at 34.
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are inefficient for private employers, but who are still socially
efficient. In this circumstance, social efficiency is measured by any net
positive gain to society. Specifically captured by this policy are
disabled workers who can perform productive work through the
provision of unreasonable (or, extra-reasonable) accommodations.535
Many of these individuals are from the group referred to in the
economic literature as members of the “transfer” population,
meaning that they are functionally capable of work (and thus
avoiding welfare dependence), but do not have that opportunity.536
This argument is made more persuasive in light of what Bagenstos has
pointed out, namely that disability policy, qua ADA, was motivated by
the notion of dependence avoidance.537
A Kaldor-Hicks efficient equilibrium posits that the winners be
capable of compensating the loser, but does not require that this
eventuality actually transpire. Nonetheless, as I have briefly argued
elsewhere, the point at which accommodating people with disabilities
is no longer reasonable, but still socially beneficial, is an appropriate
departure point from which to consider state-funded employment
535. This section of the continuum is, in essence, a type of disability accommodation that
both Bagenstos and Wax would advocate, but with a significant variation from the arguments
that each presents. Because he operates within the ADA, Bagenstos does not address
unreasonable accommodations, although his arguments for dependence-avoidance are still
meaningful in this phase of the continuum and I believe he would agree with it. See Bagenstos,
supra note 18, at 1022–26. Wax, on the other hand, does endorse unreasonable accommodations.
However, at least partly as the result of framing her arguments within the ADA, Wax argues for
employers bearing these costs. Wax, supra note 20, at 1425. I diverge from Wax by maintaining
that unreasonable yet socially beneficial accommodation costs ought to be borne by the state,
although given the chance to respond, she might very well agree with that option.
536. See generally John Bound & Richard V. Burkhauser, Economic Analysis of Transfer
Programs Targeted on People with Disabilities, in 3C HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3417
(Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly,
Disability and Work: The Experiences of American and German Men, 2 FED. RES. BANK S.F.
ECON. REV. 17 (1998) (comparing patterns of employment, transfer receipt, and economic well-
being of men with disabilities in the United States and Germany); Matthew Diller, Dissonant
Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal
Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998) (contrasting the divergent policies and
assumptions about the employability of the disabled that underlie the ADA and other federal
disability programs).
537. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 95 (2002) (“[T]he ADA was sold as a way to reduce
governmental expenditures by getting people with disabilities off welfare.”); Bagenstos, supra
note 18, at 1002 (“[I]n the campaign to enact the ADA . . . . the adoption of an independent
living/welfare reform frame served a number of purposes for disability rights leaders.”).
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opportunities through the payment of subsidies to employers.538 By so
advocating, I diverge from other legal commentators who have
endorsed the notion of subsidies, because they do so for the funding of
reasonable accommodations rather than for unreasonable ones.539
Although there are rights-based reasons that can be raised for holding
this position,540 there is also an economic justification (beyond those of
administrative efficacy and cost spreading)541 that suggests that utilizing
regulation instead of tax-and-spend subsidies in the
antidiscrimination field can be more efficient.542 At best, subsidies can
balance out existing market inefficiencies by improving the labor
market participation of a targeted group to a nondiscriminatory
equilibrium. Subsidies will not, however, change the ingrained
negative prejudices that caused those inequities, nor preclude
similarly inefficient practices from repeating in the event that the
subsidies are discontinued.543
Thus, Socially Efficient, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing
Accommodations capture circumstances in which the employer will
not profit from hiring a worker with a disability, but both that worker
and society will. When the societal gain in having a less productive
disabled worker employed exceeds the cost of compensating an
employer for doing so, this section of the continuum will govern
disability accommodations.
538. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1684 (“Providing extra-reasonable
accommodations could overcome existing market inequities borne by the most stigmatized
among the disabled.”).
539. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A
Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 197 (1998); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1969, 2009–13 (1994). For an appraisal of subsidy programs run previously under the
Rehabilitation Act, see Alberto Martini & Sharon Arnold, Programs Providing Subsidized
Employment to Disadvantaged Workers: A Review of their Effectiveness (Mathematica Policy
Research Paper No. 7725-400, Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
540. Briefly stated, funding all disability accommodations by subsidies rather than through
private employers both detracts from the notion of people with disabilities being entitled, as equally
valued human beings, to civil rights, and/or renders those subsidies vulnerable in the future to the
political process. The latter point is underscored within the context of learning disabilities in MARK
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 195–226 (1997).
541. See KELMAN, supra note 371, at 93 (concluding that an ordinary income or excise tax
would be a more efficient means of funding ADA accommodations); Wax, supra note 20, at
1451 (“When putting more disabled persons to work makes economic sense, it may be better to
try to find ways to help employers defray the costs of accomplishing that goal.”).
542. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1684.
543. Id. at 1683–84.
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C. Wholly Inefficient Accommodations
This last section of the accommodation cost continuum, that of
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations, is merely the inverse of the
preceding Kaldor-Hicks Social Welfare Enhancing Accommodations.
When an employee with a disability is unprofitable to the extent that
the social benefit of accommodating her is outweighed by all the
weighted and quantifiable costs of maintaining her in the workplace,
then she should be excluded from the labor market. In this
circumstance, applying a Kaldor-Hicks framework of analysis reaches
the conclusion that general social welfare would be diminished by
employing and/or accommodating this worker. Instead, that person is
an appropriate candidate to be excluded from the workplace through
the receipt of disability-based welfare benefits. Once the costs of
accommodation outweigh the benefits to society, then society would
be made worse off by employing the worker in any capacity. Thus,
even if the worker herself may still be made better off through her
employment, because neither the employer nor society will benefit
financially, the only viable economic option is to exclude her from
workplace opportunity by providing her with social welfare benefits.
Whether society ought to look beyond economics and instead be
motivated by concerns for human dignity and well-being is an
argument that goes beyond the scope of this Article, although one I
would endorse.544
CONCLUSION
To fully pursue further discourse on disability accommodations,
additional empirical research and theoretical thought need to be
given to at least three inquiries. Initially, it is crucial to decide which
people are, or ought to be, considered “disabled” under the ADA.
Although the Supreme Court has decided fourteen ADA cases over
the last four years, the scope of the ADA’s coverage remains unclear.
Knowing who is included in the protected class is fundamental to the
expectations that those individuals, their employers, the judiciary, and
general society will have regarding the duty to provide
accommodations. A clearer understanding of group identity would
544. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity, 27 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 305, 331–32 (2001) (asserting that the historical example of people with severe
disabilities demonstrates the need “to find a reasonable middle way between demeaning
handouts and forced labor”).
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also improve the cohort that economists target when studying post-
ADA employment effects, as well as the actual costs of
accommodations. Without common ground for analysis, econometric
findings lack a basis for meaningful comparison. Second, further
research needs to be conducted into the actual cost of
accommodations. Although reservations should be held about the
results of the handful of existing studies, their findings indicate that
there is a larger story to be investigated. So far, the analyses have
focused on the hard costs of providing or amending the physical work
environment, without also assessing the soft costs incurred by altering
job requirements or methods of administration. At the same time,
very little research has examined the potential benefits that
employers can receive from hiring disabled workers. Regardless of
the effect that these analyses will have on whether accommodations
are viewed as economically net productive for employers, they will
render a more balanced and appropriate calculus. Additionally, a
great deal more thought needs to be given to the problem of how
better to disseminate information about workers with disabilities.
Because employers are not familiar with disabled workers, they may
rely on statistical proxies of productivity that are inaccurate.
Moreover, employers have not generally utilized the existing tax
credits and incentives that could balance out or even exceed
accommodation costs. Properly addressing this information
asymmetry, however, requires engaging the attendant issue of what
transaction costs are incurred in obtaining that information. Doing so
requires that extralegal alternatives also be considered.
The ADA mandates that employers provide “reasonable”
accommodations to “qualified” disabled workers, but it gives little
guidance on how to determine reasonableness. To date, neither
courts nor commentators have articulated a systematic economic
model for analyzing employer-funded ADA accommodation claims.
Similarly, very little has been written on what (if any)
accommodations and/or subsidies society, rather than employers,
ought to support for disabled workers beyond the ADA’s boundaries.
This Article offers an initial law and economics framework for
analyzing both these inquiries by demonstrating how disability-
related accommodations span a cost continuum ranging from the
Wholly Efficient Accommodations (where barring market failure
accommodations are voluntarily provided by employers) to the
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations (where the only economically
feasible option is labor market exclusion and no one ought to provide
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these accommodations). It illustrates how disability-related
accommodations can be thematically organized into areas of
economically viable Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Semi-Efficient
Accommodations (to be funded by employers) and Social Benefit
Gain Kaldor-Hicks Efficient Accommodations (where the costs
should be borne by the public fisc), delineates the boundaries
between each category, and explains why the entities designated
should bear the costs assigned to them. Finally, this Article explores
when disability-related accommodations are totally inefficient and
therefore not viable from even a social benefits perspective.
011204 STEIN.DOC 01/30/04  9:04 AM
2003] DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS 181
APPENDIX: VALUE ASSUMPTIONS
This Appendix sets forth the values used in measuring and
weighting efficiency as part of the accommodation cost continuum
described above.545 Respectively, these are: efficiency, cost-benefit
analysis, Pareto optimality, Kaldor-Hicks welfare enhancement, and
wholly inefficient mandates.
A. Efficiency
A common theme in the law and economics discipline, and one
that is also utilized in this Article, is the focus on achieving the most
“efficient” or optimal outcome, meaning the one having the greatest
utility.546 However, it is in large part differences about how to
determine what solutions are efficient that separates the various
approaches within law and economics.547 Thus, the discipline
encompasses several distinct strands of thought, including
traditionally utilized wealth-maximizing law and economics, and the
historically lesser used, but recently more controversial, welfare
economics.548 It also includes several developing areas of enquiry
within what may be loosely termed “progressive” law and
economics,549 meaning branches of the field that question some of the
accepted underlying assumptions of the discipline550 and seek
545. See supra Part IV.
546. For a general overview of efficiency mechanisms, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (5th ed. 1998).
547. Professors Duncan Kennedy and Mario Rizzo push this assertion further, contending
that methodological approaches can be maneuvered to yield desired outcomes. See Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388–
89 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642–43 (1980).
 548.  See generally Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE
WORLD OF ECONOMICS, supra note 259, at 889; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE (2d ed. 1965). Welfare economics has become controversial
due to the work of Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, as briefly discussed infra note 574.
549. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment, Progressive Law and Economics—And the New
Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 341–42 (1988) (urging “the development of a reformist
law and economics, closely linked to administrative law and based on public finance theory,
public policy analysis, and social choice theory”). This perspective of law and economics
includes Duncan Kennedy’s scholarship, as well as the “liberal” law and economics of
Professors Richard Markovits and Bruce Ackerman that Kennedy criticizes. See Kennedy,
supra note 547 (articulating the weakness of efficiency as a reformist justification).
550. An early, and typically brilliant, take is by (Nobel Prize winner) Amartya Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317
(1977). See also Jeffrey Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
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alternative ways for understanding economic rationality in
human behavior.551
How each branch confronts a given inquiry will depend upon the
relevance and weight that it places on particular preferences as
criteria.552 Thus, Judge Posner’s study of gender implications in the
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1314–25 (1986) (analyzing the validity of the economics
assumptions of self-interest and observable preferences); see generally Nicholas Mercuro &
Steven Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 455, at 65 (arguing that law is
no longer an autonomous discipline but is influenced by a variety of disciplines).
551. These fields include feminist law and economics, notably the work of Professor Gillian
Hadfield, cited infra note 554, as well as those works featured in the publication FEMINIST
ECONOMICS, available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~femec/contents.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and environmental law and economics, see generally
Daniel H. Cole, Environmental Protection and Economic Growth: Lessons from Socialist
Europe, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 455, at 295
(tracing the comparative failure of environmental protection in socialist Europe); Jeff L. Lewin,
Toward a New Ecological Law & Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 455, at 250 (suggesting “the emergence of a new ‘ecological law and
economics’ that will address such issues as ecological scarcity and environmental equity from a
perspective that overcomes the limitations of the neoclassical approach”). Adding to this
scholarship are the interesting and developing fields of behavioral law and economics (which
questions some of the rationality assumptions underlying the traditional discipline). See generally
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) (describing the
role of law in the development of social norms, and socioeconomic law and economics (which
seeks to inject psychological and social factors related to wealth and race into otherwise “neutral”
economic analyses)); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35 (2002) (developing a “belief change” theory of law’s effect on social norms and
preferences); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998) (envisioning how law and economics analysis may be improved by attention to
insight about actual human behavior); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (suggesting that law may be alternatively
conceptualized for its expressive, as well as its traditionally acknowledged enforcement,
functions); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339
(2000) (highlighting the power of the approval or disapproval of law in shaping behavior);
Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1583–1788 (1998) (analyzing the impact on contract
negotiations of negotiator biases for the status quo and inaction, as well as expressive law and
economics (which examines how legal norms can alter social norms)). Referring to themselves as
“the radical middle,” these last scholars are represented by their own section in the American
Association of Law Schools organization and contribute to the publication of the Journal of
Socio-Economics, available at http://www.jrlse.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
552. That this is the case has also led to criticisms of the discipline discussed below.
Conversely, one commentator argues that this flexibility of weighting assumptions can lead to a
more democratic process, at least in the context of administrative agency determinations, when
regulators enunciate their preferences. Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1720 (2002). Abramowicz’s critique was in response
to the position of Cass R. Sunstein, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
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workplace553 is considered deficient by Professor Gillian Hadfield for
not adequately inquiring into the impact on women’s role
determinations of regulating sexuality.554 Moreover, a recent and
growing debate among law and economics practitioners555 has begun
to parallel earlier critiques from those outside the discipline,556
namely, whether morality or fairness (in contrast to pure efficiency) is
at all relevant to economic analysis.557
In presenting a law and economics model for assessing the
reasonableness of ADA accommodations, I have elected to utilize a
cost-benefit analysis and to frame the arguments in terms of
efficiency. I weight all the relevant (and socially acceptable) external
costs and values, while also questioning some of the received
neoclassical assumptions, and so my analysis avoids many of the
criticisms aimed at more traditional economic analyses.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Regardless of the particular approach taken within the available
range of law and economics scholarship, each engages in some form
of cost-benefit analysis. In such a framework, all the positive effects of
any proposed scheme are balanced against all its potential (and
socially acceptable) deficiencies.558 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) itself
has lately come under a good deal of self-evaluation,559 mostly due to
PROTECTION 25–29 (2002), that these determinations ought to be more fluid and less overt. Id.
As such, Abramowicz’s arguments parallel those in this Article.
553. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
554. Gillian K. Hadfield, Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of
Sexual Man, 106 HARV. L. REV. 479, 502–03 (1992) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 553). In a
similar vein, Hadfield takes to task the circular reasoning used by those law and economics
scholars who explain gender wage differentials by reference to the historical household
structure without also questioning the existence of this arrangement. Gillian K. Hadfield,
Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J.
89, 89–90 (1993).
555. This is addressed, both in the context of cost-benefit analysis, infra Appendix, Section B,
as well as in the discussion of the Semi-Efficient segment of the continuum, supra Part IV.B.1.
556. See, e.g., supra note 189. It should be mentioned that those scholars outside the
discipline also call into question the morality of the whole enterprise.
557. For two strong examples of this analysis, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of
Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1007–08 (2000),
and Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 189, at 135.
558. However, deficiencies which accord weight to socially unacceptable values are not
included in the evaluations. See supra note 281.
559. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41–42 (2d
ed. 1997); POSNER, supra note 546, at § 1.2 (defining the economic concepts of value, utility and
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its professed goal of wealth maximization.560 This is especially so
because of its agnostic acceptance of efficiency as a leitmotif
irrespective of moral determinants. In addition, there are three main
objections to CBA: income distribution, discounting, and moral
shortcomings.561
One objection to CBA is that it weighs all money equally,
whereas not every person does so.562 A very wealthy person, for
instance, would value each additional dollar less due to diminishing
returns. As a result, in CBA, the interests of the wealthy are arguably
given greater preference than those people who are less wealthy.563
The uneven nature of income distribution and its effects upon
determining efficiency564 are particularly clear in instances involving
“environmental justice.”565 Although placing a toxic waste site in a
wealthy neighborhood would engender a $20 million loss of property
values, placing the same dump in a poor neighborhood might only
cause a loss of $5 million. Although the waste dump poses an equal
burden in the form of abrogating personal preferences to all citizens,
according to CBA, placing it in the rich neighborhood is inefficient.566
efficiency); ZERBE, supra note 359, at 14–33 (suggesting principles to provide an ethical basis
for cost-benefit analysis); Robert Frank, Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 280, at 93–94 (utilizing moral theory to understand objections to cost-benefit analysis).
560. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?,
98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 596 (1985) (“Being ‘assigned’ a right on efficiency grounds . . . hardly
satisfies the particular human need that can be met only by a shared social and legal
understanding that the right belongs to the individual because . . . it [is] organically and
historically a part of the person that she is . . . .”).
561. Frank, supra note 559, at 77–81.
562. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 224 (1999).
563. This criticism of the compensating variable (CV) test provides much of the inspiration
for the call that CV’s, which are based on willingness to pay (WTP) calculations, be replaced
with a measure of welfare equivalence (WE). Id.; Frank, supra note 559, at 80–81.
564. Beyond wealth concerns, there are also (related) issues of power distribution. See
generally Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 431 (1994) (recognizing the existence of distributional inequalities and suggesting
administrative approaches in the context of environmental justice).
565. See generally Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1995).
566. Because the less wealthy individuals on the “losing” end of this equation frequently
tend to be minorities, this phenomenon is also referred to by some advocates as “environmental
racism.” See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 119–
20 (1996) (arguing that the disproportionate land use in poor and minority communities stems
from cultural conditions sustaining wealth inequalities). For a discussion of income disparity in
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Thus, the optimal CBA result would be to locate toxic sites in poor
neighborhoods, even if, to achieve this result, enough funds were
transferred to the poor population to make such
determination palatable.567
A second criticism of CBA is that it values the present at the
expense of the future by utilizing a discount rate.568 Money is worth
less in the future than it is now due to inflation. The use of a discount
rate (five percent is standard) can have profound effects. A $10
million investment today to halt $1 billion in far-off future pollution
damage would be considered uneconomical.569 The objection raised to
CBA in this context is that it is fixated on the present, hence
mortgaging future needs and benefits.570 But this need not always be
the case. Suppose, for example, that the United States sold the Grand
Canyon to Japan for $30 billion. Many might argue that in doing so
the federal government has discounted the benefits that future
generations would enjoy from having it under American control. But
such an argument is highly dependent upon what is done with the
proceeds. If they were dissipated through one long nationwide party,
then that argument would hold true. On the other hand, if those funds
were invested in biomedical research that ultimately finds cures for
cancer, AIDS, or other feared maladies, then future generations
might well be happy with the decision to trade in one asset
for another.
economic analysis, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Entitlement and Contract, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 455, at 221.
567. Of course, not everyone perceives this as a negative or undesirable result. See, e.g., Jill
E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 1219 (1998) (objecting to the inclusion of “environmental racism” in the
environmental justice movement); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate
Impact Suits (Environmental Racism), 34 GA. L. REV. 1155 (2000) (“Decisions that have
disparate racial effects . . . unlike intentionally discriminatory decisions, are not always
undesirable. . . .”).
568. Frank, supra note 559, at 79–80; Derek Parfit, The Social Discount Rate, in POLITICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 572–78 (Robert E. Goodwin ed., 1994); see also Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 950–51 (1999) (chronicling the debate over discounting future lives saved
with respect to asbestos regulation).
569. If a billion dollar loss in today’s monetary values will not occur for another one
hundred years, then at a 5 percent discount rate society should not spend $10 million today to
prevent it. 1 billion/ 1.05100 equals roughly $7.6 million. In Revesz’s example, the OMB
discounted the value of a human life saved in ten years to just over $22,000. Id. at 951.
570. Carried out to its most extreme implication, the discount rate devalues future human
lives saved. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999) (challenging the
use of discounting in the valuation of future lives).
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The third, and most significant criticism of CBA, is that in
assessing efficiency it does not take into account questions of
morality.571 As Judge Posner has pointed out with typical frankness,
many socially undesirable results––for example, suicide pacts or baby
selling––are not necessarily inefficient;572 Professor Steven Shavell has
even explicated the logical efficacy of selling one’s immediately
unneeded organs.573 Thus, a typical CBA will not filter out those
assumptions that are less fair than others. Nor does CBA itself
provide normative guidance. The exclusion of any consideration of
morality (expressed in terms of fairness) as a variable is at the center
of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s controversial work.574 They
argue that fairness should never trump social welfare (efficiency)
when deciding upon legal rules, because utilizing a fairness
justification may make everyone worse off.575 Kaplow and Shavell use
the alternative tort liability theories of negligence and strict liability
as an example which applies equally to everyone. Strict liability may
increase social welfare, and yet due to concerns with fairness,
negligence is used.576
571. See generally Nussbaum, supra note 557.
572. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 927, 928
(1988) (“Abrogating the laws against selling babies for adoption would reduce, not increase, the
price that adoptive parents must pay to acquire a child.”); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of
the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 71–72 (1987) (noting that adoption today is “baby
selling,” and “the question of public policy is not whether baby selling should be forbidden or
allowed but how extensively it should be regulated”). Always a fluid thinker, Judge Posner’s
more recent work has taken greater account of social norms. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Social
Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553,
564–65 (1998) (embracing a rational choice approach to norms as a component of law and
economics).
573. Steven Shavell, Why Not Sell Organs?, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at A22.
574. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
967–68 (2001) (published in book form as LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE (2002)) (“Notions of fairness . . . should receive no independent weight in
the assessment of legal rules.”). The responses, sometimes emotional, arise from scholars who
would not accept a legal regime lacking moral values. See, e.g., David Dolinko, The Perils of
Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 393 (2002) (objecting that Kaplow and Shavell fail
to “resolve this issue of whether the challenge arises from doubts about . . . philosophical
propriety ” or issues arising from “government basing its special actions on those notions”);
Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 847 (2002) (arguing that fairness ultimately determines policy outcomes, even if welfare
economics is applied); Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992
(2002) (advocating a role for fairness in setting the appropriate values for costs and benefits).
575. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 574, at 1011.
576. Id. at 967.
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Since everyone is made worse off in certain circumstances, a
proposition that flies against the Pareto principle, Kaplow and Shavell
argue that fairness is not a useful policymaking tool.577 By contrast,
Professor Howard Chang asserts that fairness and the Pareto
principle are not mutually exclusive.578 A fairness theory can comply
with the Pareto theory because weight can be given to individuals’
preferences.579 Chang’s argument makes sense because fairness is also
something which can be valued in terms of well-being. Chang also
indirectly addresses other strikes against CBA, arguing that people
are not always able to measure utility due to the lack and cost of
information.580 Fairness in such a case makes for an attractive
decisionmaking tool.581 Of course it can be argued in reply, and
Kaplow and Shavell do so, that there are innumerable theories of
fairness that can be applied, whereas the notion of efficiency is much
better defined, and hence predictable.582
Ultimately, as Professors Mathew Adler and Eric Posner have
pointed out, CBA is merely a tool and can include whatever values a
policymaker chooses.583 As such, CBA can be applied to different
circumstances and, depending upon the values sought by the person
applying CBA, to many different ends.584
C. Pareto Optimality
Despite the growing debate about the role of fairness, the least
controversial law and economics scheme is that of Pareto optimality,
wherein no one can be made better off without anyone being made
worse off.585 The Pareto measure, however, is rarely acceptable as a
policymaker’s lone decision making tool, because Pareto optimality
577. See id. at 1015 (“[L]ogical consistency requires that one can give no weight in
normative analysis to notions of fairness because doing so entails the contrary proposition that
sometimes it is normatively desirable to adopt a policy that makes everyone worse off.”).
578. See generally Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility,
and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000).
579. Id. at 233–34.
580. Id. at 230–32.
581. Id. at 230–31.
582. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 574, at 1306–14.
583. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 280, at 270.
584. See generally Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001).
585. See supra Part IV.A.
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denies interpersonal connections of welfare, and thus involuntary
transfers. For example, one rich individual’s $100 loss could preclude
vast wealth increases for a million starving destitutes. Because in
reality, a proposed policy rarely has no economic losers, Pareto CBA
is rarely the sole device used for social planning.
D. Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancement
Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, a policy is efficient so long as the
“winners” (meaning those benefiting from the policy change) could
theoretically compensate the “losers” (i.e., those individuals for
whom the policy change engenders a detriment).586 Kaldor-Hicks is
the principal method of CBA, at least so far as public policy decisions
are concerned, because it allows for involuntary transfers in the name
of efficiency and also does not require that everyone affected by an
action be agreeable to its consequences.587 Accordingly, Kaldor-Hicks
welfare enhancing solutions are usually promulgated through
governmental action, especially via administrative agencies.588
Utilizing a Kaldor-Hicks model, the costs and benefits of a
proposed program are weighed, and the policy is accepted if it will
increase societal well-being.589 Achievement of this goal is determined
by whether there has been “wealth-maximizing,” meaning an increase
in “wealth” or “value” as units of measurement.590 Because the
desirability of results are critiqued on individuals’ ability to pay (and
586. See Feldman, supra note 532, at 417.
587. For very different perspectives on the import of this loss of autonomy, compare
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 94–95 (1981), with Jules L. Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 534–40 (1980).
588. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A
Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 441–45 (1996)
(suggesting that rational choice theory, which dictates how much deference the Supreme Court
gives to lower court administrative decisions, enables the Court to shape regulatory policy);
Posner, supra note 584, at 1138 (demonstrating “a trend toward greater recognition of cost-
benefit analysis among the circuit courts as an appropriate and possibly even necessary part of
the regulatory process”); see also Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on “Understanding Pennzoil
v. Texaco”: Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REV. 335, 364 (1996)
(proposing that, because agency problems often impede settlement for large corporations
engaged in complex litigation, in-house counsel should intervene to help senior management
control these problems).
589. Thus, the significance of how CBA ought to be utilized is discussed in the repartee
between Sunstein and Abramowicz, supra note 552.
590. Although from a technical point of view, Kaldor-Hicks and wealth maximization need
not be the same. A very concise treatment of Kaldor-Hicks is provided in JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 33–35 (1995).
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thus potentially compensate those who “lose”), Kaldor-Hicks has
been criticized as an insufficient surrogate for utility, particularly
when applied to individual, rather than to systemically-based,
transactions.591 As used in the proposed framework, Kaldor-Hicks
welfare enhancing policies have two variations.
Under a Semi-Efficient scheme, an accommodation would bring
about a Semi-Efficient state if both the disabled worker and the
employer benefit, but, in this case, the employer’s benefits are less
than optimal. In this regard it is similar to Pareto in that both
involved parties gain and are placed in net positive positions.
However, it differs from Pareto in that, in a Pareto optimal state, the
employer would receive as much benefit by employing the disabled
worker as he would by employing a (fungible) nondisabled worker.
With a Semi-Efficient Accommodation, the employer still achieves a
net positive profit position, but his profits are less than they would be
had he employed an equivalent nondisabled employee.592 Hence,
within the Semi-Efficient state, there exists a range of profit-capturing
transactions, from slightly less than full profit to slightly more than no
profit. Related to the issue of where to draw the line on
reasonableness are two issues: first, the extent to which (if at all)
accommodations effectuate equality, rather than distribution; and
second, the cross-dynamic of an employer repeatedly providing
accommodations, and how this affects the extent to which
profitability ought to be compromised. As shown in Part IV,593 the
Semi-Efficient phase is uniquely modulated to ADA
accommodations.
The second part is Social Benefit Gain efficient, which operates
outside the boundaries of the ADA as defined by the limits of Pareto
and Semi-Efficiency, to employ disabled workers who are inefficient
for private employers but still socially efficient.594 In this circumstance,
591. Id. at 34. Harrison offers the following hypothetical:
[S]uppose two individuals—one rich and one poor—both desire a gallon of milk. The
poor person wants it desperately and is willing to give his or her last dollar for the
milk. On the other hand, the rich person does not care for the milk but thinks it
would be fun to . . . pour the milk into a storm drain and, therefore, is willing to pay
$1.50 for the milk. Under wealth maximization principles, the efficient allocation is to
the rich person.
Id.
592. Put another way, the Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum is neither Pareto optimal,
wholly efficient, or Kaldor-Hicks, and therefore needs to be cataloged and dealt with separately.
593. See supra Part IV.B.1.
594. See supra Part IV.C.
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social efficiency is measured by any net positive gain to society.595
Captured by this policy are disabled workers who can perform
productive work through the provision of unreasonable
accommodations.596
E. Wholly Inefficient Mandates
When the costs of employing a worker with a disability exceed
any net positive gain to society relative to the costs of providing for
the worker through the social welfare system, these accommodations
result in socially inefficient mandates. While an illustration of how a
hypothetical worker with a disability would, in practice, fall within
this sphere is provided below,597 it bears noting at this juncture that
the phenomenon of disabled employment being socially inefficient
raises two important issues.
First, where does a policymaker draw the line between Kaldor-
Hicks welfare enhancement and a socially inefficient
accommodation? As shown in Part II.B.3, two commentators portray
disability-related employment as a means of avoiding dependence,
although neither provide a formula for predicting when a given
worker reaches this level or, because they operated from the ADA,
how far society ought to go (if at all) in this respect. The formula
provided for determining socially inefficient mandates offers one
solution to this dilemma.598
The second connected issue, and one that goes beyond the scope
of summary mention, is one that has been raised in economic analyses
led by Professors Marjorie Baldwin599 and Richard Burkhauser:600
whether people with disabilities are expected to work after the ADA.
Baldwin asserts that Title I is unlikely to bring about a substantial
increase in the employment rates of workers with disabilities because
the ADA does not adequately take into account the influence of
595. See generally DIANA FUGUITT & SHANTON J. WILCOX, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR
PUBLIC SECTOR DECISION MAKERS (1999).
596. See infra Appendix, Section E.
597. See supra Part IV.B.
598. See supra Part IV.C.
599. Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37 (1997); William G. Johnson & Marjorie Baldwin, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Will It Make a Difference?, 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 775 (1993).
600. Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?,
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71 (1997).
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prejudice.601 Burkhauser criticizes the ADA’s lack of conjoined work
initiatives by contrasting various European policies directed toward
“transferring” people with disabilities from social welfare networks
into the workforce.602 Burkhauser also points out that the success of
these initiatives correlates directly to the degree that any given
national policy provides incentives for, or harbors expectations about,
participation in the workplace by individuals with disabilities.603
Although their arguments bring into question issues that are also
beyond the scope of this Article,604 the assertions they make will help
lend insight into how far accommodations beyond the ADA’s scope
ought to go.605
601. Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Dispelling the Myths About Work
Disability, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 39 (Terry Thomason et
al. eds., 1998).
602. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, Disability and Work: The Experiences of
American and German Men, 2 FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. REV. 17 (1998); Richard V.
Burkhauser & Petri Hirvonen, United States Disability Policy in a Time of Economic Crisis: A
Comparison with Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 MILBANK Q. 166 (1989).
603. Richard V. Burkhauser, Policies to Make Work Pay for People with Disabilities, in
GROWTH IN DISABILITY BENEFITS: EXPLANATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Kalman
Rupp & David C. Stapleton eds., 1998); Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, U.S. Disability
Policy in a Changing Environment, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 213 (2002); Richard V. Burkhauser et
al., How People with Disabilities Fare when Public Policies Change, 12 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 251 (1993).
604. Most prominently, the impact that factors exogenous to the statute have on its efficacy.
To give just a few examples, these include the absence of job training programs and incentives
for those with disabilities comparable to those directed at other groups historically dependent
on public assistance, the lack of Department of Justice or EEOC enforcement funding, and the
absence (until 2000) of a health insurance provision. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note
22, at 1684–87. For detailed econometric studies demonstrating these effects, see generally
Burkhauser & Stapleton, supra note 333.
605. See supra Part IV.C.
